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I. INTRODUCTION
Admittedly, the first analytic forays into popular legal culture,' espe-
cially including research on law and film, 2 did not initially make much of a
dent in American legal scholarship. One law professor, Kenneth Lasson of
the University of Baltimore, even expressed skepticism regarding the intel-
lectual value of such research on the basis of the title of one published essay
in the field.3 Lasson, himself the author of an oddly titled law book, Mouse-
traps and Muffling Cups, inspired another law review essayist, Oklahoma
City attorney Michael D. McClintock, to adopt an equivalently shorthand
approach, questioning the value of research into American legal culture sim-
ply by reproducing Lasson's original list of presumably dopey article titles.
The sarcasm of Lasson and McClintock's writing style appeared to eclipse
the sincerity of their argument.
Where Lasson had adroitly removed author information, McClintock
deleted entire citations, making it impossible for readers to decide for them-
+ At the author's request, Nova Law Review has retained the informal essay format of
this article and thus deviated from standard procedure with regard to providing sources for
each of the textual references employed.
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
1. See, e.g., Anthony Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 Wis. L.
REV. 527 (1986); Anthony Chase, Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass Media
Portrayals of American Attorneys, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 281 (1986).
2. See Anthony Chase, An Obscure Scandal of Consciousness, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
105 (1988).
3. Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure,
103 HARV. L. REv. 926, 930-31 (1990). Lasson's essay is routinely cited for the proposition
that legal scholarship is partly a consequence of pressure to obtain academic tenure, though so
mundane a fact was no doubt appreciated by most of those reading what Lasson wrote before-
hand. The real trick is to take the next step and provide a socioeconomic explanation of why
law schools were integrated into institutions (universities) which required academic scholar-
ship of legal professionals in the first place. See Anthony Chase, The Legal Scholar as Pro-
ducer, 13 NoVA L. REV. 57, 65 (1988).
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selves whether the suspect titles had been drawn from articles worth read-
ing.4 But good things come to those, including Lasson and McClintock, who
wait, and a confluence of factors ranging from the dramatic rise of culture
studies within the late-twentieth century American college curriculum
through the ubiquity of legal culture in American society have, after almost
two decades, brought the study of law and popular culture into legal acade-
mia's mainstream.5 "Mass-mediated images," argue Austin Sarat, Lawrence
Douglas, and Martha Merrill Umphrey, "are as powerful, pervasive, and im-
portant as are other early twenty-first-century social forces-for example,
globalization, neo-colonialism, and human rights-in shaping and transform-
ing legal life."6 This realization seems to have taken hold both inside and
outside law schools.
Published in 2002, Movies on Trial: The Legal System on the Silver
Screen7 illustrates one way of approaching legal culture, giving special focus
to different cinematic genres dealing with law and lawyers.8 Therein the
reader will find, for example, a brief discussion of why there have been so
few motion pictures and television series based upon the workings of the
United States Supreme Court or devoted to an exploration of constitutional
law and practice. But there has developed an important if carefully circum-
scribed narrative tradition in both fiction and film dealing with the American
Revolution, an event from which constitution-making in the United States is
inseparable, as well as with the historical context within which the origins of
American constitutional government must be situated.9
The same holds true for France. While French cinema has rarely given
focus to French appellate practice or constitutional decision-making, the
French Revolution has been a popular subject of French movies and mass
entertainment. As a companion piece to what has already been written about
the popular culture of the American Revolution, this essay confronts one of
the ways the French Revolution has been portrayed in French motion pic-
4. Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An
Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659, 674 (1998).
5. See, e.g., LEGAL REELISM: MOVIES AS LEGAL TEXTS (John Denvir ed., 1996); PAUL
BERGMAN & MICHAEL AsIMOw, REEL JUSTICE: THE COURTROOM GOES TO THE MOVIES
(1996); LAW AND FILM (Stefan Machura & Peter Robson eds., 2001); STEVE GREENFIELD ET
AL., FILM AND THE LAW (2001); RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING
LINE BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE (2000); MICHAEL ASIMOW & SHANNON MADER,
LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE (2004).
6. LAW ON THE SCREEN I (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2005).
7. See ANTHONY CHASE, MOVIES ON TRIAL: THE LEGAL SYSTEM ON THE SILVER SCREEN
(2002).
8. Id. at 35-66.
9. Id.
[Vol. 30:2:209
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tures and suggests that interpretation of such "mass-mediated images" can
help shed light on the fundamental character of French law and politics.
II. END OF AN AFFAIR?
The U.S.-French relationship has, of course, become enormously con-
troversial since the French failed to support the United States in its decision
to invade Iraq in 2003. At one level, the dispute between the two countries is
said to turn on a sharp divide over the relationship between the Iraq war, the
United Nations, and international law. On this view, the French are made
uncomfortable by the Bush administration's embrace of a unilateralist policy
in foreign affairs, especially including the invasion of Iraq, and by the two
nations' contrary views of how international law should be applied to the
circumstances of Iraq's alleged efforts to develop weapons of mass destruc-
tion, and its relationship to international terrorism.
With respect to the first issue, I have elsewhere sought to show that
claims of a new unilateralism in American foreign policy are greatly exag-
gerated.1° And the United States has pursued a self-interested foreign policy
quite consistently since the end of the Second World War. It would, for ex-
ample, be silly to argue that America's war in Vietnam was somehow less
"unilateral" than the recent invasion of Iraq. As to the second issue, how
international law should be applied to American conduct, I have also sought
elsewhere to demonstrate that international law has in common with other
kinds of law a certain flexibility which permits arguments to be marshaled-
and marshaled convincingly-on both sides of most major international dis-
putes, including the Iraq war." Both the United States and France, their dip-
lomats and lawyers, understand this and are well aware of the fact that legal
arguments are not at the heart of the friction between the two nations over
Iraq.
While it is true that the United Nations Security Council did not sanc-
tion the United States' use of military force against Saddam Hussein in 2003
(in contrast to the Gulf War of 1990-91), the U.N. also failed to approve the
use of military force by NATO in Bosnia to combat the "ethnic cleansing"
practiced by Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian regime-and in that instance, the
French not only approved the use of force but were themselves participants
in its deployment. The lack of correspondence between NATO's use of
force in Bosnia and what Secretary General Kofi Annan refers to as the
10. Anthony Chase, Some Realism About Unilateralism, 28 NOVA L. REV. 631 (2004).
11. Anthony Chase, Marxism and International Law, Historical Materialism (forthcom-
ing 2006).
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"U.N. paradigm" did not trouble the French when the human rights of Alba-
nian Kosovars were on the line.
To be sure, American pundits like Ann Coulter are quick to assert that
the real difference between the United States and France is simply that
Americans have the backbone to stand up for liberty and the French do not.
12
With regard to President Ronald Reagan's bombing of Tripoli, for example,
in an effort to discourage Libya's sponsorship of terrorism, the French did
not, in Coulter's view, rise to the occasion. "Quaking in the face of
[Reagan's] show of manly force," she writes, "France denied America the
use of its airspace. As a consequence, American pilots were required to be-
gin their missions from airbases in Britain."' 3 Nevertheless, some important
facts are omitted from Coulter's rendition of events. Neither France's air-
space in the bombing of Tripoli, nor its Security Council vote in the United
Nations at the time of the Iraq invasion were even important to the success of
American military operations, let alone essential to them.
It was a very different story in Vietnam, however, when France's own
war was very much in doubt and the United States held all the cards. For-
eign correspondent John Newhouse records that in April 1954, the position
of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu was hopeless. "By then, [the U.S.
Navy's] Admiral Radford had reported the conclusion of an 'advance study
group' in the Pentagon: 'Three tactical A-weapons, properly employed,
would be sufficient to smash the Vietminh effort there.""' 14 The Vietminh
was the fighting force assembled by Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese com-
munists, under the leadership of General Vo Nguyen Giap, for the purpose of
resisting a continuation of French colonial domination in Southeast Asia. "In
Paris," continues Newhouse, "the French military were counting on Ameri-
can military intervention, which alone could head off the loss of their colony.
Radford, they felt, had promised aerial strikes against enemy positions."' 5
The air strikes were not forthcoming, nor were the three tactical nuclear
weapons the Pentagon's "advance study group" rather optimistically pre-
dicted could eliminate the Vietnamese resistance. 6 Nor was a miracle that
the French suffered one of the most humiliating military defeats in their na-
12. Ann Coulter, Attack France!, TOWNHALL.COM, Dec. 20, 2001, http://www.townhall.
com/opinion/columns/anncoulter/2001/12/20/161943.htmil.
13. Id.
14. JOHN NEWHOUSE, WAR AND PEACE I' THE NUCLEAR AGE 100 (1989) (quoting DAVID
ALAN STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLmCS: WHY THE REAGEN REVOLUTION FAILED 380
(1986)).
15. Id. (citation omitted).
16. Id.
[Vol. 30:2:209
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tional history at the hands of the communists at Dien Bien Phu.17 Ironically,
the United States itself, twenty years later, would suffer military defeat when
confronted with these same tenacious Vietnamese patriots. But the point to
be made here is that France could certainly be forgiven for feeling "be-
trayed" by an America unwilling to fight or, at least, unwilling to fight when
French national pride hung in the balance in Southeast Asia.
At times France has come to the aid of the United States (e.g., Lafayette
during the Revolution) and at times Americans have fought to save France
(as in World War II); there have also been times when each nation pursued a
course of action that bitterly disappointed the other. So what is the current
falling out between America and France actually about? In the wake of an
obviously acrimonious United Nations debate between the two countries in
2003, a series of bitter tracts have appeared, each entry in the line claiming a
fundamental irreconcilability between American and French interests, each
failing to identify the historical terrain on which fundamental differences
invariably are fought out, substituting a list of carefully selected events-
especially recent ones-which obviously fortify rather than subvert their
main line of argument. 8 Such pop comparative history or jerry-rigged inter-
national relations theory is of little lasting value.
III. READING HISTORY
There are fundamental differences between French and American po-
litical histories and cultures, but they are not likely to be rationally explored
in books ready-made for an anti-French (or anti-Frenchfries) American read-
ing public whose prejudices seem easily enflamed by publishing houses
looking for a fast buck, occasionally willing to stoke any xenophobic bonfire.
Until the last two decades of the twentieth century, a familiar debate in the
social sciences turned on the issue of American Exceptionalism.1 9 It is, to be
sure, beyond dispute that since the arrival in New England of white European
settlers in the seventeenth century, Americans had regarded themselves as
somehow politically and spiritually unique, destined to forge not simply a
17. See id. at 99-100.
18. See, e.g., JOHN J. MILLER & MARK MOLESKY, OUR OLDEST ENEMY: A HISTORY OF
AMERICA'S DISASTROUS RELATIONSHIP WITH FRANCE (2004); KENNETH R. TIMMERMAN, THE
FRENCH BETRAYAL OF AMERICA (2004); RICHARD Z. CHESNOFF, THE ARROGANCE OF THE
FRENCH: WHY THEY CAN'T STAND US-AND WHY THE FEELING IS MUTUAL (2005); DENIS
BOYLES, VILE FRANCE: FEAR, DUPLICITY, COWARDICE AND CHEESE (2005).
19. See, e.g., DAVID W. NOBLE, DEATH OF A NATION: AMERICAN CULTURE AND THE END
OF EXCEPTIONALISM (2002); CHARLES LOCKHART, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM:
HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE (2003); Is AMERICA DIFFERENT? A NEW LOOK AT
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (Byron E. Shafer ed., 1991).
2006]
7
: Nova Law Review 30, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LAWREVIEW
new nation but an original genus of civilization, a kind of new harmony out
of the transatlantic wilderness. 20 But just how accurate was this national self-
perception? Has it survived intact into the twentieth-century world of indus-
trial development and economic underdevelopment, technological invention
and military intervention, violence and war? And what concrete conse-
quences has it had for politics and society?
Does it, for example, explain why, in Werner Sombart's phrase, "There
is No Socialism in the United States? '21 While many political historians and
social commentators used the concept of American exceptionalism to explain
why neither socialism nor Marxism enjoyed the sort of intellectual credibility
or popular embrace in America that they had achieved in Europe by the end
of the Second World War, the decades following the elections of Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the international export (and not just to
Western Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union) of Reaganomics or, later,
neoclassical laissez faire and globalization, seemed to render the differences
between the United States and Europe, which had appeared in such sharp
outline as recently as the Euro-Communist bid for power in Italy and France,
much less visible. The rise of southern rim (or sunbelt) states (and their eco-
nomic power bases, including military bases) in the United States-and the
Californiaization (as some called it) of America-only foreshadowed a
seemingly unstoppable Americanization of Europe. The more Europe was
like the United States, the less exceptional America would inevitably be-
come.
22
So if the United States and Europe, including France, are more and
more like each other, at least in the grand scale of things, why should the
United States and France have such a bitter falling out now? Another way of
asking this question is to inquire why, with Europe so far along the road of
unification, with all that means, should France, in 2005, vote against Euro-
pean constitutionalism in a much-watched national referendum, thus veering
off the main highway onto a side trip of its own? And why should the Neth-
erlands, for that matter, wish to join France, breaking out of the pack to chart
another stray national itinerary? Amsterdam and Paris would appear, almost
single-handedly, to have dynamited Europe's road to utopia--symbolized
first and foremost by the American-style economic prosperity promised by
the European Union's bureaucratic ruling elite in Brussels.
20. See DEBORAH L. MADSEN, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (1998).
21. WERNER SOMBART, WHY Is THERE No SOCIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES? 23 (C.T.
Husbands ed., Patricia M. Hocking & C.T. Husbands trans., Int'l Arts & Sciences Press, Inc.
1976) (1906).
22. See MIKE DAVIS, PRISONERS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (1986).
[Vol. 30:2:209
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An acute observation on the outcome of the 2005 European constitu-
tional referendum provides us with a useful key to understanding more than
just the Franco-Dutch shredding of the Europeans Unions' vaunted roadmap.
According to Jean-Christophe Cambad6lis, a French Deputy from Paris'
nineteenth arrondissement, the no vote represented "la victoire posthume de
Georges Marchais sur Frangois Mitterrand. '23 Georges Marchais, general
secretary of the French Communist Party for twenty-two years (1972-94),
and Francois Mitterand, leader of the Socialist Party in France and president
of the country for a key decade-and-a-half (1981-95), are indeed both dead.
But Cambadelis sees the French rejection of E.U. constitutionalism as a
postmortem victory for Marchais in the sense that Marchais not only boister-
ously opposed Mitterand's efforts to reconcile a tepid socialism with free-
market capitalism during the Reagan years but also vigorously countered
Mitterand's love affair with the Common Market and its successor, the
European Economic Community, with a deeply French version of what
Benedetto, Browne, and Quaglia label "Euroscepticism. ' 24
In spite of the fact that the two most successful political parties in recent
French national elections represented the center-right and the far-right, the
French left still has sufficient political clout to throw a roadblock onto the
Autobahn, so to speak, the fast track to one Europe. It is that same left which
is today even more skeptical of America than of Europe and firmly plants its
feet in the soil rather than being dragged along on elite projects like the crea-
tion of a single state in Europe or a single definition of freedom, imposed by
American militarism, around the world. And this explains much of French
hostility to America's Middle Eastern ambitions. To the consternation of
pro-American right-wing political philosophers who have come to dominate
the French intellectual scene in the past couple of decades, French conserva-
tives, not least of all President Jacques Chirac, often publicly and dramati-
cally opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 as well.
But just as the conservatives alone could not persuade the French to
rubber stamp the E.U. Constitution, they could not have placed France in so
prominent a position of resistance to American foreign policy as has been the
case since the U.N. Security Council debacle of 2003. But if the enduring
23. Posting of Jean-Christophe Cambad6lis to Journal d'un Chou,
http://chourka.canalblog.com/archives/2005/05/31 (May 31, 2005, 08:47 CET); Posting of
Isabelle Mandraud to Bella Ciao, http://bellaciao.org/fr/article.php3?idarticle=15691 (May
31, 2005, 00:03 CET). For an excellent analysis of the larger causes of France's resounding
"Non," see Robin Blackburn, Capital and Social Europe, 34 NEw LEFT REV. 87 (2005).
24. GIACOMO BENEDETTO ET AL., EUROSCEPTICISM AMONG WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST
PARTIES IN FRANCE, SPAIN AND ITALY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2004), available at
http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2004/benedetto.pdf.
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left-wing quality of French political culture helps explain the tension be-
tween an increasingly conservative America25 and France today, what ex-
plains this "path-dependency ' 26 of French politics, this habitual adherence to
a dialectical field of political (and social) conflict within which the left looms
large-before, during, and after the Soviet experiment in Russia? Political
scientist Mark Lilla, in an insightful essay comparing Anglo-American and
Continental philosophical traditions, argues that there has been a sharp divide
between the two approaches and asserts that "[t]he estrangement of political
philosophy in the two traditions had . . . concrete causes." Those causes
were, says Lilla, "not surprisingly, political. 27
In other words, the chasm separating American and European, espe-
cially French (in Lilla's critique), political philosophy reflected, in fact, a
concrete and decisive separation between American and French political
history and social experience, not just philosophy. That conflict emerged
most clearly from the French Revolution forward. "French political debate
in the nineteenth century," claims Lilla, following the work of noted French
historian, Frangois Furet, "devolved into contentious struggles over the revo-
lutionary heritage that largely excluded the kind of liberal politics that devel-
oped in England and America. '28 How could contrasting perspectives on the
French Revolution shape French philosophy, indeed French politics, decade
in and decade out, from the Revolution to the present, long after the Revolu-
tion itself was consigned to dusty textbooks in dilapidated libraries and mu-
seums? To be sure, observes Lilla, the "Revolution was over. But to those
intellectuals for whom the Revolution was an eternal process, ever to be ex-
tended and reconceived ... the Revolution was internationalized, with the
French Communist Party (PCF) and the Soviet Union now serving as honor-
ary sans-culottes. "29 While, to be sure, the Soviet Union is no longer and the
PCF and the French left are alive and well (as the E.U. constitutional refer-
endum made transparent), it is to the theory and practice of the French left
which, in effect, Mark Lilla opposes the contemporary practice of American
politics and imperial outreach. Thus, in an attempt to come to terms with the
contemporary relationship between the United States and France, between
French law and politics and America's version of the same institutions and
25. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION:
CONSERVATIVE POWER IN AMERICA (2005).
26. W1KIPEDIA, PATH DEPENDENCE, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathdependence (last
visited Feb. 8, 2006).
27. Mark Lilla, The Legitimacy of the Liberal Age, in NEW FRENCH THOUGHT: POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 3, 3 (Mark Lilla ed., 1994).
28. Id. at7.
29. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 30:2:209
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systems, we can reasonably begin by taking a closer look at the French
Revolution--especially at how it has been represented in French popular
culture.
IV. THE GREAT REVOLUTION
Italian filmmaker, Roberto Rossellini, once remarked that Karl Marx
dreamed of a society without classes and without government, the very ideals
of the American Revolution. One might ask whose American Revolution did
Rossellini have in mind? That of the New England merchants or Boston's
poor? Of Alexander Hamilton or Tom Paine? Just as the premier Russian
movie director, Sergei Eisenstein, never managed to make a film out of Marx
Capital, a project on which he had set his sights for years, Rossellini failed to
get around to making a movie about the American Revolution. Others did,
however, as mentioned above, though perhaps fewer in number than one
might expect. The French Revolution, by contrast, has attracted novelists
and filmmakers like flies.
Will it continue to do so? Sociologist Barrington Moore, writing during
the decade of the 1960s, placed the Bolshevik Revolution in a direct line of
descent from the French.30 As Mark Lilla suggests, it is well known that
debates within modem French historiography over the revolution of 1789,
the "Great Revolution," have often been nothing more than arguments cam-
ouflaging bitter disagreement over socialism, communism, and the revolu-
tions they have inspired." Does the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the
end of the twentieth century, and America's "victory" in the Cold War, sig-
nal it is high time to reevaluate the relationship between these two extraordi-
nary, late-eighteenth-century revolutions? If Americans now see their revo-
lution, and the legal and political system it founded, as a model for the rest of
the world's nations to emulate, does that not place France's revolution in-
creasingly in the shadow, a discredited progenitor of failed left-wing social
movements and, in power, botched schemes for a worker's paradise? We
shall have to wait and see.
In a catalogue accompanying the 1983 Rediscovering French Film ex-
hibition organized by New York's Museum of Modem Art and France's
Ministry of Culture, curator Richard Roud describes Abel Gance's French
Revolution film, Napolgon, which premiered at the Paris Opera House in
30. BARRINGTON MOORE JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD
AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 112 (reprint 1993) (1966).
31. Lilla, supra note 27, at 10.
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1927, as one of the "milestones in the history of world cinema. 32 Napolion
certainly deserves as much as any film ever made to be designated as avant-
garde or ahead of its time.33 Gance, the film's director, not only pioneered
an editing process which employed a rapid and rhythmically compelling
mode of inter-cutting powerful images but also invented the use of hand-held
cameras-later utilized so successfully by French Nouvelle Vague and ci-
ndma vgritj filmmakers-image distorting lenses, and what Gance called
Polyvision. The latter process involved first shooting, then projecting onto a
screen, three separate images arranged horizontally, creating both a wide-
screen and split-screen effect which, not surprisingly, overwhelmed early
film-goers. Also relying upon a range of masking devices (familiar from
D.W. Griffith's movies) and even a 275mm telephoto lens, Gance estab-
lished himself, according to film historians David Bordwell and Kristin
Thompson, as the boldest innovator in the history of film technology.34
A minority of critics, over the past eighty years, have resisted the seduc-
tive force of Gance's Napoleon and refused to be enlisted by its furious en-
thusiasms, decrying it as Hollywood spectacle gone mad. For example, in
the film's sequence during which a youthful officer presents the Revolution
with its anthem, or Napoleon's trial at sea in which the raging storm against
which he struggles is inter-cut with the political storm raging in the legisla-
tive convention back in Paris, or in the sequence near the end of the film in
which, as army commander in the Italian campaign, Napoleon is visited by
the ghosts of the Revolution, the leaders whose authority he inherits, some
critics have seen Gance's transformation of historical forces into those of
nature, personality, and spirit as defects in his narrative technique.
The personification of history seems typical of Hollywood's own ver-
sion of historical spectacle. Describing Jean Renoir's film of the French
Revolution, La Marseillaise (1938), made a decade after Napolion, Jonathan
Buchsbaum says that Renoir specifically sought to avoid making just another
Hollywood historical epic or its French equivalent, hysterical drama like
Gance's Napolion.35 A critic for the politically-oriented Cineaste magazine
even accused Gance of employing an essentially fascist cinematic technique.
Attribution of politics to aesthetic technique alone often seems over-
drawn. Perhaps less so in Brecht's famous theory of alienation effect, but
32. Richard Roud, Introduction to REDISCOVERING FRENCH FILM 13, 21 (Mary Lea Bandy
ed., 1983).
33. See ABEL GANCE, NAPOLEON (Bambi Ballard ed., Moya Hassan trans., Faber & Faber
Ltd. 1990) (1927); NORMAN KING, ABEL GANCE: A POLITICS OF SPECTACLE (1984).
34. DAVID BORDWELL & KRISTIN THOMPSON, FILM ART: AN INTRODUCTION 90
(McGraw-Hill, 2003) (2001).
35. JONATHAN BUCHSBAUM, CINEMA ENGAGt: FILM IN THE POPULAR FRoNT 258 (1988).
[Vol. 30:2:209
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when both Godard and Luc Mollet write in Cahiers du Cinima that a travel-
ing (or tracking) shot is a moral statement, you have to wonder exactly what
they mean. A specific motion picture image, shot in a certain way, can se-
cure a political meaning just as it can any other kind of meaning. Eisen-
stein's "montage," or juxtaposition of successive images of stone lions that
appear to be rising to their feet in anger during the Odessa Steps massacre
sequence in The Battleship Potemkin (1925) provides a familiar illustration.
This kind of inter-cutting between two different sets or streams of images,
used by Godard and other French New Wave filmmakers as well as Gance
and Eisenstein before them, constitutes one of the elementary principles of
Rudolph Arnheim's psychological theory of film technique.
But the "form is content" theory actually goes further and posits, for ex-
ample, that Eisenstein's method of editing is itself a political or ideological
statement. Its defenders usually argue that it is a Marxist approach to film-
making, but by the time Godard's own approach to making movies had
evolved to the point, revealed at the end of Weekend (1968), where he be-
lieved the history of cinema had come to an end, he regarded Eisenstein's
Potemkin as a right-wing film simply because it retained evidence of conven-
tional narrative or story-telling strategies. Another director, Constantine
Costa-Gavras, expressed surprise at Godard's statement-recalling that Po-
temkin had an unmistakably left-wing influence on his generation of film-
makers. It is fine for Godard to glibly observe, for example, that you cannot
make left-wing films on a right-wing editing table, but again, how does that
translate into a coherent political idea about film practice?
In any event, Abel Gance's effort to tell the story of the French Revolu-
tion through his depiction of the life of a single man, Napoleon Bonaparte,
makes sense in the context of real French history. Within a few years of the
Corsican's arrival on the scene, as E.J. Hobsbawm reminds us, "France had a
Civil Code, a concordat with the Church and even, most striking symbol of
bourgeois stability, a National Bank., 36 Of course, there is a limit to the im-
pact of a single individual on history--even a Napoleon, as they say.
"[M]ost-perhaps all-[Napoleon's] ideas," Hobsbawm acknowledges,
"were anticipated by Revolution and Directory."37 If, as is certainly the case,
Napoleon eventually drew the line on the Jacobin project of social emancipa-
tion, the dreams of Robespierre and Jean-Paul Marat, the Jacobin revolution-
ary sensibility still managed to survive the legend of Napoleon.
In the section of Gance's film titled, Thermidor, following the inter-
title, a mask shot is used to reveal the Convention in turmoil. Along with the
36. E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF REVOLUTION: EUROPE 1789-1848, at 74 (1962).
37. Id. at 75.
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well-dressed politicians, the chamber is now flooded with George Rude's
"crowd,"3 8 and there are calls of "Death to Saint-Just!" and "Death to
Robespierre," as a reaction sets in. "Death to the monsters!" is cried by a
shiftless rabble that has suddenly turned against the Revolution. Robespi-
erre, begging to be given a chance to speak, is simply shouted down. One of
his opponents raises a dagger and promises to stab this "new Cromwell" if
the "Convention lacks the courage to indict him." With another knife, held
in the trembling hand of Charlotte Corday, those most frightened by and bit-
ter toward the Revolution have already murdered Marat in his bathtub--an
historical incident filmed by Gance with great deference to the Republican
painter Jacque-Louis David, who as a revolutionary Deputy voted for the
execution of King Louis XVI and would later paint the most noble of
Marat's portraits.
Finally, after a couple of false starts, Saint-Just, played by Abel Gance
himself, obtains the podium. This scene, in which Saint-Just is able to win
over the assembled mass, even though his personal fate may already be
sealed, is one of the true glories not only of Gance' s career but of the history
of French film. "Yes, we had to have victims," says Saint-Just, "but is not
the Revolution a great beacon lit upon tombs?" Gance cuts to a close-up of
Saint-Just's face which now fills the screen. "Have you forgotten that during
this time we have created for you a France that is new and ready to be lived
in?" Here Gance gives focus to the beautiful face of Violine Fleuri, one of
his characters in the film, who is obviously moved by these words. "And we
have done all this," cries Saint-Just, again in close-up, "with that vulture, the
Vendee, at our flanks, and on our shoulders that mass of tigers, the kings!"
A medium shot of the crowd, now standing and clapping, follows along with
one of Robespierre, stony-faced, then Saint-Just, again, like a cat ready to
strike: "You can now scatter our limbs to the four winds-Republics will
rise up from them!" Saint-Just glances upward, as he concludes his fiery
polemic, and most of the listeners in the packed hall rise to their feet, ap-
plauding wildly. Robespierre stoically stands and embraces Saint-Just.39
V. CONCLUSION
Like Saint-Just, the German philosopher, G.W.F. Hegel, decried the
abolition of equality in wealth, that political gambit Hegel believed had led
directly to the decline of the great republics in classical antiquity. "There
38. GEORGE RUDI, THE CROWD IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 178-79 (Reprint 1960).
39. For a relatively brief but interesting biography of Gance's character, in English, see
NORMAN HAMPSON, SAINT-JUST (Blackwell, 1991). See also, BERNARD VINOT, SAINT-JUST
(1985).
[Vol. 30:2:209
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss2/1
THE REAL FRENCH CONSTITUTION
was no longer any activity for the whole," wrote Georg Lukacs in his book
on Hegel, "for an idea--each man either laboured for himself or was forced
to work for another.... All political freedom faded away; the law only gave
the citizen a right to the security of property, the pursuit of which now filled
his entire life."' The republican values Hegel saw personified in Napoleon,
a world-historical figure, and his victory at Jenna in 1806; that Robespierre
and Saint-Just saw in the Great Revolution; that Lukacs saw in the revolu-
tionary social movements which derived hard lessons as well as inspiration
from the fierce Jacobin commitment to freedom-all this can be felt build-
ing, moment by moment, throughout Abel Gance's compelling cinematic
tribute to the utopian aspirations of French political history.
Would one be wrong to regard this aspiration as the real French Consti-
tution, the political and moral dynamic animating the Civil Code and its ef-
forts to undercut the undemocratic authority of judges and generals and even
bureaucrats in Brussels? Can we be surprised that French republicanism
should produce a foreign policy---or legal process--contrary to that gener-
ated by American liberalism, a political and constitutional ideology with
which we, on this side of the Atlantic, have lived for much too long?
40. GEORG LuKAcs, THE YOUNG HEGEL: STUDIES IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
DIALECTICS AND ECONOMICS 47 (Rodney Livingstone trans., The Merlin Press 1975) (citations
omitted).
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I. INTRODUCTION
War broke out in the Middle East. Domestic terrorism got out of
control. The President tirelessly toured the country, urging pa-
tience and calm .... Martial law was declared, and the United
States of America was turned, overnight, into a police state. Cur-
fews were enforced. Identity papers were required for all. Penal-
ties for unlawful behavior were harsh and certain. And it worked
too, for a time. The riots stopped. Everyone had food, water, and
power. Stability and peace were returned to the country. But it
was peace without Freedom.'
The passage quoted above sounds like a modem-day headline, but it is
not. These words, from the introduction to a recent television program,2
echo those of one of our Founding Fathers. At its base is Benjamin Frank-
lin's quote in 1759, in which he says, "[t]hose, who would give up essential
liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor
safety."3 This article analyzes what happens when the United States gives up
civil liberties for security. It further attempts to determine, based on histori-
cal precedent, if this country is heading down that dangerous road again. Are
the words in the quotes above unfounded fears, or have they actually become
reality in our country's short history? Is the United States now in a new cy-
cle of civil liberty deprivation that will once again lead us down a path that
was not intended by ostensibly well-intentioned policy makers?
1. Freedom (United Paramount Network (UPN) television broadcast 2000) (transcript of
Introduction available at http://geocities.yahoo.com.br/forewordfreedom). This prophetic
paragraph is known as "Decker's Intro" from the UPN television series Freedom, which aired
in the 2000-2001 television season. Id. The quote appeared as a graphic with a voice-over at
the beginning of each episode. Id. The final line of the quote, omitted above, states, "And
that was a price some of us would not pay." Id. The action-drama featured four freedom
fighters who were trying to restore the government to civilian authority because the military
was not willing to step down from power now that peace was restored. Id.
2. Freedom, supra note 1.
3. THE HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONS: CLASSICAL AND MODERN 1106 (Burton Stevenson
ed., 10th ed. Greenwich House 1984). This quote is attributed to Benjamin Franklin in his
Historical Review of The Constitution and Government of Pennsylvania. BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN, HISTORICAL REvIEw OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(1759). However, this "sentence was much used in the Revolutionary period" and its earliest
use was in November 1755, "in an Answer by the Assembly of Pennsylvania to the Gover-
nor." RICHARD FROTHINGHAM, THE RISE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 413 n. 1 (4th
ed. 1886).
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National crises and emergencies in the United States have, at times,
meant that civil liberties were abandoned to preserve our national security.4
However innocent the initial retrenching of these liberties may have been,
the lessons of history demonstrate what happens when constitutional free-
doms are lost.5 In each century, a President has taken away our country's
fundamental liberties.6 Thus far, the United States has been able to survive
these transgressions on its constitutional values. Nevertheless, are we des-
tined to repeat the past as we move forward to the even greater challenges in
this country's future?
Following a Democratic administration, a Republican President takes
office. There is turmoil within the country's borders. The President, against
the judgment of the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 7 sus-
pends the writ of habeas corpus8 throughout the land.9 At first this was to
protect the national safety interest, 0 but eventually it became a tool whereby
people considered subversive or against national security were arrested" and
brought before a military tribunal.12 If this sounds startling, like the present
day United States of America, it might surprise the reader to know that this
4. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
218 (1998).
5. See id. at 218-24.
6. In the 1800s, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus. See Proclama-
tion No. 1, 12 Stat. 730 (1862); Proclamation No. 7, 12 Stat. 734 (1863); see also Act of Mar.
3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (explaining the President's powers in relation to suspending the
writ of habeas corpus). In the 1900s, President Roosevelt relocated Japanese Americans to
internment camps. See Exec. Order No. 9102, 7 Fed. Reg. 2165 (Mar. 20, 1942). In 2001,
President George W. Bush began the process of removing civil liberties with the enactment of
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, requiring the fingerprinting of all
non-residents in the United States. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
405, 115 Stat. 272, 345.
7. See exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
8. Habeas corpus is defined as "[a] writ employed to bring a person before a court, most
frequently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or detention is not illegal." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999).
9. See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 24-25. The initial suspension was just for Maryland
because it was a "strategic location [that had a] substantial degree of secessionist sympathy in
Baltimore, ma[king] the city the Achilles' heel of the early efforts to bring federal troops to
defend Washington." Id. at 18. The writ was eventually suspended throughout the United
States in 1863. See Proclamation No. 7, 12 Stat. 734 (1863).
10. See Proclamation No. 7, 12 Stat. 734 (1863).
11. See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 63-64; see also Constitutional Rights Foundation,
America Responds to Terrorism: Lincoln and the "Writ of Liberty," http://www.crf-
usa.org/terror/Lincoln.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Writ of Liberty].
12. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6 (1866); Exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 243, 244 (1863).
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happened in the 1860s under President Abraham Lincoln.' 3 The target was
anyone opposing the war effort, 14 but what ended up happening was "13,000
arbitrary arrests."' 5 People were dragged from their beds in the middle of the
night and interned in military confinement without judicial process.' 6 When
Lincoln's administration was criticized, First Amendment rights were tram-
pled upon. 7
Fast forward to World War II: the year is 1941. President Franklin
Roosevelt directs that the conduct of the Japanese within the United States is
to be observed.'8 This led the United States down a slippery-slope that
evolved into curfews' 9 and eventually created the relocation camps, which, a
year later, incarcerated loyal American citizens of Japanese descent.
20
With a new century came a new challenge-September 11, 2001-
another day that will live in infamy2' in U.S. history. The Twin Towers of
the World Trade Center were destroyed by terrorists using jetliners as weap-
ons. The national security was again being threatened by those within our
borders. In response, the United States Congress enacted the USA
PATRIOT Act.22 Subsequent to that Act, the Attorney General of the United
States, John Ashcroft, announced the National Security Entry-Exit Registra-
tion System. 23 This new program would more closely monitor aliens within
U.S. borders from certain unnamed countries. 24 The major newspapers re-
ported that the people that were to be monitored would be primarily Mus-
lims. 25 However, the Justice Department would not state that outright.
26
13. See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 11-25.
14. General Order No. 38 stated, "[t]he habit of declaring sympathies for the enemy will
no longer be tolerated in this department. Persons committing such offenses will be at once
arrested." Writ of Liberty, supra note 11.
15. Mark E. Neely, Jr., Lincoln, Abraham, in GROLIER MULTIMEDIA ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://ap.grolier.com (follow "Presidents" hyperlink; then follow "GME" hyperlink under
"Abraham Lincoln") (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
16. See exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
17. See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 221.
18. Proclamation No. 2525, 6 Fed. Reg. 6321,6321 (Dec. 10, 1941).
19. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407, 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 102-03 (1943).
20. Exec. Order No. 9102, 7 Fed. Reg. 2165, 2165 (Mar. 20, 1942).
21. "[A] date which will live in infamy" is the opening line of Franklin Roosevelt's ad-
dress to Congress on December 8, 1941, asking Congress to declare war on the Empire of
Japan. President's Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 87 CONG. REC. 9504 (1941).
22. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
23. John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen., Press Conference with James Ziglar, INS Commis-
sioner (June 5, 2002), in FDCH POL. TRANSCRIPTS.
24. Id.
25. Eric Schmitt, U.S. Will Seek to Fingerprint Visas' Holders: Justice Plan to Require
Muslims to Register, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at Al.
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Is history once again repeating itself? In each of the historical contexts
there was an enemy that was well defined-the South in the Civil War and
the Japanese in World War II. Each of these battles was won in a clear, con-
cise manner, after which civil liberties were restored. In the current situa-
tion, there is not just one country we are fighting against. Will there ever be
a clear victory? Our goal in the war on terrorism is aimed at "the disruption
and... the defeat of the global terror network."27 What will that mean in the
long term to civil liberties in the United States? Aspects of the current En-
try-Exit Registration System will be examined in a historical context with
these questions in mind.
Part II will explore the Lincoln administration's battle with the United
States Supreme Court, exploring whether the Court is really able to be the
branch of government that comes to the rescue when civil liberties are tram-
pled upon. Part III will explore what happens when national sentiment and
political motivation get in the way of a government's quest for national secu-
rity. Finally, Part IV will bring together the historical elements and review
the current national security situation in the United States and some of the
actions being taken to see what dangers might lay in our path.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISES, A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. "King Lincoln"' 2 and "Conquering Peace"29
"I must pronounce that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe, in the
number of hands proposed by the federal Constitution. From what quarter
can the danger proceed? . . . But where are the means to be found by the
President ... [but he] cannot possibly be [a] source[] of danger."30
-James Madison
26. See Ashcroft, supra note 23.
27. George W. Bush, President, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-
8.html [hereinafter Presidential Address].
28. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 66. The full quote from Clement Vallandigham was "a
plea to citizens who valued their rights to exercise the franchise and hurl 'King Lincoln' from
his throne." Id. He was arrested shortly after making these remarks. Id.
29. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 19 (1866). "[T]o conquer a peace" is a quote
from this Supreme Court case. Id. The full quote is: "During the war [the President's] pow-
ers must be without limit, because, if defending, the means of offence may be nearly illimit-
able; or, if acting offensively, his resources must be proportionate to the end in view,-'to
conquer a peace."' Id. at 18-19.
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 308-09 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 2002) (empha-
sis added).
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James Madison, in the Federalist Papers, speaks to how protected he felt
the United States Constitution would be, such that he could not conceive of
how the liberties could be stripped away, especially by the President.3'
However, he apparently never conceived of Lincoln and the Civil War. The
Founding Fathers never anticipated that the sixteenth President would ignore
civil liberties and do things his own way, even to the extent of ignoring the
United States Supreme Court on these issues.32
"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it."'33 President Lincoln insisted that this clause in the Constitution, the only
mention of habeas corpus, 34 meant that he, as President, had the power to
suspend it.35 He first suspended the writ of habeas corpus by Presidential
Proclamation in 1862, even before Congress gave him the authority to do so,
in the belief that it was within his power.36 This was a limited suspension
designed primarily for the State of Maryland due to its strategic importance
to Washington D.C. in the war effort.3 7
He even went as far as to ignore United State Supreme Court Justice
Taney's admonition that "only Congress, and not the President, may suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus," and only a person who was
enlisted in the military could be "subject to the Articles of War."38 In Ex
parte Merryman, a Maryland case over which Justice Taney presided, "[t]he
petitioner ... while peaceably in his own house, with his family ... at two
o'clock [a.m.]" had an "armed force" enter his home "professing to act under
31. See id.
32. See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 38.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
34. Writ of Liberty, supra note 11.
35. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 38. Justice Rehnquist is speaking of President Lincoln's
Fourth of July message to a special session of Congress. Id.
36. Proclamation No. 1, 12 Stat. 730 (1862). Lincoln wrote, in a letter to the Command-
ing General of the Army of the United States, that if he found "resistance which renders it
necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus" that he granted him the power to do so.
REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 25. The Presidential Proclamation of September 24, 1862 stated:
That the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now,
or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military
prison, or other place of confinement by any military authority or by the sentence of any court-
martial or military commission.
Proclamation No. 1, 12 Stat. 730, 730 (1862).
37. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 18.
38. Id. at 36 (speaking about Justice Taney's remarks in his Merryman opinion).
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military orders."39  He was arrested and imprisoned at Fort McHenry.4"
When the writ of habeas corpus was issued to:
examine into the legality of the imprisonment, the answer of the
officer [was] that he is authorized by the president to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus at his discretion, and in the exercise of that
discretion, suspends it in this case, and on that ground refuses obe-
dience to the writ.4'
Lincoln, in a speech to Congress, also seemed to ignore Justice Taney and
his holding in Merryman and proceeded with the implementation of his pol-
icy.42
Congress, supporting the President's position during the war, passed the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 in order to give merit to the administration's
actions.43 The President then expanded the suspension of the writ in 1863 to
cover the entire United States.44 Now that he had the authority he used his
39. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 148.
42. See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 38; Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153. Merryman pro-
vided:
It is possible that the officer who has incurred this grave responsibility may have misunder-
stood his instructions, and exceeded the authority intended to be given him; I shall, therefore,
order all the proceedings in this case, with my opinion, to be filed and recorded in the circuit
court of the United States for the district of Maryland, and direct the clerk to transmit a copy,
under seal, to the president of the United States. It will then remain for that high officer, in ful-
fillment of his constitutional obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," to
determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United States to be re-
spected and enforced.
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
43. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755. The statute reads:
That, during the present rebellion, the President of the United States, whenever, in his judg-
ment, the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of ha-
beas corpus in any case throughout the United States, or any part thereof. And whenever and
wherever the said privilege shall be suspended, as aforesaid, no military or other officer shall
be compelled, in answer to any writ of habeas corpus, to return the body of any person or per-
sons detained by him by authority of the President; but upon the certificate, under oath, of the
officer having charge of any one so detained that such person is detained by him as a prisoner
under authority of the President, further proceedings under the writ of habeas corpus shall be
suspended by the judge or court having issued the said writ, so long as said suspension by the
President shall remain in force, and said rebellion continue.
Id.
44. Proclamation No. 7, 12 Stat. 734, 734-35 (1863). Presidential Proclamation No. 7
states:
Now, therefore, I, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim
and make known to all whom it may concern, that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended throughout the United States in the several cases before mentioned, and that this
suspension will continue throughout the duration of the said rebellion, or until this proclama-
22
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proclamation to put the courts and citizens of the United States on notice that
no further challenges will be tolerated with the language, "I do hereby re-
quire all magistrates ... to take distinct notice of this suspension, and to give
it full effect, and all citizens ... to conduct and govern themselves accord-
ingly."45
1. A General and the Power to Decide Who Deserved the Writ
While President Lincoln may have felt justified in his action in the sus-
pension of the civil liberties, his men were starting to take advantage of the
power that it gave them, which would inevitably embarrass their com-
mander-in-chief.4 6 General Ambrose Burnside, in command of Ohio's mili-
tary district, was one of those men.47 He issued General Order No. 38, which
did not allow for "'sympathies for those in arms against the Government of
the United States, declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object
and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its effort to sup-
press the unlawful rebellion.' ' 48 Clement L. Vallandigham would be one of
the first citizens to experience the restraint on his civil liberties.49 "Val-
landigham appeared at a Democratic rally" and Burnside sent observers to
take notes.5° Vallandigham called the General's Order No. 38 "a usurpation
of arbitrary power,"51 and finished his lengthy speech with a call to "hurl
'King Lincoln' from his throne."5 2 Burnside was not pleased with these re-
marks and set in motion Vallandigham's silencing by having him arrested.53
With sixty-seven men, they broke through the door of his home and sent him
by specially commandeered train to a military prison near Cincinnati.54 His
charges indicated that he was "'declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions,
tion shall, by a subsequent one to be issued by the President of the United States, be modified
or revoked. And I do hereby require all magistrates, attorneys, and other civil officers within
the United States, and all officers and others in the military and naval services of the United
States, to take distinct notice of this suspension, and to give it full effect, and all citizens of the
United States to conduct and govern themselves accordingly, and in conformity with the con-
stitution of the United States and the laws of congress in such case made and provided.
Id.
45. Id.
46. See Writ of Liberty, supra note 11.
47. See id.; REHNQUIST supra note 4, at 63.
48. REHNQUIST supra note 4, at 66 (citation omitted); accord ex parte Vallandigham, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 244 (1863).
49. See Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 244.
50. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 65.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 66.
53. See id.
54. Id.
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with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its
effort to suppress the unlawful rebellion.' 55 The charges indicated that he
had declared that "'the present war is a wicked, cruel and unnecessary war,
one not waged for the preservation of the Union."'56 The First Amendment
to the Constitution was of little concern to the administration of this era57 and
"the government sought to suppress public criticism of the administration's
war effort."" This was a time in U.S. history when newspapers and the very
presses on which they were printed were seized if they spoke out against the
government's policies.59
Vallandigham's petition for certiorari was denied by the Court.' How-
ever, Lincoln would not sign the order suspending Vallandigham's writ of
habeas corpus,6' as it seemed that the President knew little of what was going
on in the case other than what he "read in the newspapers" and the "vague
response" he received from his inquiries.62 The President's cabinet discussed
the case in a subsequent meeting and "[m]ost members seemed to agree with
the assessment of [the] Secretary of the Navy ... that Burnside's summary
action had been a mistake. But now that it had taken place, there was no way
to back down. ' 63 This matter was an embarrassment to the President64 and he
commuted the "sentence from imprisonment for the duration of the war to
banishment 'beyond the Union lines. "'65
2. A Peace Time Constitution
The United States Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in the Val-
landigham matter stating that they "had no jurisdiction to review the decision
of the military commission.,,66 "While the bloody Civil War raged on, the
Supreme Court decided it was not the time to challenge the power of General
Burnside or his commander-in-chief, Abraham Lincoln., 67 There were over
55. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 66 (citation omitted).
56. Id. (citation omitted).
57. See id. at 221.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 243, 254 (1863).
61. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 67.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Writ of Liberty, supra note 11.
65. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 67 (citation omitted).
66. Id. at 67-68 (citing exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 251-52 (1863)).
67. Writ of Liberty, supra note 11.
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"13,000 arbitrary arrests" 68 of "Northern citizens who opposed his policies 69
during the time the writ of habeas corpus remained suspended.7°
In 1864, under military orders, Lamdin P. Milligan, a U.S. Citizen, was
arrested while at home and confined to a military prison.7 He was charged
with: "[c]onspiracy against the Government;" "[a]ffording aid and comfort
to rebels;" "[i]nciting insurrection;" "[d]isloyal practices;" and "[v]iolation
of the laws of war."72 He was found guilty and sentenced to have his life
ended at the gallows.73
In this case, decided after the conclusion of the Civil War, the United
States Supreme Court indicated that "[d]uring the war [the President's] pow-
ers must be without limit, because, if defending, the means of offence may
be nearly illimitable; or, if acting offensively, his resources must be propor-
tionate to the end in view,-'to conquer a peace."' 74 The Court reasoned that
the challenges of war are fast paced and the legislative process is slow to act,
so the President needed some room to maneuver to meet these challenges.75
The amendments to the United States Constitution provide for "[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion"76 and "[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation. '77 The United States government, in its ar-
gument in the Milligan case, called these amendments "peace provisions,"
which are silent during war time when the government's only concern is for
the safety of its citizens.78 The government called this concept the "supreme
law. '79 They further stated that "the Constitution takes it for granted that [the
writ of habeas corpus] will be suspended'... in time of war.., when the
public safety requires it."'
80
68. Neely, supra note 15.
69. Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Fighting Facts with Slander, LEWROCKWELL.COM, Apr. 3,
2002, http://www.lewrockwell.com/dilorenzo/dilorenzol4.html.
70. Neely, supra note 15.
71. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6 (1866).
72. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 18-19.
75. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 41 (James Madison)).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
78. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 20.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 21.
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Milligan's attorney' stated that, "[i]t is a question of the rights of the
citizen in time of war."82 The question he poses seems to reverberate two
centuries later as the United States goes through its current terrorism crises.
Is it true, that the moment a declaration of war is made, the execu-
tive department of this government, without an act of Congress,
becomes absolute master of our liberties and our lives? Are we,
then, subject to martial rule, administered by the President upon
his own sense of the exigency, with nobody to control him, and
with every magistrate and every authority in the land subject to his
will alone?
83
As it is stated in the United States Constitution, "'[t]he privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebel-
lion or invasion, the public safety may require it."'" The argument was that
Lincoln did not have the power to suspend habeas corpus because this privi-
lege of suspension was contained in the first article of the Constitution-
powers of the legislature-not in the section where the President derives his
authority.85 The words of the government's counsel86 are also words that
ring true in the United States after September 11, 2001:
the facts are unprecedented; because the war out of which they grew is
unprecedented also; ... because the necessity which called forth this ex-
ertion of the reserved powers of the government is unprecedented, as
well as all the rest .... [W]e shall have set precedents how a nation may
preserve itself from self-destruction.
87
81. Mr. David Dudley Field was one of the attorneys for the petitioner who presented the
case to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 22.
82. Id.
83. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 22; see also Proclamation No. 7, 12 Stat. 734, 734-35
(1863). In the Proclamation, Lincoln makes it clear that it is his authority that must be obeyed
and that the courts should "take distinct notice" of his suspension of habeas corpus and "give
it full effect." Id. at 734. This was proclaimed after Congress gave him full authority in such
matters earlier in that year, 1863. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755.
84. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 40 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2). This is the
only mention of habeas corpus in the United States Constitution. Writ of Liberty, supra note
11; see generally U.S. CONST.
85. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 41-42.
86. Mr. Butler gave the reply for the United States. Id. at 84.
87. Id. at 88.
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"The [war] power is tremendous. It is strictly constitutional, but it
breaks down every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty,
property, and life.",88
After weighing the arguments presented, the Court issued its opinion.
8 9
The Supreme Court noted that the framers of our constitutional liberty fore-
saw that a time would arrive when our nation's leaders, in times of trouble,
might conclude that the ends justified the means in abating the unrest.9
They realized that one day constitutional liberties might be put "in peril,
unless established by irrepealable law."9' The Court held that "[tihe Consti-
tution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and
in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times, and under all circumstances. 92 The Court ruled that Milligan, who
was a private citizen, should not have been tried by a military tribunal even
during the war because the courts in his state were open and able to handle
such matters. 93 The Constitutional guarantees could have been preserved and
the same result would have followed if he was arrested and tried before the
courts in his home state. 4
Martial law gave the commander of the armed forces "the power.., to
suspend all civil rights and their remedies, and subject citizens... to the rule
of his will" 95 without due restraint, thus "substitut[ing] military force for and
to the exclusion of the laws, and punish all persons, as he thinks right and
proper, without fixed or certain rules." 96 The Court was concerned that this
would be the "end of liberty regulated by law," "destroy[] every guarantee of
the Constitution," and "render[] the 'military independent of and superior to
' ,,97the civil power'....
The Supreme Court was not totally without sympathy for the great task
of keeping the peace that befell the federal government. They allowed for
occasions in which martial law could be implemented.9"
If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it
is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, ...
88. Id. at 104 (internal quotations omitted).
89. See id. at 107-31.
90. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 120-21 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 121-22.
94. Id. at 122.
95. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 124.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citation omitted).
98. See id. at 127.
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there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority ... to
preserve the safety of the army and society; and ... it is allowed to
govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course.
99
However, the Court was insistent that there must be an actual invasion,
not a "threatened invasion" and "[miartial rule can never exist where the
courts are open, and... in the case of a foreign invasion, martial rule may
become a necessity in one state, when, in another, it would be 'mere lawless
violence.""'' ° Milligan "clearly limited the powers of the President and Con-
gress in time of war."'0 1 However, Lincoln may have thought that the ends
justified the means when he asked rhetorically, "[a]re all the laws, but one, to
go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces, lest that one be
violated?"' 2 This is a justification that any President could use to eliminate
some aspect of our civil liberties. Isn't this same justification being used
today?'03
B. Roosevelt, the 1940s, and the Alien Enemies'°4
"The essence of Government is power; and power, lodged as it must be
in human hands, will ever be liable to abuse." 105
-James Madison
The current Entry-Exit program has the United States government keep-
ing close tabs on all non-resident aliens within its borders °6 That sounds
innocent enough-a country wanting to protect itself from within. However,
isn't that how it began in 1941 with President Roosevelt's orders to keep tabs
on all Japanese over the age of fourteen?"°7 As we have already seen, the
99. Id.
100. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 127.
101. Supreme Court Cases, Ex Parte Milligan, 1866, http://www.phschool.com/atschool/
supremescourt-cases/milligan.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
102. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at viii (citation omitted). This is the introduction to Justice
Rehnquist's book, which gets its title from that quote. Id. The quote was taken from Presi-
dent Lincoln, in a message addressing a special session of Congress on July 4, 1861. Id.
103. For the reader's understanding, note that this Law Review article was written in 2002.
104. The term "alien enemies" comes from the title of President Roosevelt's Proclamation.
Proclamation No. 2525, 6 Fed. Reg. 6321, 6321 (Dec. 10, 1941).
105. THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITiCAL THOUGHT OF JAMES
MADISON 403 (Marvin Meyers ed., Univ. Press of New England 1981) (1973) (emphasis
added). President James Madison spoke to the Virginia Constitutional Convention on De-
cember 2, 1829. Id. at 401-02.
106. Ashcroft, supra note 23.
107. Proclamation No. 2525, 6 Fed. Reg. 6321, 6321 (Dec. 10, 1941).
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Supreme Court, almost one hundred years prior to World War II, put strin-
gent guidelines on when and how martial law could be imposed.' °8 It has
been said that "'[i]t is devoutly to be hoped that the decision of the Court
may never be subjected to the strain of actual war. If, however, it should be,
we may safely predict that it will be necessarily disregarded."" '
It began innocently enough after the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl
Harbor by the Japanese Imperial Forces." ° Franklin D. Roosevelt, issued a
Presidential Proclamation entitled "Alien Enemies-Japanese."' " Under 50
U.S.C. §§ 21-24, which he relied on for his authority, the President
direct[ed] that the conduct to be observed on the part of the United
States toward all natives, citizens, denizens or subjects of the Em-
pire of Japan being of the age of fourteen years and upwards who
shall be within the United States or within any territories in any
way subject to the jurisdiction of the Untied States and not actually
naturalized, who.., are termed alien enemies .... 12
The President wanted to keep track of possible enemy activity within our
country's borders." 3 How then did the United States go from a sincere effort
to observe possible enemies to forcing Japanese-Americans from their homes
into "concentration camp[s]? ''"14
1. Moods and Attitudes
It is difficult to understand why history unfolded in the manner which it
did without having an understanding of American society at the time. The
day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States declared war on Ja-
pan." 5 By March 1942, Lieutenant General DeWitt was in command of the
108. See generally ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (holding that if civil
courts are still operating during wartime, military tribunals may not try civilians).
109. THE MILLIGAN CASE 3 (Samuel Klaus ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1929) (quoting
JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY 251 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2000) (1893)).
110. President's Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 87 CONG. REc. 9504 (1941).
President Roosevelt addressed a joint meeting of the two Houses of Congress. Id.
111. Proclamation No. 2525, 6 Fed. Reg. 6321, 6321 (Dec. 10, 1941).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944); see generally Public Procla-
mation No. 4, 7 Fed. Reg. 2601, 2601 (Apr. 4, 1942); Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1, 8 Fed.
Reg. 982, 982 (Jan. 21, 1943). In Korematsu, there was disagreement among the Justices as to
whether the term "concentration camp" should be used. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
115. S.J. Res. 116, 77th Cong., 55 Stat. 795 (1941).
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states on the west coast of the United States in what had been designated the
"Western Defense Command."' 1 6 There were racist overtones to what was
beginning to happen to the Japanese population." 7 This was also an era
when federal laws prohibited naturalization of Japanese ex-patriots who
wanted to become citizens." 8 Laws forbad land ownership," 9 intermarriage
with Caucasians, 2 ° and the Japanese were often "unable to secure profes-
sional or skilled employment except in association with" their former coun-
trymen.'21
Special interest groups were involved in supporting the concept of mass
evacuations. 22  The Saturday Evening Post published an article entitled,
"The People Nobody Wants."'23 The article spoke about the special interest
groups whose comments were less than subtle.
124
"We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish rea-
sons.... We do.... If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we'd
never miss them in two weeks, because the white farmers can take
over and produce everything the Jap grows. And we don't want
them back when the war ends, either."'
125
Popular media, such as movie serials, portrayed the Japanese as evil vil-
lains and portrayed those who defeated them as being good and heroic. 26
116. Korenatsu, 323 U.S. at 227; see Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407, 1407 (Feb.
25, 1942) (creating the military areas); see also Public Proclamation No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg. 2320,
2320-21 (Mar. 26, 1942) (giving the military the power to create the Western Defense Com-
mand).
117. See generally Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215-16, 223-24 (upholding the internment of
Japanese Americans during World War II).
118. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 96 n.4 (1943) (citations omitted); see
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 190, 194 (1922).
119. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 96 n.4 (citation omitted).
120. Id. (citation omitted).
121. Id. (citation omitted).
122. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239 n.12 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (citing Frank J. Taylor, The People Nobody Wants, THE SATURDAY EVENING
POST, May 9, 1942, at 24, 66).
124. See id.
125. Id. (quoting Taylor, supra note 123, at 66).
126. E.g., BATMAN (Columbia Pictures Corp., Movie Serial 1943) (copy on file with au-
thor). In this movie, Batman and Robin battle the "evil Japanese, Dr. Daka." Id. The serial
features background narration such as "since a wise government rounded up the shifty eyed
Japs" and "Daka, the sinister Jap spy." Id. An interesting note is that Sony now owns the
rights to this first Batman serial. Batman, http://www.batmantoys.com/articles/article4l.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2006). As a Japanese company, they deleted these phrases during a re-
release of the video series. Id. Additionally, one of this generation's cultural icons, George
Takei, who portrayed Mr. Sulu in the television series Star Trek was forced, as a child, to
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While this was the popular sentiment, in the eleven months that it took to
remove all of the "subversive" Japanese, "not one person of Japanese ances-
try was accused or convicted of espionage or sabotage after Pearl Harbor
while they were still free.'
127
[Yet the military] makes the amazing statement that as of February
14, 1942, "The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is
a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be
taken." Apparently, in the minds of the military leaders, there was
no way that the Japanese Americans could escape the suspicion of
sabotage.128
This quote comes from a report written by General DeWitt, the commander
responsible for making the decisions about the way the Japanese were to be
handled to protect the national security on the western-most coast of our
country. 129
But why internment camps? Why not just let the Japanese move from
the military zones into the interior of the country? The residents of these
coastal areas were afraid of the Japanese living in their midst. 3 ° It was not
the recommendation of the head of the Western Military Command but of
"three California officials-the state's Governor and Attorney General, and
the Mayor of Los Angeles-and the congressional delegations of the three
west coast states."' 31 Chief Justice Rehnquist132 surmises that had the mili-
tary not gone along with this plan and it had proved in hindsight to have been
necessary then "their names will very likely [have been] 'Mudd' [for reject-
ing] a widely popular security measure.' ' 133 That may answer the question of
why the relocation program, but why internment?
Why take people from their homes and force entire families to live in a
single room, black tar-papered barracks with nothing more than a potbellied
leave Los Angeles with his family and relocate to the Rohwer Relocation Center. See GEORGE
TAKEI, To THE STARS: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE TAKE1, STAR TREK'S MR. SULU 19
(1994).
127. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 241 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 241 n.15 (quoting J.L. DEWIT1r, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM
THE WEST COAST 1942, at 34 (1943) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]).
129. See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 189.
130. Id. at 188.
131. Id. at204.
132. Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1986 to 2005. MEMBERS OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
members.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
133. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 204.
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stove for cooking?' 34 After all, "an Assembly Center was a euphemism for a
prison [as n]o person.., was permitted to leave except by Military Order."' 35
Of the 112,000 Japanese forced to leave their homes for the internment
camps, 70,000 were United States citizens,'36 also known by the Japanese
word "Nisei" meaning second generation. 137 They were, in large part, "chil-
dren and elderly men and women."'38 The British government had investi-
gated about 74,000 Germans and Austrians, and categorized them as either
"real enemies" or a "friendly enemy.' ' 139 Our allies ended up holding only
10,000 "real enemies" of that entire number and accomplished this task in
only six months. 40 What prevented the United States military from moving
the Japanese to the interior states, where security would not be an issue, and
doing the same kind of sorting? This "'was due primarily to the fact that the
interior states would not accept an uncontrolled Japanese migration.""' , 4'
This prevented the military from a "planned and orderly relocation" because
without such supervision "there might have been a dangerously disorderly
migration of unwanted people to unprepared communities.' 42  It was the
Governors of those states that would not allow for an open relocation of pri-
marily United States citizens because of the prejudices of their local con-
stituents. 43
2. Military Authority
With the exception of Hawaii, the civilian government and courts main-
tained authority in the United States.'" However, not unlike the dramatic
introduction to his article, the government empowered the military to make
decisions as to how to promulgate Executive Orders. 45 In this war, the three
branches of government were working in unison in what amounted to the
abridgment of civil liberties, conducted at the discretion of military com-
134. TAKEI, supra note 126, at21, 23.
135. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 230 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (men-
tioning General Dewitt's Report to the Secretary of War concerning the program).
136. Id. at 242.
137. See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 188.
138. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 242 n.16 (citing Robert M.W. Kempner, The Enemy Alien Problem in the Pre-
sent War, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 443,445-46 (1940); H.R. REP. No. 2124, at 280-81 (1942)).
140. Kempner, supra note 139, at 446.
141. Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 295-96 (1944) (citation omitted).
142. Id. at 296-97.
143. See id. at 295-97.
144. See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 212.
145. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942); REHNQUIST, supra
note 4, at 191.
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manders.' 4 These decisions revolved around Presidential Executive Order
9066, issued for "the protection of our war resources against espionage and
sabotage." '147 The United States Supreme Court stated in Hirabayashi v.
United States that the "[a]ppellant ha[d] been tried and convicted in the civil
courts and ha[d] been subjected to penalties prescribed by Congress for the
acts committed."14 8  This case is unlike Milligan in that there was "no ques-
tion of martial law or trial by military tribunal.' 4 9 While Roosevelt wanted
the military to be as reasonable as it could in the internment process, the
people actually in charge of the operation thought that they had "carte
blanche" from the President to conduct the operation. 5 ° Roosevelt's Attor-
ney General, Francis Biddle, 5' reflected that he did not feel "'that the Con-
stitutional difficulty plagued [Roosevelt]. The Constitution has not greatly
bothered any wartime President.'"
52
3. From Hirabayashi to Endo, the Court Comes Full Circle
"There was no physical brutality, but there were certainly severe hard-
ships-physical removal from the place where one lived, often forced sale of
houses and businesses, and harsh living conditions in the spartan quarters of
the internment centers."'53 This was the backdrop upon which the main cases
of Yasui v. United States,154 Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo-all of
which involved American citizens' 55 -would take place.
146. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 91-92 (1943).
147. Id. at 102.
I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he
may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such ac-
tion necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he
or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be
excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall
be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Com-
mander may impose in his discretion.
Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407, 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
148. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 92-93.
149. Id. at 92.
150. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 191 (quoting FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 218
(1962)).
151. Id. at 190.
152. Id. at 191 (quoting BDDLE, supra note 150, at 219).
153. Id. at 192.
154. 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
155. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 84 (1943); Yasui, 320 U.S. at 116;
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 284
(1944).
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Both Gordon Hirabayashi and Minoru Yasui were born in the United
States to Issei'56 parents.'57 Hirabayashi was convicted of two charges, "dis-
obey[ing] the curfew ... [and] fail[ing] ... to register for evacuation from
the prescribed military area"' 58 when he did not show up at a Civil Control
Station as scheduled. 5 9 In Hirabayashi, the Court espoused the philosophy
of "Inter arma silent leges: In time of war the laws are silent."' 60 There
were two charges-internment and curfew, in that order-and the sentences
were to run concurrently.' 6' The Court found that the second charge of vio-
lating the curfew was "without constitutional infirmity," thus totally side-
stepping the more difficult question of whether reporting to a Civil Control
Station meant that Hirabayashi would necessarily be confined in a relocation
center. 62 Yasui was another case of curfew violation which the Court upheld
based on the ruling in Hirabayashi1
63
When the military decided that the curfew alone would not be an ade-
quate measure, they began to exclude the Japanese from certain areas. 64 In
Korematsu, "the Court was required to confront ... the far more draconian
relocation requirement."'' 65 The Court upheld Korematsu's exclusion and the
conviction for violating Exclusion Order No. 34'66 by stating that he "was not
excluded ... because of hostility to him or his race."'' 67 "He was excluded
because we are at war with the Japanese Empire," and because the military
authority decided that "the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese
ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily."'' 68 The Court also
noted that Congress gave the military the authority to do this. 69 It was not
until the Endo case that the Supreme Court began to look at the internment of
156. "Issei" is a Japanese term referring to first generation Japanese born in Japan, as
opposed to "Nisei," which means second generation born in the United States. REHNQUIST,
supra note 4, at 188.
157. Id. at 192.
158. Id.
159. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 84.
160. See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 202.
161. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83-84, 105.
162. Id. at 105; see REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 198.
163. Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 117 (1943).
164. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see Public Proclamation No.
4, 7 Fed. Reg. 2601 (Apr. 4, 1942).
165. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 200.
166. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222-24; see Act of Mar. 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (pro-
viding a penalty for violations regarding military zone restrictions).
167. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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loyal U.S. citizens, 170 however, still choosing not to address the constitutional
issues. 17
1
Ex parte Endo was a case which came before the Supreme Court based
on a writ of habeas corpus. 72 Mitsuye Endo was an American of Japanese
descent who had been detained by the War Relocation Authority. 73 The
government had no question as to her loyalty to the United States. 174 How-
ever, the War Relocation Authority wanted her held for an additional period
as "an essential step in the evacuation program."'' 75 It was already 1944 and
"the United States' military position was much more favorable ... than it
had been in the spring of 1942."' 176 The Court no longer felt it needed to be
silent. 77 Endo was given her freedom. 178 The Court held that Relocation
Centers were not "part of the original program of evacuation but developed
later to meet what seemed to the officials in charge to be mounting hostility
to the evacuees on the part of the communities where they sought to go."'
179
The Court further held that the authority to hold a person under these circum-
stances should end once the individual is shown to be a loyal citizen. 8 '
Holding such a person because of public sentiment and hostility was not
supported by the President's Executive Order, which was created to protect
our nation against disloyal saboteurs and fashioned to prevent espionage and
sabotage.81
4. The Disloyal Citizen
While the Court held that a loyal citizen could not be held by the mili-
tary in the internment camps,8 2 it was a different matter for those who were
170. See ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at
201-02.
171. Endo, 323 U.S. at 297.
172. Id. at 285.
173. Id. at 284-85.
174. Id. at 294. "It is conceded by the Department of Justice and by the War Relocation
Authority that appellant is a loyal and law-abiding citizen. They make no claim that she is
detained on any charge or that she is even suspected of disloyalty." Id.
175. Endo, 323 U.S. at 295.
176. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 202.
177. See id.
178. Endo, 323 U.S. at 297.
179. Id. at 301.
180. Id. at 302.
181. Id. at 302-03 (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 302-04.
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disloyal.'83 On the east coast of the United States, a group of German agents,
one of whom professed American citizenship, came ashore, took off their
German uniforms, changed into civilian clothes, and entered the country in a
clandestine manner to sabotage the United States' war effort.'84 The Court
made the distinction between "[1]awful combatants [who] are subject to cap-
ture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces [and]
[u]nlawful combatants... [who] are subject to trial and punishment ... for
acts which render their belligerency unlawful."' 5 They found that:
an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through
the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or
property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally
deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to
be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment
by military tribunals.
186
An enemy combatant, even one with United States citizenship, is not re-
lieved of the consequences of his belligerency.'87 Those "[clitizens who as-
sociate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with
its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are en-
emy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of
war.'
188
In this case, there was a claim by the petitioners that they had not actu-
ally committed any anti-American activity. 189 However, the Court held that
"[t]he offense was complete when with that purpose they entered-or, hav-
ing so entered, they remained upon-our territory in time of war without
uniform or other appropriate means of identification."''
These will become important issues when reviewing the current situa-
tion in the United States. Are the Muslim and Arab-Americans being treated
more like the Japanese in World War II, or more like the enemy combatants
of the same era?
183. See generally exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (upholding detention of German
belligerents despite U.S. citizenship).
184. Id. at 20-21.
185. Id. at 31 (footnote omitted).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 37.
188. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38.
189. Id. at 38.
190. Id.
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III. BEING A PATRIOT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
"Those who refuse to comply and are already in the country, if we dis-
cover them, we'll be taking steps for them to be deported.'' 9
-John Ashcroft, June 5, 2002.
The foregoing historical perspective provided to demonstrate how far
the United States has already gone in the abridgment of civil liberties and
how it has recovered. The section that follows will speak to where this coun-
try is now and where it may be heading.
President George W. Bush has called for a review of the Posse Comi-
tatus Act which limits the role that the military can have in domestic af-
fairs.192 The head of the Northern Command, a Four Star General, favors
giving "greater domestic powers to the military to protect the country against
terrorist strikes.' 93 However it is uncertain what new role the military might
play if the Act, which was put in force after the Civil War, is repealed. 94
"Congress enacted the law in reaction to excesses by . . . troops .... 195
These perceived misuses were committed during "domestic law enforce-
ment."'196 Will modem era generals take the place of General Burnside 97 and
General DeWitt in the abridgment of civil liberties in the fight for peace and
freedom?' 98
A. A War on Terror Versus a Declared War
In each of the aforementioned historical times-the Civil War and
World War Il-the United States was in a state of declared war. 99 The for-
mer Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, William Rehnquist,
noted that "[w]ithout question the government's authority to engage in con-
191. Ashcroft, supra note 23.
192. See Eric Schmitt, Wider Military Role in U.S. Is Urged, N.Y. TIMES NAT'L, July 21,
2002, at 16.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Adam Liptak, Posse Comitatus Act Limits Armed Services at Home, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2002, at 16.
196. Id.
197. See Writ of Liberty, supra note 11.
198. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 128, at 34.
199. REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 218. There was no actual declaration of war on the
Southern Confederacy since it was not recognized by the Union as a separate nation. Id.
However, the Court held that the "insurrection could be treated by the government as the
equivalent of a declared war." Id. (citing In re Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862)).
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duct that infringes [on] civil liberty is greatest in time of declared war. ' ' 200
Where does that leave the current war on terror? The United States is strik-
ing back against those who would cause terrorist acts within its borders.2°'
President Bush20 2 declared a national emergency and called up the ready re-
serve of the armed forces to active duty.2 °3 However, there was no country to
target, only individuals that the President determined planned and executed
the terrorist actions against our country.2 ° Congress did not declare war, but
only authorized the use of military force. 205 This is the first notable differ-
ence between this time of unrest and those previously discussed.2' The
United States then proceeded with its retaliation against Al Qaeda by bom-
barding Afghanistan.27 However, the United States needed to be protected
from the inside, so the President, through an Executive Order, established the
Office of Homeland Security.08 The primary functions of this newly created
office are to be "responsible for administering such polic[ies] with respect to
terrorist threats and attacks within the United States."2°  This office will be
responsible for "detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against, re-
sponding to, and recovering from terrorist threats or attacks within the
United States."21 Prevention, as would be expected, is one of the key com-
ponents of this effort.2t Since the terrorists who attacked the World Trade
Center were from outside the United States-from Middle Eastern coun-
tries212--there will also be careful scrutiny of immigration and visas.213 Will
200. Id.
201. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
202. George W. Bush, America's 43rd President.
203. Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2.
204. See id. The Act provides:
[Tihe President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in or-
der to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such na-
tions, organizations or persons.
Id.
205. See id.
206. See supra Part I.
207. See, e.g., James Dao with Patrick E. Tyler, A Nation Challenged: The Alliance;
Military Called Just One Element in War on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, at Al.
208. Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812, 51,812 (Oct. 10, 2001).
209. Id. at 51,816.
210. Id. at 51,812.
211. Id. at 51,813.
212. See James Risen & Don Van Natta, Jr., Authorities Have Learned the Identities of 18
Hijackers, Attorney General Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 14, 2001, at A4.
213. Exec. Order No. 13,228,66 Fed. Reg. 51,812, 51,813 (Oct. 10, 2001).
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civil liberties stand in the way of these investigative activities? Not accord-
ing to section 3(k) of the Executive Order which indicates that if the legal
authority to act is inadequate they will periodically review the matter and
seek Presidential and legislative action to change the laws to accommodate
the functions of this office.21 4
B. The USA PATRIOT Act and the Arab and Muslim in America
The United States already has "relatively poor relations with the Mus-
lim world, 2 5 a kind of "Islamophobia. ' '21 6 The USA PATRIOT Act goes to
great lengths to reassure Arab and Muslim Americans that the United States
does not see them as the enemy.21 7 In response to incidents of hate crimes
that have taken place since September 11, 2001,218 the President has even
gone so far as to visit a Mosque to show his support for Muslim and Arab-
Americans. 219  He has stated in a political address that the people of the
United States respect those of the Muslim faith. 220  However, not unlike
World War II and the reaction to the Japanese living in our country, this is a
time when non-Muslim Americans are retaliating, with hate, in their own
communities, and the targets are innocent Arab and Arab-looking individu-
als.2 2 1 The fear is that "'life is going to be miserable,"' for the Arab Ameri-
214. Id. at 51,815.
215. Adrien Katherine Wing, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: A
Critical Race Perspective, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 561, 581 (2000).
216. Id. (citing Farhan Haq, Religion-Rights: UN Report Shows Mixed Picture on U.S.
Muslims, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 18, 1999).
217. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 102(a)-(b), 115 Stat. 272, 276-
77.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that -
(1) the civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans, including Arab Americans, Muslim
Americans, and Americans from South Asia, must be protected, and that every effort must be
taken to preserve their safety;
(2) any acts of violence or discrimination against any Americans be condemned; and
(3) the Nation is called upon to recognize the patriotism of fellow citizens from all ethnic,
racial, and religious backgrounds.
Id. § 102(b), at 277.
218. See Laurie Goodstein & Gustav Niebuhr, Attacks and Harassment ofArab-Americans
Increase, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A14.
219. Blaine Harden, Arab-Americans Are Finding New Tolerance Amid the Turmoil, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001, at B1.
220. Presidential Address, supra note 27.
221. See Tamar Lewin & Gustav Niebuhr, Attacks and Harassment Continue on Middle
Eastern People and Mosques, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at B5. The article lists a series of
hate crimes in which a Sikh gas station owner was killed; a Lebanese clerk at another gas
station was shot at; a Pakistani grocery store owner was gunned down; Mosques were being
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can.222 These criminal acts are admittedly the work of extremists and the
United States government has worked hard to cast them in their proper
light.223 However, there is an attitude that has developed in the United States
which has caused us to give a second look at the Arab-looking person.224
There is a fear that President Bush will follow the lead of Lincoln and
Roosevelt in abrogating constitutional liberties. 25 "Americans [seem] deeply
conflicted about the balance between security and civil liberties ... ,226 The
undercurrent seems to be about taking civil liberties from Middle Eastern-
ers.227 "[M]any Muslims ... have felt like targets in a larger society where
'Arab' and 'Muslim' are often equated with 'terrorist.' ' 228 Yet others are
worried that people in power who have their own personal agendas could use
this situation to take too many of our liberties away.229 To quote one Arab-
American, "'[o]fficials come and say there's a distinction between terrorists
and Islam .... Publicly they say we are friends. But secretly they say, 'No,
go behind them, tape them and spy on them."' 230
It is little wonder that the Arab and Muslim American community is
worried when Attorney General Ashcroft makes remarks like "'Islam is a
religion in which God requires you to send your son to die for him. Christi-
anity is a faith in which God sends his son to die for you.' '231 Having a per-
son who has the power to certify that you are engaged in terrorist activities
without showing evidence understandably makes the presumed targets of that
232scrutiny uneasy.
attacked--one mosque even had a car drive through the doors; and school children were being
bullied. Id.
222. Harden, supra note 219.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Robin Toner, Civil Liberty vs. Security: Finding a Wartime Balance, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2001, at Al.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Toner, supra note 225.
231. Dan Eggen, Alleged Remarks on Islam Prompt an Ashcroft Reply; Critics Urge a
More Emphatic Repudiation of Comments, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2002, at A31. Remarks
were allegedly made by Attorney General John Ashcroft to syndicated columnist Cal Thomas
who quoted them on his radio broadcast. Id. The Justice Department said that Ashcroft's
statement "referr[ed] to terrorists who distorted Islamic beliefs." Id. A spokesperson for the
Department of Justice said that the "statement reflected views of terrorists and not mainstream
Muslims." Justice Officials Deny Ashcroft Insulted Islam, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2002, at 21.
232. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350-52.
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C. National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
The new Entry-Exit Registration System is becoming a reality.2 33 The
system will have three prongs.2' The first is "fingerprinting and photograph-
ing at the border. 235 Next is "periodic registration of aliens who stay in the
United States thirty days or more., 236 Finally, the implementation of "exit
controls that will help the Immigration and Naturalization Service remove
those aliens who overstay their visas. '237 The worry seems to come from the
second part of the process since it would affect those law abiding residents
already here legally.238 American Muslim groups do not like the plan be-
cause they feel that it will target Muslims and Arabs instead of terrorists,
becoming a kind of modem day "witch-hunt., 239 Ashcroft would not, even
with repeated questioning, state from which countries visitors would be fin-
gerprinted.240 However, "[o]ther government officials said men 18 to 35
years of age from about 20 largely Muslim and Middle Eastern nations, in-
cluding important allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, would make up the
bulk of those who would be fingerprinted, photographed and required to fill
out a long form. ' 241
Since this new system has been put in place without Congressional con-
sultation, not everyone on Capitol Hill is pleased with the plan. 42 Senator
Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts stated that he was "'deeply disap-
pointed"' by this new system and considered it a way of "target[ing] Muslim
and Arab nationals. 24 3 He felt it would do little to protect against terrorist
attacks and would "'further stigmatize innocent Arab and Muslim visitors,
students, and workers who have committed no crimes and pose no danger to
us.' ,244
233. See Ashcroft, supra note 23.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See Jerry Seper, New INS Policy Targets Middle Easterners, WASH. TIMES, June 6,
2002, at AO.
239. Carolyn Lochhead, Rights Groups Condemn Visa Plan: Ashcroft Says Crackdown is
Essential for U.S. Security, S.F. CHRON., June 6, 2002, at Al.
240. See Ashcroft, supra note 23.
241. Eric Schmitt, Ashcroft Proposes Rules for Foreign Visitors, N.Y. TIMEs, June 6,
2002, at A28.
242. Seper, supra note 238.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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1. The New Face of Racial Profiling
A concise definition of racial profiling is a "'law enforcement-initiated
action based on an individual's race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than
on the individual's behavior or on information identifying the individual as
having engaged in criminal activity."' 24 However, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that "when determining whom to
approach as a suspect of criminal wrongdoing, a police officer may legiti-
mately consider race as a factor if descriptions of the perpetrator known to
the officer include race."246
When the United States government treats the entire Arab and Muslim
communities as if they are terrorist suspects, they "'don't create trust or co-
operation. [They] create fear."'247  Many writers point out that targeting
people by their country of origin will be ineffective because "Zacarias Mous-
saoui248 held a French passport and suspected shoe-bomber Richard Reid
[held] a British passport. 249 The question then becomes, if the threat can
just as easily come from U.S. citizens and national origin is an unreliable
factor, what possible means can we use other than physical appearance?
2 0
2. Power to Regulate Immigrants
The reason that there is no constitutional challenge to Ashcroft's plan is
because "[t]he Supreme Court has stated that the power to regulate immigra-
tion is firmly in the hands of the political branches of the Federal Govern-
ment. '25' The question really is whether the power falls to the Attorney Gen-
245. United States v. Coleman, 162 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (quoting TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 3.05 (Vernon 2005)).
246. United States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597,604 (6th Cir. 2000).
247. Editorial, Treating Visitors Like Enemies, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 14, 2002,
at C18 (quoting David A. Harris, a visiting law professor at St. Louis University, and "an
expert on racial-profiling").
248. Zacarias Moussaoui, a self-admitted member of al Qaeda, is suspected by the United
States government of being the "20th hijacker" on Sept. 11, 2001. See Raymond Bonner &
Douglas Frantz, French Suspect Moussaoui in Post-9/1l Plot, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 2002, at
22. He was kept off the plane when he was taken into custody for violating the terms of his
visa. Id.
249. Lochhead, supra note 239; see also America's War Against Terrorism; New INS
Mandate May Be More Divisive than Effective at Preventing Terrorism, MORNING CALL
(Allentown, Pa.), June 7, 2002, at A18.
250. See Lochhead, supra note 239.
251. Zheng v. Reno, 166 F. Supp. 2d 875, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 305 (1993); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982)).
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eral or the Congress? The answer is Congress."' Therefore, the courts will
not be much help in this matter.253
But whether immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether
they may have reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or
anti-Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress. Courts
do enforce the requirements imposed by Congress upon officials in
administering immigration laws, and the requirement of Due Proc-
ess may entail certain procedural observances. . . . One merely
recognizes that the place to resist unwise or cruel legislation touch-
ing aliens is the Congress, not this Court.
2 54
The USA PATRIOT Act was created by Congress and signed into law
by the President.255 As of that date, 56 when the law became effective, the
Attorney General was given the power to implement the Entry-Exit program,
including fingerprint identification.257 When decisions are made, however,
there is a clause which states that no court shall have, absent special circum-
stances, jurisdiction to review, by habeas corpus petition or otherwise, any
such action or decision.258 As with all laws, "'[a]nyone who [is] truly dan-
gerous is not going to show up to be registered.' ' '259 "'This is targeting a
group of people, the overwhelming majority of whom are innocent, but
whose lives will be turned upside down .... 6
3. McVeigh and Padilla-The United States Citizen Who Terrorizes
Terrorists are not just from outside of our borders; many are United
States citizens.26' Timothy McVeigh blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
252. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597-98 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
253. Id. at 589 (majority opinion).
254. Id. at 597-98 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
255. OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 47
(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat-strat-hls.pdf (stating that
the President signed the USA PATRIOT Act into law on October 26, 2001).
256. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 41 1(c)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 348.
257. USA PATRIOT Act § 405(a).
258. See USA PATRIOT Act § 412.
259. Schmitt, supra note 25 (quoting Jeanne Butterfield, Executive Director, American
Immigration Lawyers Association).
260. Id. (quoting James J. Zogby, President, Arab American Institute).
261. See Not All Terrorists Are from Mideast, THE ADvOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), May
10, 2002, at 8B.
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Building in Oklahoma City, causing 168 deaths.262 The bomb "destroyed 14
buildings, damaged 309 others and... injured more than 500 people. 263 He
was caught and subsequently executed for his crimes.2' He was not the only
one.265 There was "the Unabomber" who sent explosive letters through the
mail.266 The mailbox bomber put pipe bombs in mailboxes throughout the
Midwest. 267 Finally, there was Jose Padilla who was arrested for planning a
dirty bomb attack.268 Americans, one and all, yet not one of them would
have had to pass through the new Entry-Exit system.269 There was no gov-
ernment ultimatum that all Americans should be fingerprinted and photo-
graphed, although there was talk of a type of national identification card
through United States driver licenses.270 The plan would be a "back door"
approach to do the same thing to the American citizenry as is being done to
the foreigners entering our borders.27'
IV. CONCLUSION
In times of peace, the government is in a precarious balance of power
between the judiciary, administrative, and legislative branches. However, in
times of war all of that begins to break down. Our Constitutional guarantees
no longer become ones that are for every citizen, but become ones that are
for those that fall within the popular and political beliefs of the nation at the
time of crisis. The Supreme Court has shown itself to be powerless if there
is a strong President or if the President and Congress work in unison to
abridge civil liberties.
Unlike previous wars where the North had to defeat the South or the
unconditional surrender of Japan ended the need for worrying about the in-
terned Japanese citizens, the United States has no clear cut foreseeable vic-
262. See Erin Hallissy, Oklahoma City Bombing; Timothy McVeigh Execution; Endurance
in the Face of Tragedy; Six Years Later, Oklahoma City Moves Forward, S.F. CHRON., June
10, 2001, at A1 7, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2001/06/10/
MN39387.DTL&hw=oklahoma+city+bombing&sn=ooldsc= 1000.
263. Id.
264. See Rick Bragg, The McVeigh Execution: The Overview: McVeigh Dies for Okla-
homa City Blast, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at Al.
265. See Not All Terrorists are from Mideast, supra note 261.
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., GC Pay Weathers the Storm: Congress Must Set Rules for
How We Lock up Potential Terrorists, LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 2002, at 44.
269. See Ashcroft, supra note 23.
270. See John Hall, Might National ID Begin with Drivers' Licenses?, TAMPA TRIB., July
24, 2002, at 11.
271. See id.
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tory in the war on terror. The civil liberties that are disappearing will proba-
bly disappear forever. Those within our borders who are from other coun-
tries have no choice but to turn themselves in for fingerprinting and photo-
graphing, not unlike an arrested criminal. But who will really come forward?
The terrorist who wants to check in or the law abiding citizen who wants to
follow the rules and live in our country peaceably? This is another instance
where the government is intruding into the lives of the innocent in order to
find the few that might be guilty. It is no different than the internment camps
of World War II, seeking a few saboteurs among an otherwise loyal popu-
lace, except that the barbed wire has been replaced with fear of arrest without
habeas corpus rights and deportation. As seen by the news of recent days, the
popular sentiment is still not strongly sided with the Muslim and Arab com-
munity. Perhaps it is a fear of the unknown, both about their religious beliefs
and about when and where the next attack might be perpetrated. The United
States must learn from the past so that it does not become a totalitarian re-
gime in the future. It is a dangerous path this country is on when it seeks to
take away a group's civil liberties to prevent future criminal events. That
should be left to the stuff of fiction.272
272. MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002). The film featured officers who
would arrest people before a crime was committed or even thought of, in order to prevent it
from ever taking place in the future. Id. This made for a peaceful society, free of violent
crime. Id. Is this where we are heading?
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I. INTRODUCTION
Something has gone awry with American democracy. Since at least the
start of this decade, the country has been closely and sharply divided when it
comes to national elections and national policy. Yet at the very same time,
more and more elections in the United States are becoming little more than
formal rituals; they are affairs of acclimation rather than intensely competi-
* Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law.
Carnegie Scholar 2004-05. I would like to thank former Congressman and independent can-
didate for the Presidency in 1980, John Anderson, now a professor at Nova Law School,
whose commitment to competitive democracy has been an inspiration to many.
+ This article is based on an amici curiae brief I co-authored with my colleagues, Pro-
fessors Samuel Issacharoff and Burt Neuborne, and filed in the currently pending "Texas
redistricting case," League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry. Brief of Samuel Issa-
charoff, Burt Neubome, & Richard H. Pildes as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants at 1,
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, Nos. 05-204, 05-254, 05-276, 05-439 (U.S.
Aug. 11, 2005). I would like to personally thank Sam and Burt, best of colleagues, for their
indulgence in permitting me to reproduce portions of that brief here. I also thank David Lit-
terine-Kaufman for research assistance.
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tive contests that force conflicts over policies and ideologies to the surface
and give voters meaningful choice. This is true for certain national elections,
such as for Congress, and for many elections to state institutions, such as
state legislatures.
Consider the following striking fact: the post-redistricting elections in
2002 were the least competitive in American history.' Challengers managed
to defeat only four congressional incumbents.2 More than one-third of state
congressional delegations did not change at all.3 There were 338 incumbents
who won by more than a twenty-point margin, the generally accepted defini-
tion of a "landslide." 4 There were only thirty-eight minimally competitive
districts nationwide, using the generally accepted definition of less than a
ten-point margin of victory (and even many of those districts were designed
by commissions, not partisan legislatures).5 These figures reflect a dramatic
decline from previous decades in competitiveness.6
The purpose of this essay is to offer a constitutional framework for iden-
tifying and rectifying the constitutional threat posed by the most pernicious
cause that now contributes to the near elimination of competitive congres-
sional elections: the design of election districts.7 In particular, the aim of
this essay is to offer an alternative framework to the way litigants and the
Court have previously thought about the constitutional issues concerning
election-district design. In the past, litigants and the Court have relied pri-
marily on the Equal Protection Clause to challenge and judge the structure of
election districts, whether in the original malapportionment cases, the vote
1. See Gary C. Jacobson, Terror, Terrain, and Turnout: Explaining the 2002 Midterm
Elections, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 10-11 (2003).
2. Id.
3. These numbers were compiled from the following sources: CONG. QUARTERLY'S
STAFF, CQ's PoLITIcs IN AMERICA 2004: THE 108TH CONGRESS (David Hawkings & Brian
Nutting eds., 2003); MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN
PoLITIcs 2004 (2003); and STATISTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 5,
2002 (Jeff Trandahl ed., 2003), available at http://clerk.house.gov/members/electionlnfo/
2002election.pdf [hereinafter 2002 ELECTION STATISTICS].
4. See tbl.1 infra p. 273.
5. See CONG. QUARTERLY'S STAFF, supra note 3. On the effects of commission rather
than legislative redistricting, see infra pp. 275-76.
6. See tbl.1 infra p. 273.
7. The doctrinal arguments in this essay build on the conceptual work in: Richard H.
Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 28 (2004) [here-
inafter Pildes I]; Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L.
REv. 593 (2002); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REv.
1605 (1999) [hereinafter Pildes 1I]; and Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as
Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643 (1998).
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dilution cases, or the racial-redistricting cases.8 This has led to continuing
judicial struggle to define partisan "excessiveness" in districting, whether
through the "consistent degradation" test of Davis v. Bandemer,9 or through
the three different proposals of the dissenters in the recent Vieth v. Jubelirer°
decision.'
When it comes to the threat that non-competitive elections pose to le-
gitimate representative self-government, then, the instinct of lawyers and
judges will similarly be to turn to the Equal Protection Clause. This impulse
is understandable. For over forty years, the Equal Protection Clause has
served as the principal constitutional vehicle for intensive judicial involve-
ment in protecting the right to vote and to run for office. 2 The Supreme
Court's insistence on rigorous compliance with principles of formal electoral
equality has provided-and continues to provide-an essential foundation
for American democracy.
In the last decade, however, it has become clear that formal political
equality can co-exist with suppression of an essential element of democratic
self-governance--competitive elections in which voters can hold their repre-
sentatives electorally accountable. When a state legislature designs a con-
gressional apportionment that satisfies the formal mathematical norms of
"one-person one-vote," but intentionally dispenses with competitive elec-
tions in virtually every congressional district, the lens of formal equality no
longer reveals the nature of the constitutional injury. Nor is that injury fully
addressed in a search for a "fair" allocation of the political spoils between the
political parties. Rather, the constitutional violation lies in the structural
harm to representative self-government that results when state legislatures
abuse their powers under the Elections Clause, Article I, Section 4, and de-
liberately suppress competitive elections in systematic fashion.
Such a structural harm to the fundamental mechanisms of representative
self-government is a kind of harm that the Equal Protection Clause is not
well designed to recognize, let alone remedy. My aim here is to provide an
alternative, one tied more directly to the constitutional underpinnings for
8. Pildes II, supra note 7; Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and
Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505 (1997).
9. 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion).
10. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
11. Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 346-53 (Souter, J., dissenting); Id. at 362-67
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
12. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962).
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state regulation of national elections. As the Supreme Court increasingly
confronts these and related issues, as in the Texas mid-decade redistricting
case before the Court this Term, 3 the need for an appropriate framework for
constitutional protection of the basic mechanism of representative self-
government-the electoral accountability of officeholders to voters-is all
the more urgent.
II. THE ASSAULT ON COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS
As noted above, congressional elections in the wake of the post-2000 re-
districting were the least competitive in American history. No matter which
way the question is framed-incumbents defeated, incumbents retired, in-
cumbents victorious in a landslide-the 2002 elections were less competitive
than after any redistricting in any decade since Baker v. Carr.14 Turnover,
the percentage of new representatives, is at an all-time low.'5 The following
published Table provides the summary statistics: 6
13. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, Nos. 05-204, 05-254, 05-276, 05-439
(argued Mar. 1, 2006).
14. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15. Gary C. Jacobson, Competition in U.S. Congressional Elections (draft paper pre-
sented at conference, "The Marketplace of Democracy" (March 6, 2006).
16. Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in
the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 183 (2003).
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Table 1. Comparison of the 2002 Election with Elections from
1972 to 200017
This lack of competitive elections for Congress contrasts notably with
the greater competitiveness seen in Senatorial and Gubernatorial elections.
While only one of eleven House elections was decided by less than ten per-
centage points, fully half of state governorships and Senate seats contested
on the same day-in elections impervious to political gerrymandering-were
instead competitive enough to be decided by less than this ten-point margin.
As one of the leading political science analysts of congressional elections has
17. Id. at 183 tbl.1.
18. Challengers defeated only four incumbents in the 2002 election. Jacobson, supra
note 1, at 10-11. An additional four incumbents lost seats due to diminution in the size of
their States' congressional delegations. Hirsch, supra note 16, at 183. They challenged other
incumbents and lost. Id.
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put it: "Redistricting was clearly one source of the loss of potentially com-
petitive districts, especially after 2000."'9
The virtual elimination of competitive congressional elections has come
about as a result of multiple causes.20 But of these causes, only one is subject
to easy change, has little justification, and is capable of being reached
through constitutional law: political gerrymandering of election districts.
Over the last twenty years or so, state legislatures have learned to "perfect"
two forms of gerrymandering. The first is the partisan gerrymander, such as
the Texas plan before the Court this Term, in which a faction with transitory
dominance draws district lines to maximize its party's political advantage at
the expense of the minority party. The second kind is the "sweetheart," bi-
partisan gerrymander, in which the two major parties work as a cartel and
risk-aversely agree to allocate political representation to protect as many
19. See Jacobson, Congressional Elections, supra note 15, at 8. In earlier work shortly
after the 2002 elections, Jacobson attributed a strongly causal role to redistricting: "Redis-
tricting patterns are a major reason for the dearth of competitive races in 2002 and help to
explain why 2002 produced the smallest number of successful House challenges (four) of any
general election in U.S. history." Jacobson, supra note 1, at 10-11.
20. The other potential contributing causes appear to be the greater consistency with
which voters vote along party lines; the greater geographical concentration of voters by party
affiliation independent of the way election districts are designed; and the increasing cost of
elections, which disadvantages challengers. Of course these factors likely interact, also, in
complex ways. Some have argued, for example, that the apparent greater polarization in vot-
ing patterns is an effect of safe districting, rather than a cause; faced with only the extreme
partisan choices generated by non-competitive safe districts, voters, on this view, will appear
to be more partisan in their voting behavior. See MoRRIs P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE WAR?
THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2005). In recently published work, some authors have
suggested that redistricting practices have not played a significant role in the decline of com-
petitive elections. Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of
Competition in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75, 86 (2006). But other experts have con-
vincingly pointed out serious methodological flaws that undermine this recent work; in par-
ticular, this study uses the three-way 1992 Presidential election, in which Ross Perot received
18.9% of the vote, as a baseline for assessing the 1992 congressional elections, while using
the conventional two-party Presidential race in 1988 as a baseline for the 1990 elections. This
greatly distorts the results; when the data are reanalyzed with less distorted baselines, they
continue to show that redistricting has contributed to the decline of competitive congressional
elections. See Michael McDonald, Re-Drawing the Line on District Competition, 39 PS: Pol.
Sci. & Pol. 99 (2006); see also Michael McDonald, Drawing the Line on District Competition,
39 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 91 (2006). Although Gary Jacobson, a leading analyst of congres-
sional elections, earlier concluded that redistricting practices were "a major reason" for the
decline in competitive elections, more recent, unpublished work by Jacobson concludes that
increasing partisan consistency and polarization in voters' voting patterns in all elections,
districted or not, contributes more than redistricting to the decline in competitive congres-
sional elections. See supra note 19.
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incumbents as possible.2 Common to each form is intentional state legisla-
tive action to minimize the risk of competitive elections or eliminate that risk
altogether. These tactics have contributed to the decline in competitive con-
gressional races. 22 Even during the decades of gross malapportionment, dis-
franchisement, and a virtual Democratic Party monopoly on political power
in the South, incumbents still lost 10-11% of the time on average during, for
example, the 1930s and 1940s-as compared to 1.8% in the 2000s so far.23
These results are even more troubling because the first election after the
decennial census, reapportionment, and redistricting is historically the time
when congressional elections are most competitive. When not intentionally
manipulated to eliminate competitive elections, redistricting is historically
the moment at which incumbents and prior political coalitions are most de-
stabilized and elections therefore most open to new blood. As the data pre-
sented above show, with new incumbents settling into their seats in new dis-
tricts, congressional elections typically become less and less competitive
over the ensuing decade.
The impact of self-interested, anti-competitive gerrymandering on elec-
toral accountability is also suggested by differences between the competi-
tiveness of congressional districts that are drawn by courts or commissions
and those that partisan state legislatures design.24 In 2002, the seventeen
states using commissions or courts to draw congressional lines, 31% of the
commission-drawn districts were competitive enough to preclude a landslide,
23.3% of the court-drawn districts were similarly competitive, but only
16.3% of the legislatively-drawn districts were competitive enough to be
won by less than a landslide. 25 A decade earlier, the 1992 redistricting pro-
duced the same general pattern: Commission-drawn districts were the most
competitive, court-drawn districts were less so, and legislatively drawn dis-
tricts were the least competitive. The major difference between 1992 and
21. Experts characterize California, New York, Illinois, and Ohio (with a combined total
of 119 seats) as having adopted bipartisan gerrymanders in which nearly all seats were pro-
tected, though both California (Democratic) and Ohio (Republican) were nominally under
unified party control. BARONE & COHEN, supra note 3, at 44.
22. See supra, note 20.
23. HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS
2005-2006, at 47 tbl. 1-14 (2006).
24. Data and analysis in this paragraph are from Jamie L. Carson & Michael H. Crespin,
The Effect of State Redistricting Methods on Electoral Competition in United States House of
Representatives Races, 4 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 455 (2004).
25. Id. at 456, 460 tbl. 1. "A race is [defined here as] competitive if the winning candi-
date received less than 60 percent of the two-party vote in the general election." Id. at 460
tbl.1.
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2002 was a decline of almost 50% by 2002 in the number of congressional
districts not won by a landslide when legislatures controlled districting.
Thus, these data further confirm the perverse "perfection" in recent years of
the political insider's "art" of undermining competitive congressional elec-
tions.
The cost of these "designer districts," artificially manipulated to ensure
non-competitive elections, is not just the loss of electoral accountability that
is the defining element of representative self-government. Competitive elec-
tions also are essential to other tangible democratic and constitutional values.
Thus, it is well documented that competitive elections encourage the appear-
ance of strong challengers to incumbents and increase voter turnout and party
mobilization.26 The two-party system itself is enhanced over the long run by
competitive elections, for political parties that are overwhelmingly dominant
in particular localities have no greater incentives than do lazy monopolists in
economic markets.27
Finally, the structural role of the House is to be the institution most im-
mediately and directly responsive to shifts in popular political preferences.
Elections every two years and minimal qualifications for office were de-
signed for exactly this reason. That is why mid-term congressional elections
have historically served, as designed, as a partial referendum on national
policy in the long interval between Senatorial and Presidential terms. State
legislative abuse of the Elections Clause power interferes with this intended
structural role of the House. As a result of anti-competitive districting, the
House is now perhaps the least responsive institution in the national govern-
ment:
A national swing of five percent in voter opinion-a sea change in
most elections-will change very few seats in the current House of
Representatives. Gerrymandering thus creates a kind of inertia
that arrests the House's dynamic process. It makes it less certain
that votes in the chamber will reflect shifts in popular opinion, and
26. See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION,
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 177-88 (2003); L. Sandy Maisel & Walter J. Stone, Determi-
nants of Candidate Emergence in U.S. House Elections: An Exploratory Study, 22 LEGIS.
STuD. Q. 79 (1997); Gary W. Cox & Michael C. Munger, Closeness, Expenditures, and Turn-
out in the 1982 U.S. House Elections, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 217 (1989); see also EVERETr
CARLL LADD, WHERE HAVE ALL THE VOTERS GONE?, at xxii (2d ed. 1982) (identifying greater
sense of efficacy among voters able to hold incumbents accountable).
27. See ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PROCESS,
PARTICIPATION, AND POWER IN STATE LEGISLATURES 194-95 (1998).
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thus frustrates change and creates undemocratic slippage between
the people and their government.
28
To ensure that all elections are competitive is, of course, impossible. A
natural political advantage enjoyed by one or another political faction in a
geographical area may render election outcomes a foregone conclusion.
Nothing in the Constitution or in democratic political theory guarantees a
perennial political minority anything other than a fair chance to persuade the
political majority and continued enjoyment of equal treatment under law.
But as evident from the design of 90% of congressional districts nationwide,
a lethal combination of modem technology, partisanship, and incumbent self-
dealing renders it possible for state legislatures to assure that nearly all con-
gressional elections are non-competitive.
Challenges by the political parties to partisan gerrymandering have al-
ways been framed in terms of whether one party or the other has been so
"discriminated" against in districting as to violate the Equal Protection
Clause.29 The political parties dispute the distributional equity of one or an-
other districting plan. But even as they do so, the undeniable fact of modem
political life is the virtual disappearance of competitive congressional elec-
tions. None of the equal-protection arguments about the partisan implica-
tions of one or another districting plan captures the full insult to the constitu-
tional commitment of electoral accountability that state legislative creation of
overwhelmingly "safe" congressional districts entails. In California, for ex-
ample, not a single challenger in the 2002 congressional general election
received even 40% of the vote.3° Political actors facing such an absence of
electoral competition well understand that the power to "choose" representa-
tives in "elections" resides, not in "the People," but in what the Court has
elsewhere termed a "self-perpetuating body" of self-dealing insiders.3 One
need look no further for proof than this unabashed admission regarding Cali-
fornia redistricting by Representative Loretta Sanchez, in which she
describes the role of redistricting czar Michael Berman, the leading consult-
ant to the controlling Democratic Party in drawing the new district lines:
So Rep. Loretta Sanchez of Santa Ana said she and the rest of the
Democratic congressional delegation went to Berman and made
their own deal. Thirty of the 32 Democratic incumbents have paid
Berman $20,000 each, she said, for an "incumbent-protection
28. Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 487 (2004).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
30. Hirsch, supra note 16, at 182.
31. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 793 n.10 (1995).
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plan." 'Twenty thousand is nothing to keep your seat," Sanchez
said. "I spend $2 million (campaigning) every election. If my col-
leagues are smart, they'll pay their $20,000, and Michael will draw
the district they can win in. Those who have refused to pay? God
help them."
32
No political actor seeking such a path to electoral sinecure has an incen-
tive to bring before the courts the full constitutional harm that political ger-
rymandering of this sort imposes. Nor is the Equal Protection Clause, fo-
cused on alleged discrimination between the political parties, well designed
to address the full constitutional harms at stake in the systematic, intentional
elimination of electoral competition and accountability. The Elections
Clause33 grants the States enumerated powers to regulate national elections
only for legitimate purposes. As Part III now seeks to show, judicial en-
forcement of the limits contained in the Elections Clause, particularly when
read in conjunction with other constitutional provisions, best protects the
structural constitutional values under assault by the systematic, intentional,
and self-interested design of overwhelmingly "safe" election districts that
make officeholders less accountable to voters.
Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE MANIPULATION OF
NATIONAL ELECTIONS
The Constitution contains at least three textual provisions that, properly
understood, prohibit state legislative efforts to systematically design non-
competitive congressional election districts and frustrate the Constitution's
essential requirement that members of Congress be electorally accountable to
the voters.
First, the Elections Clause delegates power to state legislatures to estab-
lish only the "[t]imes, [p]laces and [mianner" of congressional elections.34
Just as Article I's grant of enumerated powers to Congress necessarily limit
the exercise of those powers to the reasons for which granted, the specific
and limited delegation of power in the Elections Clause does not license state
legislatures to eviscerate competitive congressional elections and undermine
electoral accountability. Yet the systematic creation of overwhelmingly
"safe" election districts on behalf of partisan allies does precisely that. In
32. Hanh Kim Quach & Dena Bunis, All Bow to Redistrict Architect: Politics Secretive,
Single-Minded Michael Berman Holds All the Crucial Cards, ORANGE COuNTY REG., Aug. 26,
2001, available at http://fairvote.org/redistricting/reports/remanual/usnews6.htm#arch.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
34. Id.
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terms of constitutional law, the question should not be simply whether, under
the Equal Protection Clause, one of the major political parties has been un-
constitutionally discriminated against in districting. The question should
also be-indeed, perhaps the central question ought to be-whether state
legislatures have the constitutional power intentionally and systematically to
insulate congressional candidates and incumbents from contested elections.
In my view, the Elections Clause should be understood to grant no such
power.
This inherent limitation on state legislative authority over congressional
elections is confirmed by two other constitutional provisions: Article I, Sec-
tion 2, which requires that the People (not the state legislatures) choose the
members of Congress, and the First Amendment, which guarantees freedom
of speech, assembly, association, and petition.35 Together with the Elections
Clause, these provisions combine to prevent state legislatures from manipu-
lating congressional elections through the creation of overwhelmingly "safe"
election districts. Under Article I, Sections 2 and 4, and the principle of rep-
resentative self-government that motivates the First Amendment, the abuse
of redistricting authority to turn congressional elections into empty rituals
should be found unconstitutional.36
I will develop each of these points in turn. But before doing so, it is
helpful to keep a more general perspective in mind. The Supreme Court has
long protected two of the three great structural pillars of the American politi-
cal and constitutional system: federalism and separation of powers. In just
the same way, the Court should protect the Constitution's third great struc-
tural imperative-representative self-government through contested elec-
tions-from destruction at the hands of self-dealing political incumbents and
their allies of both major parties. Moreover, as the last part of this essay will
suggest, manageable judicial standards to do so exist.
A. The Elections Clause
The states' power to design congressional districts derives exclusively
from the specifically enumerated grant of power in the Elections Clause.37
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36. Id.
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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The states have no reserved or inherent powers over the regulation and de-
sign of congressional districts and elections.38
Just as the grant of enumerated powers in Article I to Congress limits the
exercise of those powers to the scope and objectives for which granted,39 the
constitutional grant of specifically enumerated power to the states over con-
gressional districting limits the scope and aims for which those powers can
be exercised.4" The Supreme Court has indicated many times the importance
of ensuring that Congress' powers are limited to the scope and aims for
which the Constitution specifically enumerates the grant of particular pow-
ers.4' In exactly the same way, the Court should continue to recognize that,
when state legislatures exercise power pursuant to a specifically enumerated
grant in Article I, this power is limited to the scope and aims for which the
Constitution grants it.
In particular, state legislatures have no delegated power under Article I
to design congressional districts for the purpose and effect of destroying the
electoral accountability between representatives and citizens that is essential
to representative democracy. The Elections Clause does not grant states the
power to regulate congressional elections with the aim and effect of artifi-
cially insulating members of Congress from electoral competition through
state creation of overwhelmingly "safe," non-competitive congressional
election districts. As the Court noted in United States Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, "the Framers understood the Elections Clause as a grant of author-
ity to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate
electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade
important constitutional restraints."42
38. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2001) (recognizing that "[n]o other constitu-
tional provision [other than the Elections Clause] gives the States authority over congressional
elections"); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 834-35 (1995) (stating that
state authority over national elections exists only insofar as specifically delegated in the Elec-
tions Clause).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995).
40. See Cook, 531 U.S. at 523. "[T]he States may regulate the incidents of [congres-
sional] elections, including balloting, only within the exclusive delegation of power under the
Elections Clause." Id.
41. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598,607, 620-21 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997); Lopez,
514 U.S. at 553.
42. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833-34 (1995). See also
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932) (noting that the Elections Clause grants states the
power to regulate national elections "as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows
are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right [to vote] involved").
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The Elections Clause, like the Qualifications Clauses at issue in Term
Limits, does not empower the states (or Congress) to design congressional
districts in a way that "would lead to a self-perpetuating body to the detri-
ment of the new Republic. 43  At the Constitutional Convention, James
Madison noted the risk of leaving unfettered power in the hands of poten-
tially self-interested political actors to regulate elections: "A Republic may
be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number
capable of being elected, as the number authorised to elect."'  The Court has
constrained the ability of political bodies to manipulate electoral outcomes
through gerrymandering voting ("the number authorised to elect")45 and
vote-counting rules.46 But artificially non-competitive election districts are
now the most direct and devastatingly effective means of creating a "self-
perpetuating body" in the House, in light of modem election-behavior data
bases and sophisticated computer technology. The manipulation of district
design to ensure artificially that one party or the other's congressional candi-
dates face no meaningful competition on general election day is neither a
necessary nor a proper exercise of the specific power delegated to the state
legislatures in the Elections Clause.47
The Court and individual members of the Court have recognized that
numerous provisions of the Constitution were specifically designed to protect
against even the risk of self-interested manipulation of the election process
by those in power. That those temporarily in office will seek to leverage
their power over election-rule design into more enduring power for them-
selves and their allies is eminently predictable. As Justice Scalia has noted,
"[t]he first instinct of power is the retention of power."48 Similarly, Justice
Thomas has observed that the structure of the Census and Apportionment
Clauses reflected the Framers' realization that the danger of self-interested
43. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 793 n.10.
44. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 250 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000).
47. For recent scholarship also addressed to the limitations the Elections Clause imposes
on state legislative regulation of national elections, see Jamal Greene, Note, Judging Partisan
Gerrymanders Under the Elections Clause, 114 YALE L.J. 1021 (2005), and Note, A New
Map: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Federalism Injury, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1196 (2004)
[hereinafter A New Map].
48. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concur-
ring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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political manipulation of the census and apportionment required that the
Constitution create "a standard that would limit political chicanery.
49
If numerous provisions of the Constitution are understood to guard
against the risk of self-interested manipulation of the election process, surely
the Elections Clause prohibits the actual, transparent, and even brazen self-
interested manipulation involved in the willful creation of overwhelmingly
"safe," non-competitive election districts that destroy electoral accountabil-
ity. It is also odd that some of the Justices most attentive to the risk that
"[t]he first instinct of power is the retention of power," such as Justices
Scalia and Thomas, are among those Justices least inclined to find political
gerrymandering claims justiciable. 50 And unlike campaign finance regula-
tion or statistical sampling under the Census Clause, there can be no dispute
about the purpose and effects of the current redistricting-and now, mid-
decade redistricting-processes I challenge here: Political insiders candidly
admit that they intentionally design congressional districts to be overwhelm-
ingly safe for partisan allies and incumbents. As the post-2002 redistricting
elections demonstrate, these plans have contributed to achieving precisely
that aim.
The Elections Clause does not empower state legislatures to artificially
create overwhelmingly non-competitive congressional districting plans
whose purpose and effect is overwhelmingly to insulate preferred candidates
from electoral accountability.5 ' As noted above, not all districted elections
can be made competitive. But just as there is a difference between natural
and illegal economic monopolies, there is a difference between safe districts
that arise naturally from following traditional districting principles in particu-
lar geographic areas and safe districts that arise because political insiders
have grossly manipulated district designs for the purpose and effect of insu-
lating preferred candidates from meaningful competition. 52 The latter should
not be understood to be a permissible justification for exercise of the limited,
49. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 500 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
50. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 263 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
51. For recent scholarship also addressing the limitations the Elections Clause imposes
on state legislative regulation of national elections, see Greene, supra note 47, and A New
Map, supra note 47.
52. For fuller analytical development of the risk of self-interested capture of political and
economic markets, see Issacharoff, supra note 7. See also David Schleicher, "Politics as
Markets" Reconsidered: Natural Monopolies, Competitive Democratic Philosophy and Pri-
mary Ballot Access in American Elections, SuP. CT. ECON. REv. (forthcoming 2007), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=740304.
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enumerated power delegated to state legislatures on behalf of the people of
the United States under the Elections Clause. Judicial enforcement of the
Elections Clause is necessary to enforce the structural commitment to repre-
sentative self-government through competitive elections that enable voters to
hold elected officials accountable.
B. Article I, Section 2 and the Fundamental Voting Right for the United
States House
Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that "[t]he House of
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year
by the People of the several States., 53 The Constitution thereby expressly
recognizes an affirmative right of the People to choose their representatives
through properly structured congressional elections. This is the only textual
reference to "the People" in the body of the original Constitution and the
only express, original textual right of the People to direct, unmediated politi-
cal participation in choosing officials of the national government.
Whatever issues may still cloud the justiciability of partisan vote dilution
claims under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized for many
decades its power to enforce strictly the guarantees to the People under Arti-
cle 1, Section 2. In Wesberry v. Sanders,54 the Court rejected any justiciabil-
ity claim that:
would immunize state congressional apportionment laws which
debase a citizen's right to vote from the power of courts to protect
the constitutional rights of individuals from legislative destruction
.... The right to vote is too important in our free society to be
stripped of judicial protection by such an interpretation of Article
1.55
The protections of Article I, Section 2, specifically designed to guarantee
the integrity of national elections, are greater than those under the general
provisions of the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court reached this
conclusion with specific reference to the redistricting process itself already.56
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
54. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
55. Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted).
56. Compare Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 528-29, 536 (1969) (striking down
under Article I, Section 2, congressional districts with population deviations of as little as
6%), with Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319, 333 (1973) (upholding under Equal Protection
Clause challenge state legislative districts with population deviations up to 16.4%).
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As the Court has recognized many times, Article I, Section 2, makes un-
constitutional state electoral practices that obstruct the right of the People to
"fair and effective representation" and "an equally effective voice" in the se-
lection of representatives, as identified by Reynolds v. Sims. 57 The impor-
tance of the voting rights of the People in congressional elections is high-
lighted by three cases whose significance for the Article I, Section 2 implica-
tions of non-competitive congressional districts has been underappreciated:
Powell v. McCormack, 8 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, and Cook v.
Gralike.59 Each overturned an effort to deny or improperly condition the
ability of the People of a State to choose freely a congressional representa-
tive of their choice, either by congressional refusal to seat a disfavored repre-
sentative, 6° by state constitutional restriction on the ability to return a pre-
ferred candidate to office,61 or by imposition of conditions that compelled the
attention of voters to predetermined issues.6" In each case, as expressed in
Term Limits, the Court sought to "vindicate[] the same 'fundamental princi-
ple of our representative democracy' that we recognized in Powell, namely,
that 'the people should choose whom they please to govern them."'
63
These cases recognize two principles with direct bearing on the unconsti-
tutionality of grossly manipulated "safe" elections. First, the Court reiterated
the importance of the sovereignty of the people in selecting freely their own
representatives; as expressed by Justice Kennedy, "[n]othing in the Constitu-
tion or The Federalist Papers . . . supports the idea of state interference with
the most basic relation between the National Government and its citizens, the
selection of legislative representatives."'  Recalling the infamous Wilkes
incident from Britain, in which Parliament attempted to usurp the power to
decree proper representation, Powell turned to the "fundamental principle of
our representative democracy.. . 'that the people should choose whom they
please to govern them."'
' 65
Second, the Court identified a concern at the Founding that reposing the
power to set the terms of congressional qualifications in the hands of incum-
57. 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964) (emphasis added).
58. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
59. 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
60. Powell, 395 U.S. at 489.
61. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 783.
62. Cook, 531 U.S. at 514-15,525-26.
63. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 819 (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 547).
64. Id. at 842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
65. Powell, 395 U.S. at 547 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Debates, in DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrrUTION 251, 257 (Jonathan Elliot, ed., Burt Franklin Re-
prints 2d ed. 1974) (1968)).
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bent officeholders would be a direct threat to the constitutional guarantee of
voter sovereignty:
[In Powell,] we recognized the critical postulate that sovereignty is
vested in the people, and that sovereignty confers on the people the
right to choose freely their representatives to the National Gov-
ernment. For example, we noted that "Robert Livingston... en-
dorsed this same fundamental principle: 'The people are the best
judges who ought to represent them. To dictate and control them,
to tell them whom they shall not elect, is to abridge their natural
rights."'66
Whatever the right of the political parties not to be discriminated against
in districting, a critical question of constitutional law ought to be whether the
carving up of essentially uncontestable and uncompetitive spheres of influ-
ence is an impermissible effort, in purpose and effect, that threatens to "lead
to a self-perpetuating body" as identified in Term Limits.67 The constitu-
tional principle that meaningful electoral accountability depends on the com-
petitive integrity of congressional elections is not captured through the nar-
row framework of impermissible partisan advantage previously presented to
the Supreme Court in cases like Vieth68 and Bandemer.69 Article I, Section
2's specific grant of an affirmative right of the People to demand the ac-
countability of their Representatives itself requires protection against artifi-
cially manipulated, non-competitive elections. As expressed by Justice Ken-
nedy, "freedom is most secure if the people themselves, not the States as
intermediaries, hold their federal legislators to account for the conduct of
their office."7
The Constitution prohibits state legislatures from undermining the
House's essential structural role.7' Article I, Section 2 works hand-in-hand
with the Elections Clause.72 The Elections Clause does not grant state legis-
66. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 794-95 (omission in original) (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at
541 n.76).
67. Id.at793n.10.
68. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
69. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). Nor is Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973), to the contrary. Gaffney, like Bandemer, addressed equal protection limitations on
state legislative redistricting for state legislatures. See id. at 735-36; Bandemer, 478 U.S. at
114-15. Neither case addressed the Article I limitations on state legislative power over con-
gressional elections. See generally Vieth, 541 U.S. 267; Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109.
70. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 528 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. See Pildes I, supra note 7, at 55, 61.
72. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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latures the power to manipulate congressional elections for impermissible
reasons.7" This limitation on the grant of power is necessary to protect the
affirmative right "of the People" in Article I, Section 2, to choose their Rep-
resentatives.
74
C. The First Amendment
In addition to the Article I concerns already addressed, the intentional
evisceration of competitive congressional elections can also be understood to
threaten or violate core principles of the First Amendment. Widespread
anticompetitive gerrymanders do disrupt and damage the profound relation-
ship---both substantive and textual-that the Supreme Court has recognized
between self-government and the First Amendment.76 Although the Elec-
tions Clause and Art. I, Section 2 most directly address limits on manipula-
tion of congressional districts, the best understanding of these provisions is
buttressed by the First Amendment's grounding in principles of democratic
competition.
The Framers organized the six textual clauses of the First Amendment in
an order that reflects the nature of democracy itself.77 These clauses move in
disciplined order from a citizen's conscience, to individual expression
(speech), to mass expression (press), to political organization (assembly and
association) and, finally, to interaction with elected officials (petition). In-
deed, it is common ground that the First Amendment's core purpose is the
protection of the free flow of information needed to permit genuine electoral
choice.78 When genuine electoral competition is systematically and inten-
tionally subordinated to partisan and incumbent advantage, the damage to the
First Amendment is serious.
Moreover, the clauses themselves describe the essence of self-
government.79 The quintessential act of political expression is the casting of
a ballot. The quintessential act of political association occurs in the relation-
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Pildes I, supra note 7, at 31-32.
76. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 41 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77, 101-03 (1980).
77. This insight is attributable to my colleague, Burt Neuborne, who originally authored,
for the brief noted above, these paragraphs on the First Amendment.
78. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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ship between a voter and a favored candidate. The quintessential act of as-
sembly is the rallying to the polls on Election Day. The election itself is the
modem analogue of the petition for redress of grievances. When statewide
political gerrymanders-either partisan or bipartisan-intentionally and sys-
tematically turn congressional elections into a mere formality, the acts of
voting, assembling, associating, and petitioning are reduced to hollow rituals.
Under such circumstances, voters ratify political choices made for them by
someone else, but do not exercise the generative political power that is the
essence of representative self-government.
An obvious political gerrymander that systematically constructs islands
of voters throughout a state in such a manner that competitive elections are
virtually eliminated in every congressional district artificially destroys the
core element of self-governance--competitive elections- and for no legiti-
mate public purpose. It matters not that the apportionment respects formal
equality. It matters not that the resulting political division of congressional
representation is said, in some contexts, to be roughly equitable. What mat-
ters is that the state has treated voters, not as individuals, but as fungible po-
litical units whose democratic role is not self-governance, but the allocation
of political spoils.80
IV. JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR STATE LEGISLATIVE ABUSE OF THE POWER TO
REGULATE NATIONAL ELECTIONS
A. The Courts Should Recognize A Per Se Prohibition Against Mid-Decade
Redistricting, Absent Judicial Order or Extraordinary Circumstance
Amidst all the pre-existing problems with politically self-interested ma-
nipulation of the design of election districts, this decade has added a new,
"sudden shock to the ritual of redistricting politics. '8 For the first time in
what appears to be at least the 20' century, state legislatures have begun to
take multiple bites at the redistricting apple.82 At least two states, as of the
time of this article, have engaged in mid-decade "re-redistricting" of their
congressional districts;83 after the census and apportionment, these state leg-
80. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 372-73 (1976) (finding government employees
may not be viewed as political units designed to allocate the spoils of victory); O'Hare Truck
Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 726 (1996) (applying Elrod to independent
contractors); cf Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927-28 (1995).
81. Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 751, 751
(2004).
82. See id. at 751-52.
83. Id.
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islatures were gridlocked by partisan divisions, courts were forced to draw
new districting plans for the decade, and then later in the decade, when the
legislature had a new partisan configuration, the legislature created a new
districting plan for what remained of the decade.' State legislatures have
also commenced mid-decade re-redistrictings for state legislative seats as
well. With respect to Congress, the purpose of these "re-redistrictings" was,
quite obviously, to bolster the partisan prospects of the state legislatures'
partisan allies in the congressional battle for control of the United States
House. 85 In the most egregious case, a court drawn plan for Colorado's con-
gressional districts, which reflected the state's entitlement to one new district
after the Census, created one of the most competitive districts in the nation,
which a Republican then won by 121 votes in the 2002 elections. When Re-
publicans gained control of the state legislature, they then drastically re-drew
the congressional districts, shifting large populations around in advance of
the next election, in an effort to turn this competitive district into an over-
whelmingly safe one for the Republican incumbent.8 6
Whatever the United States Supreme Court's response to the inevitable
abuses at the decennial reapportionment stage, the Court should recognize
that the Elections Clause does not grant state legislatures the power to en-
gage in mid-decade re-redistricting, absent judicial decision requiring it or
extraordinary circumstances (such as Hurricane Katrina and the accompany-
ing massive population shifts).87 I have no belief the Court will actually do
so in the Texas case currently pending, however; the political-party challeng-
ers in the case have not pressed the issue of competitive elections, nor sought
such a per se bar on mid-decade redistricting. But such a bright-line rule
would enforce the limitations of the Elections Clause's grant of enumerated
power and would reinforce the constitutional protection of electoral account-
ability and competitive elections. The risks that mid-decade districting will
be used for purposes not within the scope of the Elections Clause, and the
costs of mid-decade redistricting, are simply too substantial to tolerate.
The constitutional requirements of the decennial census and congres-
sional reapportionment, combined with the constitutional requirement of one
person, one vote, require the states once a decade to exercise their Article I
84. See Pildes I, supra note 7, at 62.
85. See id. at 61.
86. The Colorado Supreme Court held this re-redistricting to violate the state constitu-
tion. People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (2003) (en banc), cert. denied, Colo-
rado General Assembly v. Salazar, 124 S. Ct. 2228 (2004).
87. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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powers.88 When this power lies in the hands of partisan, self-interested in-
cumbents (as in most states), it is predictable and inevitable that those insid-
ers will seek to insulate their allies from electoral accountability, to pursue
partisan advantage, or both.
The misuse of these Article I powers artificially to eliminate electoral
accountability and create non-competitive districts, as noted above, should be
unconstitutional, in principle, in any context. But whatever the Court's re-
sponse to abuses during the decennial redistricting process, the risk that mid-
decade redistricting will be used to abuse the Elections Clause power man-
dates a discrete rule dealing with mid-decade redistricting. A bright-line, per
se prohibition would forestall the risk of a spiral of retaliatory mid-decade re-
redistrictings, as the political fortunes of the two parties ebb and flow
throughout the decade across different states or as incumbents find them-
selves at electoral risk.
No constitutional compulsion-indeed, no legal compulsion of any
sort-exists for state legislatures to engage in redistricting during the decade
as partisan political prospects wax and wane in particular states. Indeed,
nothing in our historical experience compels this extraordinary assumption of
power by the state legislatures. In the Twentieth century, there had been no
practice of mid-decade congressional redistricting before mid-decade redis-
tricting efforts suddenly erupted this decade. Indeed, as one historical study
of redistricting in the United States concluded, politicians have long under-
stood that districting takes place once a decade, in response to a new census
and reapportionment.89 As that study put it:
[T]here is no denying that when a new party gains a legislative
majority in mid-decade it does not redistrict the state's congres-
sional delegation right away but waits until the next Census. This
is another of the "rules of the game" in legislative life, for every-
one wants to avoid violent seesaws in policy.90
But the rules of the game have changed in recent years. Mid-decade re-
districting has suddenly emerged as a new strategy in the partisan wars. 9'
The recent emergence of this practice results from a combination of: 1)
closely balanced partisan control of the House; and 2) technological break-
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
89. ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL
REPRESENTATION 74 (rev. ed. 1964).
90. Id.
91. Pildes I, supra note 7, at 62.
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throughs in election databases and computer technology that enable "perfect-
ing" the self-interested creation of overwhelmingly safe districts. The parti-
san margin of power in the House has hung in the balance for a more sus-
tained period than at any time over the past 100 years; 92 when partisan con-
trol was last divided as closely, numerous state legislative schemes sprung up
to manipulate congressional elections. 93 National legislation and constitu-
tional law now prohibit most of the offending historical practices, such as
legislative manipulations of suffrage rules and vote fraud. But given the
allure of political power, efforts to invent new practices not yet prohibited-
such as mid-decade redistricting-will inevitably arise again when partisan
control of the House is at stake.
In criticizing mid-decade redistricting, I do not mean to defend the con-
stitutionality, the fairness, or the appropriateness of the prior legislative plans
that preceded the recent mid-decade redistrictings in those states that have
engaged in the practice thus far. However, as a matter of constitutional doc-
trine, a per se rule against mid-decade congressional redistricting, when not
required by judicial decision or extraordinary circumstance, is the most ap-
propriate judicial means to implement the guarantees and limitations of Arti-
cle I and the First Amendment. The risk that such a power will be used for
constitutionally impermissible purposes is obvious; the benefits of such
power for legitimate purposes are undemonstrated, given the absence of a
historical state practice of mid-decade redistricting; and, even assuming mid-
decade redistricting might conceivably be used in some context for permissi-
ble purposes, the courts will find it difficult on a case-by-case basis to distin-
guish mid-decade redistricting that reflects constitutionally permissible ver-
sus impermissible purposes. To judge whether a prior plan was "fair," or
whether the new, mid-decade plan uses the purported unfairness of the prior
plan to justify a new plan that is also "unfair," would require the Supreme
Court to re-visit the inquiries that divided it in Vieth. To judge the sole,
dominant, or partial purpose of a particular mid-decade redistricting similarly
requires difficult judicial determinations-and only invites political actors to
disguise their purposes better the next time around.
92. See 2002 ELECTION STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 54.
93. Thus, in the late 19th century, when partisan control of the House similarly hung in
the balance over many years, practices of vote fraud, intimidation, manipulation of suffrage
rules, and extraordinarily gerrymandered election districts proliferated. See J. Morgan
Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 135, 141-52 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler
Davidson eds., 1992).
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These inquiries are difficult, to say the least, for courts. They are also
politically charged in the context of redistricting, since the allocation of po-
litical power is at stake. For these reasons, courts would do better not to get
mired in these kind of inquiries when an appropriate bright-line doctrinal rule
is available. Instead, a per-se rule that the Elections Clause does not permit
mid-decade redistricting is the most appropriate means to enforce the Elec-
tions Clause's enumerated grant of limited power to state legislatures.94
A per se prohibition also reinforces the right incentives for political ac-
tors who control districting. Those actors likely to lose at the start of a new
districting cycle have an incentive to paralyze the process, to game the out-
come that might be reached, perhaps through a court-drawn plan, and then to
revisit the plan if they dislike it and gain more legislative power over the
decade. A per se rule makes clear that political actors must negotiate and
compromise at the start of the decade, at the risk of otherwise losing control
of the outcome. A per se rule also indirectly constrains partisan gerryman-
dering. Justice O'Connor suggested in Bandemer that "political gerryman-
dering is a self-limiting enterprise."95 To an extent that remains so in the age
of computer technology, it is because political actors must bind themselves
to a redistricting plan at the start of the decade and live with the conse-
quences until the next census. Mid-decade redistricting destroys that inher-
ent, structural check.96
Moreover, Were mid-decade redistricting to be permitted, the political
parties would inevitably engage in retaliatory re-redistricting-particularly
when partisan control of the House is closely divided. In the Dormant
Commerce Clause context, the United States Supreme Court recognized long
ago that the appropriate means to address discriminatory state commercial
laws was not for states to enact retaliatory discriminatory laws of their own;
instead, the Court declares such laws unconstitutional, lest a downward spiral
of retaliation, in which national prosperity is drained, ensue.97 The Court
94. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67-68 (2004) (holding that constitutional
guarantees of proper legal process must be protected through bright-line, categorical rules to
withstand inevitable pressures to distort in controversial cases).
95. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
96. See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1243 (Colo. 2003) (holding
mid-decade congressional redistricting designed to protect vulnerable incumbents unconstitu-
tional under state constitution), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1093 (2004).
97. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (con-
demning "local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and retalia-
tory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent.") (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 22
(Alexander Hamilton); James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 2
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 361, 362-63 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1901)).
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should instead stop this cycle in its inception by recognizing that the Consti-
tution does not authorize states to engage in mid-decade redistricting, at least
absent judicial compulsion or extraordinary circumstance.
B. Judicial Standards Are Available for Future Decennial Redistricting
For contexts outside that of mid-decade redistricting, including more
routine, decennial redistricting, the specific standards courts can employ to
respond to the attempts of state legislatures to eliminate or diminish electoral
accountability and competition cannot adequately be addressed here. Suffice
it to say, a principal tool for legislative self-dealing in this context is running
roughshod over traditional districting principles: the freewheeling parceling
out of pieces of towns, cities, and counties into a number of different dis-
tricts; the cavalier disregard of any obligation to keep districts reasonably
compact; the use of wholly artificial means to purportedly keep districts
"contiguous" in only the most nominal sense; and the use of increasingly
refined partisan electoral data in the districting process.98 In earlier decades,
respect for these principles imposed tacit constraints on the extent to which
self-interested redistricters could manipulate district design to insulate pre-
ferred incumbents and candidates from political competition and electoral
accountability. As with other tacit constraints, once these informal, generally
accepted limitations on unmediated pursuit of political self-interest begin to
break down, a race to the bottom quickly ensures the virtual elimination of
these traditional constraints altogether. Mid-decade redistricting is but one
example of the recent erosion of such long-understood constraints.
Most importantly, it is essential to recognize that judicial standards in
this area need not take the form of bright-line rules, with necessary and suffi-
cient doctrinal criteria of application fully specified in algorithmic-like
form.99 Just as in other areas involving the Constitution's central structural
commitments, certain aspects of gerrymandering's constitutional threat
might lend themselves to bright-line judicial doctrine; others will not. In
enforcing federalism and limits on enumerated national powers, for example,
the Court has been able to craft bright-line rules in certain contexts.' °° But
for other contexts, the Court has candidly acknowledged that even the best
formulated doctrine will inevitably leave "legal uncertainty" concerning the
98. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 635 (1993).
99. See Pildes I, supra note 7, at 69-70.
100. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (anti-commandeering
rule).
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doctrine's boundaries.' Nonetheless, as the Court concluded in United
States v. Lopez, "[a]ny possible benefit from eliminating this 'legal uncer-
tainty'"-either through abandoning judicial enforcement or overly rigid
judicial doctrine-"would be at the expense of the Constitution's system of
enumerated powers."'
0 2
Similarly, in enforcing the separation of powers, the Court has some-
times recognized violations that lend themselves to bright-line boundaries.'0 3
But for some of the most momentous issues, the Court has acknowledged
that maintaining the proper constitutional balance between diffusing and
integrating governmental power cannot be judicially enforced through highly
determinate legal doctrine."°4 The structural foundations of the constitutional
order, including the commitment to self-government through the electoral
accountability of representatives, are too essential to be judicially unenforce-
able, but too complex always to yield to bright-line judicial doctrine. "The
great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white.'
0 5
Judicial standards for enforcing the limits on the power delegated to state
legislatures in the Elections Clause, and for enforcing the right of "the Peo-
ple" under Article I, Section 2, and the First Amendment to hold their repre-
sentatives electorally accountable, 1"' should be evaluated in this context, not
against abstract ideals of doctrinal perfection neither available nor applied in
enforcing the Constitution's other fundamental structural commitments.
V. CONCLUSION
Three structural ideas permeate the Constitution: separation of powers,
federalism, and representative self-government. One of the institutional roles
of the United States Supreme Court has been the forging of constitutional
101. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). "[A]s the branch whose distinc-
tive duty it is to declare 'what the law is,' we are often called upon to resolve questions of
constitutional law not susceptible to the mechanical application of bright and clear lines." Id.
at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 566 (majority opinion); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
(1997) (employing "congruence" and "proportionality" standard).
103. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (invalidating an "active role
for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts").
104. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring) ("The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot
conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or
even single Articles torn from context.").
105. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
106. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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doctrine preserving separation of powers 7 and federalism' ° in settings
where leaving these commitments to the political branches cannot protect the
relevant structural values. While the contested nature of separation of pow-
ers and federalism occasionally involve the Court in controversy, the Court
has recognized that judicially-enforced constitutional law must provide a
keystone for two of the Constitution's three great structural arches.
The third structural arch and arguably the most important-
representative self-government through periodic competitive elections, in
which voters are able to hold their representatives accountable-similarly
cannot be left to the political process itself. Mid-decade redistricting, absent
judicial order or extraordinary circumstance, should be unconstitutional.
Judicial standards should also be developed to limit state legislative abuse of
the Elections Clause power in the more regular decennial redistricting con-
text.
107. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417 (1998); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983); Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
108. For "vertical federalism," see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). For "horizontal federalism,"
see, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869
(1985); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, nineteen men affiliated with the al Qaeda ter-
rorist organization hijacked four commercial airliners.' At approximately
8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11, holding eighty-one passengers,
* Dara Jebrock received her B.A. from the University of Florida and is a 2007 J.D.
Candidate at Nova Southeastern University. She would like to express her gratitude to Profes-
sor James Levy for his assistance and guidance in preparing this article. She would also like
to thank her family and friends for their encouragement and inspiration. Finally, she would
like to thank her colleagues at Nova Law Review, especially Jennifer Viciedo, for their relent-
less effort in preparing this article for publication.
1. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF
THE 9/11 COMM'N REP. 1-2 (Comm'n Print 2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
91 l/pdf/execsummary.pdf [hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
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crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.2 "[S]omething
terrible is happening, ' 3 Stuart Meltzer declared while on the phone with his
wife from the 105th floor of the building.4 This would be the last time the
two would speak.' All of the passengers onboard Flight 11, including an
unknown number of people in the building, were killed.6
Approximately eighteen minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175, with
fifty-six passengers on board, slammed into the South Tower of the World
Trade Center.7 "'The place is filling with smoke,' a person [located] in [a]
New York office was heard to say [just before the phone] connection was cut
off."'8 Consequently, all of the passengers on board Flight 75, along with an
undetermined number of people in the building, were killed.9
It is "an 'apparent terrorist attack"' on our country,'0 President Bush
proclaimed just before American Airlines Flight 77, traveling at approxi-
mately 530 miles per hour, smashed into the Pentagon." All fifty-eight pas-
sengers on board Flight 77 were killed, in addition to 125 civilian and mili-
tary personnel located in the building.'2
At approximately 10:00 a.m., "Alice Hoglan's son, Mark, called her
from United Airlines Flight 93" and told her that the plane had been "taken
over." ' 3 Shortly thereafter, the fourth plane holding thirty-seven passengers
crashed into a rural field in southern Pennsylvania. 4 The hijacker's objec-
tive was to crash the fourth airliner into either the Capitol Building or the
White House, but a counterattack by the passengers of United Flight 93 de-
feated that goal. 5 Unfortunately, all of the people on board the airliner were
killed.'
6
2. Id; see also September 11: Chronology of Terror, CNN.COM, SEPT. 12, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/1 l/chronology.attack [hereinafter Chronology].
3. Scott Veale, Voices from Above: 'I Love You, Mommy, Goodbye,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2001, wk 7 (citation omitted).
4. Id. (citation omitted).
5. See id. (citation omitted).
6. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 2.
7. Id. at 1; Chronology, supra note 2.
8. Veale, supra note 3 (citation omitted).
9. Chronology, supra note 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.; EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1; NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST
ATrACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMM'N REP. 10 (Comm'n Print 2004), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/91 l/pdf/sec1.pdf (citations omitted) [hereinafter COMM'N REP.].
12. Chronology, supra note 2; see also COMM'N REP., supra note 11, at 10.
13. Veale, supra note 3 (citation omitted).
14. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1; Chronology, supra note 2.
15. EXECUTVE SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1.
16. See id. at 1-2.
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The deadly terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were unprecedented
in America's national history.' 7 There is no doubt that sophisticated tech-
nologies, especially internet communication, were essential to allow the
planning and plotting of the attacks. 8 As a result, President Bush, along
with Congress, responded by enacting the Uniting and Strengthening Amer-
ica by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Ter-
rorism Act of 2001,"9 generally known as the USA PATRIOT Act, in order
to allow law enforcement and intelligence agencies greater authority in track-
ing and intercepting communications."
More specifically, the USA PATRIOT Act made a series of controver-
sial amendments to the United States Code.21 In particular, this article fo-
cuses on 18 U.S.C. § 2709, which "authorizes the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) to compel .. .internet service providers (ISPs) or telephone
companies, to produce ... customer records whenever the FBI certifies that
those records are 'relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.' ' 22  The FBI
makes those demands by sending national security letters to the communica-
tion provider.23 Once the national security letter is formally issued, § 2709
bars the recipient from contesting the grounds for the letter and prohibits the
recipient from notifying the customers that their personal information has
been provided to the FBI.24 That means the provider is forced to turn over
the requested records or else face criminal prosecution.25 Thus, this provi-
sion raises serious constitutional questions because § 2709, as amended,
grants the FBI the extraordinary power to obtain records without obtaining a
warrant" supported by probable cause and judicial oversight as required by
the Fourth Amendment.27
17. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
18. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to Employees at the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 25, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/
09/20010925-5.html; see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA
PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother that Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 607, 636 (2003) (stating al
Qaeda was known to favor internet technologies).
19. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
20. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at Signing of the PATRIOT
Act, Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oct. 26, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/10/20011026-5.html [hereinafter Remarks by President Bush at PATRIOT Act Signing].
21. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272,
22. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 474-75 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (Supp. 2003)).
23. Id. at 475.
24. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2000)).
25. See § 2709.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000 & Supp. 2003); see United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424,
429 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (finding that the warrant procedure generally requires the government to
2006]
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According to President Bush, the USA PATRIOT Act provision grant-
ing the FBI such vast power was necessary in allowing the government to
enforce laws "with all the urgency of a nation at war."2 However, this arti-
cle will demonstrate that expanding the FBI's power to conduct terrorism
investigations abolishes important Fourth Amendment protections. Part II of
this article will provide a historical overview of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, while Part III will examine traditional Fourth Amendment protections
in light of national security operations. Part IV will discuss the erosion of
Fourth Amendment freedoms after 9/11 as a result of the technologies that
allowed terrorists to evade law enforcement more easily. Part V will analyze
the decision rendered in Doe v. Ashcroft, because the opinion describes how
Fourth Amendment protections cannot be guaranteed within the sole discre-
tion of the FBI and, in turn, without judicial approval. 29 Part VI will provide
recommendations to revise § 2709 in order to reduce Fourth Amendment
implications. Lastly, part VII will conclude with a summary of this article.
II. HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The Fourth Amendment affords individuals with some of the most basic
protections against government intrusion.30 In short, the Framers of the Con-
stitution designed the Fourth Amendment as a way to break away from Brit-
ish policy, which allowed for the issuance of general warrants. 31 Those types
of warrants generally allowed officials to break into an individual's home,
store, or other personal place and seize goods based on minimal suspicion of
criminal activity.32 Since there were no requirements of probable cause and
judicial oversight, the use of the general warrant was widely abused and
caused significant intrusions into individuals' personal lives because once the
warrant was obtained, there was no limit to what the official could search or
obtain a warrant based on probable cause, supported by judicial authorization, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized).
27. The Fourth Amendment guarantees:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28. Remarks by President Bush at PATRIOT Act Signing, supra note 20.
29. 334 F. Supp. 2d 471,506 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MIcH. L.
REv. 547, 657-58 (1999).
32. See id. at 693-94.
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seize.33 Moreover, because there was no fact finder to determine whether the
suspicion was justified, the official could easily lie to obtain a warrant.34
However, the Framers' concern when drafting the Fourth Amendment
was not the issuance of the warrant itself.35 The Framers' concern was the
lack of procedural limitations placed on law enforcement's ability to invade
an individual's privacy. 36 As a result, the Fourth Amendment's warrant re-
quirement, as examined below, was specifically written to protect individuals
against unjustified police behavior.37
A. The Warrant Requirement
Requiring a warrant to conduct a search or seizure was the Framers'
way of protecting individuals from unwarranted government intrusions by
limiting its ability to conduct investigations.38 One of the first cases decided
concerning the scope of the warrant requirement was Ex parte Jackson.39 In
Jackson, the United States Supreme Court clearly stated that searches and
seizures of personal documents in a criminal investigation require a war-
rant.4° The Court held that:
[t]he constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure
in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends
to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may
be. [Letters and sealed packages] can only be opened and exam-
ined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when
papers are subjected to search in one's own household. 1
Thus, under Jackson, a warrantless search and seizure of an individual's pri-
vate property constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment.42
Over time, the Court broadened the scope of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion to include searches and seizures involving entry into a person's home, as
33. See id. at 703-06.
34. See id. at 576-79.
35. Id. at 571-82.
36. See Davies, supra note 32, at 571.
37. See id. at 700-01.
38. See id. at 703-06.
39. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
40. Id. at 733.
41. Id.
42. See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV
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well as the curtilage surrounding the property. 43 That augmentation was sig-
nificant because it furthered the premise that individuals should be protected
from unwarranted government intrusion not only in the privacy of their own
home, but also in a limited, judicially-defined area surrounding their home.44
Moreover, in Camara v. Municipal Court,45 the Court then extended those
principles to include routine administrative searches of a home.' In
Camara, the petitioner leased the ground floor of a building to use as his
personal residence.47 The case arose when the petitioner did not allow an
inspector of the Division of Housing to perform a routine administrative
search of his home.48 As a result, the petitioner was charged with "refusing
to permit a lawful inspection in violation" of a city ordinance.49 On appeal,
the petitioner alleged that a search of private property is unreasonable unless
it has been authorized by a search warrant.5" The Court agreed, holding that
administrative searches authorized and conducted without a warrant are sig-
nificant intrusions upon privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment.5' Thus, the Court reversed the conviction, reinforced the importance
of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, and expanded the scope of
this amendment's protections. 2
1. Probable Cause
The Fourth Amendment generally requires a showing of probable cause
before law enforcement may obtain a warrant to conduct a search or seizure
43. E.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (recognizing that Fourth
Amendment protection extends not only to houses, but also to the area surrounding the resi-
dence, generally known as "curtilage"); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296 (1987);
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
44. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
45. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
46. Id. at 534. In general, an administrative search is an inspection made by a govern-
ment official in regards to municipal fire, health, and housing evaluation programs. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1378 (8th ed. 2004).
47. Camara, 387 U.S. at 526.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 527. This case dealt with section 503 of the Housing Code which permits:
[a]uthorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary
for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the
right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform
any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code.
Id. at 526.
50. See id. at 525.
51. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534.
52. See id. at 534, 546.
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of property.53 Under the probable cause rule, law enforcement cannot search
a person's home or seize private documents unless they have specific facts to
believe that the subject of the search or seizure is connected with criminal
activity.54 The purpose of that requirement is to lessen the possibility that
law enforcement will commit perjury to create a reason for discovering in-
criminating evidence.5 For that reason, warrants lacking probable cause
usually violate the Fourth Amendment.
5 6
2. Judicial Approval
In addition, the warrant requirement generally mandates that an inde-
pendent judicial officer determine whether probable cause exists to conduct a
search or seizure. 7 In Johnson v. United States, 8 the United States Supreme
Court stated that a warrant can only be issued by a "neutral and detached
magistrate."" Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson reasoned that:
[t]he point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the sup-
port of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evi-
dence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to
support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a war-
rant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the peo-
ple's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers. Crime,
even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave
concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on
proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a
home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a
society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom
from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
55. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486
(1958); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
56. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
57. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (citations omitted).
58. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
59. Id. at 14.
2006]
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yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
60
Moreover, the Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment was designed
to prevent the depreciation of personal freedom, personal security, and prop-
erty interests because those rights "'are to be regarded as of the very essence
of constitutional liberty."' 6' Accordingly, the Court recognized that allowing
law enforcement to seek personal information without judicial oversight vio-
lates the core principles of the Fourth Amendment.62
Subsequently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,63 the Court held that it is
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment for a government official to
issue a warrant, even if authorized to do so as a justice of the peace, when
that official is engaged in the criminal investigation.' 4 In Coolidge, police
went to the defendant's home to question him about a murder. 65 Thereafter,
the police presented the results of their inquiry to the State Attorney General
because he was leading the murder investigation.66 After concluding there
was sufficient evidence to charge the defendant, the Attorney General, acting
as a justice of the peace, 67 issued a warrant to search the defendant's prop-
erty.68 At trial, the defendant was convicted of murder based on evidence
obtained from the searches.69 The defendant appealed, alleging that such
evidence should not have been admitted at trial because it was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.7" The Court agreed, holding that a war-
rant issued by a government official involved in law enforcement activities
does not constitute a "neutral and detached magistrate" in accordance with
the warrant procedure of the Fourth Amendment.7'
60. Id. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted).
61. Id. at 17 n.8 (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)).
62. See id. at 17.
63. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
64. Id. at 453.
65. Id. at 445.
66. Id. at 446-47.
67. "Under New Hampshire law in force at that time, all justices of the peace were au-
thorized to issue search warrants." Id. at 447.
68. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 447.
69. See id. at 448.
70. Id. at 449.
71. Id.
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B. From Property to Privacy
The invention of surveillance technologies provided law enforcement
with the ability to surreptitiously observe and record an individual's private
telephone conversations.72 The warrantless use of such technology to aid
securing criminal convictions was challenged for the first time in Olmstead
v. United States.73 In Olmstead, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy
to violate the National Prohibition Act.74 Federal officers obtained the evi-
dence that led to their conviction by inserting small wires along the ordinary
wires of a telephone company which was connected to the defendants' resi-
dences.75 Using the taps on the telephone wires, federal officials surrepti-
tiously listened to the defendants' conversations and took stenographic
notes. 76 As a result, federal officials procured evidence to indict and eventu-
ally convict the defendants of conspiracy.77 In 1928, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the use of evidence obtained from
wiretapping the defendants' private conversations constituted a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.7" On a five-to-four vote, the Court held that the use
of wiretapping to obtain evidence without a search warrant was not within
the confines of the Fourth Amendment because there was no physical en-
croachment onto the defendants' property.79
After Olmstead, the measure of Forth Amendment protection was de-
termined on a property-based analysis. However, in 1967, the Supreme
Court redefined the Amendment's scope by recognizing "that the principal
object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than [the
further protection of] property. 8 ° In Katz v. United States,81 the Supreme
Court held that the "Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply
'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures," and that its reach
"cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure."82 In Katz, the petitioner, a bookkeeper, was suspected of
using a public telephone booth to conduct business transactions in violation
72. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,455 (1928).
73. Id. at 438.
74. Id. at 455.
75. Id. at 456-57.
76. Id. at 457.
77. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455, 457.
78. Id. at 455.
79. Id. at 466.
80. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
81. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
82. Id. at 353.
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of a federal statute.83 To confirm those suspicions, the FBI placed an elec-
tronic eavesdropping device on the outside of the telephone booth, which
recorded the petitioner's conversations. 84 As a result, the petitioner was
charged and convicted of transmitting gambling information by telephone
across state lines. On appeal, the petitioner alleged that the recordings had
been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.86 However, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that no violation occurred be-
cause the FBI agents did not physically enter the telephone booth.87
In light of that ruling, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to consider whether electronic surveillance was subject to the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.88 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Stewart declared that:
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the pub-
lic, may be constitutionally protected.89
For those reasons, the Court ruled that a violation of the Fourth
Amendment occurs when FBI agents conduct electronic surveillance of an
individual without presenting "their estimate of probable cause for detached
scrutiny by a neutral magistrate," even when there is no interference with
property.9" Consequently, the petitioner's conviction was reversed because
he had not been provided with the procedural safeguards of the Fourth
Amendment.9' Thus, the Court's decision is significant because it recognizes
the importance of protecting Fourth Amendment liberties, especially when
technological innovations threaten personal privacy.9
83. Id. at 348. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 made it a crime to "knowingly [use] a wire communica-
tion facility for the transmission in interstate.., commerce of bets or wagers.., on any sport-
ing event or contest .... which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of
bets or wagers." Id. at 348 n. I (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 348.
85. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
86. Id. at 348-49.
87. Id. at 349.
88. Id. at 349-50.
89. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
90. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 356.
91. Id. at 359.
92. See id. at 349-53.
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III. NATIONAL SECURITY AS A POTENTIAL EXCEPTION
In Katz, the majority declined to consider whether national security in-
vestigations should be exempt from the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment.93 However, Justice White noted in his concurring opinion that the
warrant requirement and the objective judgment of a magistrate would be
unnecessary "if the President of the United States or his chief legal officer,
the Attorney General," authorized electronic surveillance in national security
situations.94
Alternatively, Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion proclaimed
that:
Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In
matters where they believe national security may be involved they
are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate
must be. Under the separation of powers created by the Constitu-
tion, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disin-
terested. Rather it should vigorously investigate and prevent
breaches of national security and prosecute those who violate the
pertinent federal laws. The President and Attorney General are
properly interested parties, cast in the role of adversary, in national
security cases.
95
In his conclusion, Justice Douglas acknowledged that throughout history the
Fourth Amendment has never been construed to distinguish between differ-
ent types of crimes.96 Thus, those opinions suggest that there are constitu-
tional limitations on the government's ability to obtain intelligence informa-
tion even in the name of national security.
A. National Security in Domestic Affairs
Following Katz, courts had difficulty determining whether there is in
fact a national security exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment.97 For example, in United States v. Smith, the defendant was found
guilty of violating a federal statute and sentenced to two years in prison.98
The defendant appealed his conviction and while "pending, the government
93. Id. at 358 n.23.
94. Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring).
95. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 360.
97. See United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 429 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
98. Id. at 424.
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disclosed to the Court of Appeals that it" monitored the defendant's conver-
sations by electronic surveillance to gather information regarding a national
security investigation.99 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the United States District Court of the Central District of California to
consider whether it was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment for the
government to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance without judicial
approval, even though such surveillance had been authorized by the Attorney
General for national security purposes.' ° At the proceeding, the government
argued that although a warrant was not obtained prior to conducting the sur-
veillance, it was constitutional because it had been expressly authorized by
the Attorney General to gather information necessary to protect the nation.' 0
More specifically, that the surveillance was reasonable because "the Presi-
dent, acting through the Attorney General, has the inherent constitutional
power" to authorize electronic surveillance without a judicially approved
warrant in national security cases and to unilaterally determine whether a
situation constitutes a national security matter.10 2 However, the district court
disagreed, holding that in domestic situations there is no national security
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 103 Moreover, "the
President is... subject to the constitutional limitations imposed upon him by
the Fourth Amendment," 4 which means that he cannot judicially determine
the restrictions on his power to protect the security of the nation.0 5 The
court reasoned that the Constitution was drafted "to strike a balance between
the protection of political freedom and the protection of the national security
99. Id.
100. Id. at 424, 426.
101. Id. at 426. To support its argument, the government relied on the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which stated in relevant part:
[T]he constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to
obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or
to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall any-
thing ... limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems
necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or
other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or exis-
tence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by au-
thority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in
any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall
not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power.
Smith, 321 F. Supp. at 425 (quoting Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2511(3), 82 Stat. 197, 214).
102. Id. at 426.
103. Id. at 429.
104. Id. at 425.
105. See Id. at 425-30.
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interest."' 6 Thus, "to sacrifice those freedoms in order to defend them' ' 7
would undermine the democratic system.0 8 Consequently, the electronic
surveillance violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because it
had been authorized without judicial oversight.' °9
Likewise, in United States v. Sinclair,110 the United States District Court
of the Eastern District of Michigan furthered the Smith rationale by holding
that the President, acting through the Attorney General, does not have the
inherent constitutional power to authorize, without a judicial warrant, elec-
tronic surveillance in national security investigations."' In Sinclair, the de-
fendant was indicted based on evidence which was obtained when the FBI
conducted warrantless electronic surveillance of the defendant's telephone
conversations."
2
The dispute arose when the defendant made a motion to suppress such
evidence, alleging that it was acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement because it lacked judicial approval."3 In response, the
government asserted that the electronic monitoring of the defendant's con-
versations was lawful because the Attorney General, acting as an agent of the
President, authorized the surveillance in the interest of national security."4
Particularly, the government argued that the evidence should not be sup-
pressed because the President has the inherent constitutional power to au-
thorize warrantless electronic surveillance when gaining such information is
essential to the security of the nation.'' 5
Nevertheless, the district court disagreed, stating that the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment warrant procedure is to maintain a system of checks and
balances between the citizens and the government.1 6 Therefore, independent
judicial review of whether or not probable cause exists to issue a warrant is
essential because it protects citizens' "constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures."" 7 Further, the court explained that if
the executive branch were granted unchecked investigative power in domes-
tic situations, citizens' Fourth Amendment protections would be threat-
106. Smith, 321 F. Supp. at 430.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
111. Id. at 1077.
112. Id. at 1075-76.
113. Id. at 1076.
114. Id.
115. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. at 1077.
116. Id. at 1078.
117. Id.
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ened." s For those reasons, the court held that the evidence should be sup-
pressed because there is no exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement in domestic situations involving national security.' 1
9
Following Smith and Sinclair, the Supreme Court ruled that in domestic
situations the executive branch is not exempt from obtaining a judicially ap-
proved warrant when seeking information in a national security investiga-
tion. 12 In United States v. United States District Court (Keith),12' the gov-
ernment "charged three defendants with conspiracy to destroy [g]overnment
property in violation of' a federal statute. 22 During pretrial proceedings, the
defendants filed a motion to determine whether certain surveillance informa-
tion obtained by the government complied with the defendants' Fourth
Amendment rights. 23 In response, the government alleged that such infor-
mation was obtained lawfully because the surveillance conducted without
judicial approval was authorized by the Attorney General "'to gather intelli-
gence information deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the
Government.""2 4 More specifically, the government argued that requiring
judicial oversight would create a danger of leaks, threaten the need for se-
crecy, and endanger the lives of informants and agents. 25 However, the Dis-
trict Court disagreed and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the
surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. 1
26
In response to that decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
termine "'[w]hether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving ... national
security. ' ''" 27 To answer this question, the Supreme Court began by noting
that under Article H, Section 1 of the Constitution, the President has the duty
"to 'preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States,"' 12
8
especially against those who try to depose the government. 2 9 Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell expressed his apprehension towards allowing elec-
tronic surveillance in national security matters because it provides the gov-
118. See id. at 1079.
119. Id. at 1079-80.
120. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1972).
121. Id. at 297.
122. Id. at 299.
123. See id. at 299-300.
124. Id. at 300 (citation omitted).
125. Keith, 407 U.S. at 319.
126. Id. at 301.
127. Id. at 309 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967)).
128. Id. at 310 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1).
129. Id.
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ernment with the capability to intrude upon individuals' Fourth Amendment
rights. 3 ' However, Justice Powell recognized that technological develop-
ments have resulted in new ways to depose the government."' For that rea-
son, Justice Powell stated that it would be contrary to public interest to deny
the government use of such technology, since it is necessary to counteract the
practice of techniques which threaten democracy. 132 As a result, the Court
acknowledged that the conflict between the government's need to act when
safeguarding the nation's security and individual rights will be implicated in
any situation concerning electronic surveillance of a person's private activi-
ties. 33 Consequently, the Court balanced those values, concluding that the
guarantee that an individual's privacy can only be invaded upon the issuance
of a warrant by a neutral and detached magistrate founded on probable cause
prevails over the government's duty to preserve national security. 134 More-
over, domestic security surveillances conducted entirely within the discretion
of the Executive Branch is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment because
those officials are not neutral and detached. 35 Finally, the role of judicial
approval cannot be dispensed because it "accords with [the] basic constitu-
tional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through [the]
separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches
and levels of [g]ovemment."' 136
B. National Security in Foreign Affairs
Based on the Court's decision in Keith, it is clear that there is no na-
tional security exception to the Fourth Amendment in situations involving
domestic investigations. 37 However, the Court expressly refused to define
the constitutional limitations on the Executive Branch's power to meet for-
eign threats to the nation. 3 As a result, the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections still remain uncertain in situations involving the Executive
Branch and foreign security surveillance.
In Noro v. United States, 139 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether the search and seizure of account books owned by Japanese
130. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 312.
131. Seeld. at312.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 312-13.
134. See id. at 312-17.
135. Keith, 407 U.S. at 316-17.
136. Id. at 317.
137. See id. at 321.
138. Id. at 321-22.
139. 148 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1945).
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citizens living in the United States was a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.140 In Noro, the defendants were Japanese citizens who established a
business in the United States, which had been licensed by the Secretary of
the Treasury.14' Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the President ordered
customs officers to remove books, files, and accounts of all Japanese enter-
prises licensed in the United States. 42 As a result, customs officers seized
account books from the defendants' business without obtaining a judicially
approved warrant. 43 After searching the books, the government discovered
that the defendants completed false income tax returns.' 44 Based on that dis-
covery, the defendants were charged with tax evasion and were convicted at
trial. "' On appeal, the defendants argued that the entry into their place of
business and the seizure of their account books violated the Fourth Amend-
ment because such documents were obtained without a judicially authorized
warrant. 14 6 However, the court disagreed stating that no violation occurred
because "searches in the sudden emergency of war [are] necessary to be
made ... with all speed and efficiency, under the urgent orders of the Presi-
dent and Secretary of the Treasury."' 147 Thus, the court recognized that the
Executive Branch has the power to authorize searches and seizures without
judicial oversight in situations that involve foreign threats to the security of
the nation. 4
8
Likewise, in United States v. Brown,149 the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that warrantless electronic surveillance authorized by the President
for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information without prior
judicial approval was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 50 In
Brown, the defendant was charged and convicted of transporting a firearm in
violation of a federal statute. '5' The defendant appealed his conviction and,
while the appeal was pending, federal officials monitored and recorded the
defendant's telephone conversations without judicial authorization.12  On
appeal, the defendant argued that the warrantless wiretaps violated his Fourth
140. Id. at 697.
141. Id. at 697-98.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 697.
144. Noro, 148 F.2d at 697.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 698.
148. Id. at 698-99.
149. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
150. Id. at 426 (citing United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 170-72 (5th Cir. 1970)).
151. Id. at420.
152. Id. at 421.
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Amendment rights.'53 In response, the government contended that no viola-
tion occurred because the wiretaps had been authorized by the Attorney Gen-
eral, acting as an agent of the President, for the purpose of gathering foreign
intelligence. 54  Consequently, the court agreed with the government, ex-
plaining that the President has the inherent authority to protect national secu-
rity in the context of foreign affairs.'55 Thus, the court recognized that it is
constitutionally permissible for the Executive Branch to conduct searches or
seizures without a judicially approved warrant when "safeguard[ing] the na-
tion from possible foreign encroachment."' 56
Similarly, in United States v. Butenko,'57 the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the President's authority to authorize warrantless searches in
foreign intelligence investigations does not contravene the safeguards of the
Fourth Amendment. 58 At trial, one of the defendants, a Soviet national, was
convicted of conspiring to transmit foreign government information relating
to the national defense of the United States.'59 Federal officials obtained the
evidence that led to this conviction by conducting warrantless electronic
wiretaps of the defendant's conversations which were authorized by the At-
torney General for purposes of gathering foreign intelligence information."
The defendant appealed his conviction on the basis that his Fourth Amend-
ment rights were violated because the material collected through the elec-
tronic surveillance was obtained without a judicially authorized warrant.' 6'
On appeal, the court disagreed, holding that the President can authorize war-
rantless searches without prior judicial approval when the primary purpose of
those searches is to secure foreign intelligence information. 62 However, the
court noted that under these circumstances the Fourth Amendment requires
post-search judicial review in order for electronic surveillance to be lawful
because post-judicial oversight ensures that the primary purpose of the gov-
ernment's investigation is to obtain foreign intelligence information. 63
153. Id. at425.
154. Brown, 484 F.2d at 425.
155. Id. at 426.
156. Id. (citations omitted).
157. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974).
158. Id. at 603-06.
159. Id. at 596.
160. Id. at 596-601.
161. Id. at 596.
162. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 603-06.
163. Id. at 605-06.
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IV. EROSION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AFTER 9/11
Following September 11, 2001, securing the nation demanded height-
ened vigilance because technological innovations allowed terrorists to evade
law enforcement more easily. On October 26, 2001, Congress enacted the
USA PATRIOT Act64 to provide government officials with greater authority
when conducting terrorism investigations. 65  In particular, the USA
PATRIOT Act revised 18 U.S.C. § 2709 in order to expand the FBI's power
to obtain customer information from internet service providers and telephone
companies. 1
66
Originally, § 2709 was enacted as a part of the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986,67 which was designed to protect commu-
nications customers from unwarranted invasions into privacy, while at the
same time allowing law enforcement access to records after satisfying the
warrant requirement. 61 Under the ECPA, § 2709 operated as an exception to
the warrant requirement in order to permit the FBI to seek records upon issu-
ing a national security letter to an internet service provider or telephone
company by certifying that 1) the requested "information was 'relevant to an
authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation[;]"' and 2) that there was
probable cause to believe that the customer to whom the information sought
was connected to a "'foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."" 6 9 Sub-
sequently, Congress further revised § 2709 to allow the FBI to obtain cus-
tomer records where there is a contact with a suspected terrorist or where
circumstances of the conversations indicate that the customer may have in-
formation regarding terrorist activities. 7 Recently, in 2001, § 505 of the
USA PATRIOT Act dispensed § 2709's foreign nexus requirement, "replac-
ing that prerequisite with a broad standard of relevance to investigations of
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."'' Under the current provi-
sion, "' law enforcement officials have unchecked power to obtain a person's
164. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
165. See Kerr, supra note 18, at 607.
166. See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2709 (2000 & Supp. 2003)).
167. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848.
168. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 480 (citation omitted).
169. Id. at 481 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000)).
170. Id. at 482 (citation omitted).
171. Id. at 483. Compare 18 U.S.C § 2709 (2000), with 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000 & Supp.
2003).
172. The amended version of § 2709 states:
(a) DuyT TO PROVIDE. - A wire or electronic communication service provider shall comply
with a request for subscriber information and toll billing records information, or electronic
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private information from an internet service provider or telephone company
without a warrant, and, in turn, without judicial authorization. 173  As dis-
cussed below in the case of Doe v. Ashcroft, to allow the government to ob-
tain private information in the manner provided by § 2709 is arguably an
unjustified encroachment upon an individual's Fourth Amendment rights.
V. DOE V. ASHCROFT
A. The Case for Controversy
The controversy began when John Doe'74 received a telephone call from
the FBI informing him that he would be served with a national security let-
ter."'75 Shortly thereafter, Doe received a document stating that pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 2709, he was required to provide certain intelligence information
to the FBI.176 Printed on FBI letterhead, the national security letter was certi-
fied in compliance with the terms of § 2709. 7' Specifically it stated, "'that
the information sought [was] relevant to an authorized investigation to pro-
communication transactional records in its custody or possession made by the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation under subsection (b) of this section.
(b) REQUIRED CERTIFICATION. -The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or his
designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a
Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director, may-
(1) request the name, address, length of service, and local and long distance toll
billing records of a person or entity if the Director (or his designee) certifies in writ-
ing to the wire or electronic communication service provider to which the request is
made that the name, address, length of service, and toll billing records sought are
relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United
States person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and
(2) request the name, address, and length of service of a person or entity if the Di-
rector (or his designee) certifies in writing to the wire or electronic communication
service provider to which the request is made that the information sought is relevant
to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandes-
tine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States
person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
(C) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURE.-No wire or electronic communication service
provider, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any person that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or records under this sec-
tion.
18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
173. See Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 495-96.
174. "John Doe" is a fictitious name used to describe an internet service provider. Id. at
475.
175. Id. at 478.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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tect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.' 178
Moreover, Doe was warned not to disclose anything about the national secu-
rity letter, not even that he received it.'79 Accordingly, Doe contacted the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)"8 ° and the American Civil Liberties
Foundation (ACLF) seeking legal advice about whether the FBI had the au-
thority to demand records from him.'8
In April 2004, the ACLU and the ACLF, acting as counsel for John
Doe, filed a lawsuit challenging the FBI's authority to issue national security
letters instructing communication firms to disclose customer records.182 In
the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that § 2709 violates the Fourth Amend-
ment because it allows the FBI to obtain private information without any
form of judicial oversight. 183 In response, the government argued that the
congressional purpose of the provision was to allow the FBI greater investi-
gative powers because there is a need for secrecy in national security investi-gations."8
B. Securing Fourth Amendment Freedoms
Unwilling to sacrifice liberty for security, Judge Marrero of the United
States District Court of the Southern District of New York ruled that the pro-
vision authorizing the FBI to demand customer records from internet service
providers and telephone companies "whenever the FBI certifies that those
records are 'relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against interna-
tional terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,""' 185 violates the Fourth
Amendment. 86 Judge Marrero began his analysis by recognizing that "[n]a-
tional security is a paramount value, unquestionably one of the highest pur-
poses for which any sovereign government is ordained. Equally scaled... is
personal security .... [a] guarantee ... to be free from imposition by [the]
government."' 87 Moreover, Judge Marrero acknowledged that in order "[t]o
178. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 478-79 (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 479.
180. The ACLU is an organization that advocates for individual rights and liberties. See
American Civil Liberties Union, About Us, http://www.aclu.org/about/index.html (last visited
Feb. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Challenge to NSL Authority].
181. See Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475,479.
182. Id.; American Civil Liberties Union, Challenge to National Security Letter Authority,
(Sept. 29, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/patriot/17458res20040929.html.
183. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 495-96.
184. Id. at 500.
185. Id. at 475 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (Supp. 2003)).
186. Id. at 506.
187. Id. at 476.
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perform its national security functions properly, government must be em-
powered to respond promptly and effectively to public exigencies as they
arise," while at the same time "maintain a reasonable measure of secrecy"
when conducting its investigations.188 Consequently, such a race will inevi-
tably cause a collision between securing the nation and protecting Fourth
Amendment freedoms.' 89
Expounding on those principles, Judge Marrero recognized that the
temptation to dispense with such freedoms was arguably grounded given the
emotional aftermath of 9/11 190 However, in addressing the Government's
reach to combat terrorism, Judge Marrero declared that the "'state of war is
not a blank check"' to dispense those rights so clearly grounded in the core
of the Constitution. 9' Therefore, because "longstanding Supreme Court doc-
trine makes clear"'192 that Fourth Amendment guarantees are fundamental to
the democratic system, § 2709 "must be invalidated because ... it has the
effect of authorizing coercive searches effectively immune from any judicial
process."' 19 3 Thus, the decision rendered in Ashcroft suggests that expanding
the FBI's investigative power to seek personal information without judicial
oversight, even during times when national security is at its apex, is likely
unconstitutional since such authority allows for abuse of Fourth Amendment
rights.'94
VI. RECOMMENDATION
Applying the abovementioned Supreme Court jurisprudence to § 2709,
as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, clearly infringes on our Fourth
Amendment rights.' 9 However, the technological innovations used by the
terrorists to plan and plot the events of 9/11 clearly were not within contem-
plation of the Supreme Court at the time it rendered those pre-9/11 deci-
sions.'96 Yet what is clear from the Court's rulings is that it is necessary to
preserve both liberty and security and not compromise one for the other. 97
188. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
189. See id. at 477.
190. See id. at 477-78.
191. Id. at 477 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)).
192. Id. at 495.
193. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
194. See id. at 501.
195. See supra Parts 11-V.
196. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972).
197. See id.; see also Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 495, 506 (concluding that § 2709 vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment as applied).
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Based on that premise, this article proposes several possible checks which
could be placed on the FBI in fighting the war against terrorism, while at the
same time preventing erosion of Fourth Amendment protections.
A. Prior Judicial Approval
First, Congress could redraft § 2709 to limit the FBI's current un-
checked ability to issue national security letters. One way of accomplishing
this goal would be to include a provision which allows for judicial approval
of national security letters before the FBI issues them. Although doing so
would inhibit the FBI's need for secrecy in terrorism investigations because
of the likelihood that the information will be overheard by the judge's clerks
or staff, 98 it would better protect Fourth Amendment rights. 9 9 Under this
approach, the "coercive searches" 2°° that Judge Marrero mentioned would be
at a complete minimum, since a neutral judge or magistrate could objectively
determine whether or not there was probable cause to demand customer re-
cords from communications firms.20'
B. Post Judicial Oversight
Alternatively, Congress could also draft the provision to mandate judi-
cial oversight after the national security letter is received. Although there is
a heightened possibility of infringing upon Fourth Amendment rights be-
cause of the possibility that the information could be leaked by the judge's
employees, °2 this approach at least ensures that the primary purpose of the
government's investigation is to secure intelligence information relating to
terrorism investigations.0 3 Moreover, such a requirement would make cer-
tain that the government is not using the national security letters as a means
of obtaining information solely to conduct domestic intelligence investiga-
tions.20
198. See, e.g., Keith 407 U.S. at 319; Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. at 476; United States v.
Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 425 (C.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074,
1077 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
199. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
200. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
201. See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
202. See, e.g., United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 603-06 (3d Cir. 1974).
203. Id. at 606.
204. See id. But see United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 430 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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C. The Keith Approach
In Keith, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court recognized that the
warrant requirement "may vary according to the governmental interest to be
enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection. '2°5 In dicta,
the Court suggested that it may be willing to approve a different standard by
which to obtain probable cause in domestic security situations.2 °6 Thus, be-
cause in terrorism investigations it is unclear whether the government's in-
terest is truly "domestic '2 7 or "foreign, '2 °8 lowering the probable cause stan-
dard may meet the reasonable needs of the FBI.209 Like the Prior Judicial
Approval approach, the Keith approach would prevent "coercive
searches, 210 since judicial approval would still be required, just at a lower
standard of reasonableness.2 ' Moreover, like the Post Judicial Oversight
approach, this approach would ensure that the issuance of national security
letters truly pertained to terrorism investigations.2 2
VII. CONCLUSION
Prior to 9/11, "[t]errorism was not the overriding national security con-
cern for the U.S. government. 213 The government never had a need to de-
velop the tools necessary to thwart plots of overthrowing the government and
in turn, the democratic system. 214 As a result, the attacks of 9/11 transformed
the nation and eventually transformed the FBI's communications to counter-
act terrorism operations.2 1 Congress responded by enacting the USA
205. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 323 (1972).
206. Id. Specifically, the Court stated:
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the application and affidavit showing
probable cause need not follow the exact requirements .. .but should allege other circum-
stances more appropriate to domestic security cases; that the request for prior court authoriza-
tion could, in sensitive cases, be made to any member of a specially designated court ... and
that the time and reporting requirements need not be so strict ....
Id.
207. See, e.g., Smith, 321 F. Supp. at 430; United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074,
1079 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
208. See, e.g., Butenko, 494 F.2d at 606; United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th
Cir. 1973); Noro v. United States, 148 F.2d 696, 699 (5th Cir. 1945).
209. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 323.
210. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
211. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 323.
212. See Butenko, 494 F.2d at 603-06; Keith, 407 U.S. at 323. But see Smith, 321 F.
Supp. at 424.
213. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 10.
214. See id. at 6-10.
215. See id. at 13.
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PATRIOT Act which provided the FBI with investigative tools to shield the
nation from another 9/11 experience.21 6 However, the government may have
gone too far because it took away certain liberties in order to protect such
freedoms in the name of national security.
When Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 2709 through the USA PATRIOT
Act, it gave the FBI unchecked power to infringe on Fourth Amendment
rights.217 Specifically, § 2709 authorized the FBI to issue national security
letters to obtain a person's private information from an internet service pro-
vider or telephone company without satisfying Fourth Amendment require-
ments of probable cause and judicial authorization. 18 At the time, Congress'
reasons for compromising Fourth Amendment protections seemed justified,
considering the state of the nation after 9/11. 2 19
Three years after 9/11 and the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act,
the ACLU and an unknown internet service provider fought to protect the
dissemination of Fourth Amendment rights by challenging the constitutional-
ity of § 2709.220 Standing up for those rights, Judge Victor Marrero ruled
that Fourth Amendment protections cannot be guaranteed solely within the
discretion of the FBI because Supreme Court doctrines demonstrate that the
"state of war is not a blank check 221 to infringe upon the rights of American
222citizens.
In a post-9/11 world, technological innovations will continue to threaten
personal privacy. Therefore, it is clear that Congress needs to set boundaries
concerning law enforcement's ability to secure the nation from future terror-
ist attacks. The suggestions mentioned above will provide an effective way
to conduct terrorism investigations, while at the same time protect against
future attacks on Fourth Amendment rights.
216. Remarks by President Bush at PATRIOT Act Signing, supra note 20.
217. See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
218. See id. at 495-97.
219. See id. at 477-78.
220. Challenge to NSL Authority, supra note 180.
221. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 524 U.S. 507, 536
(2004)).
222. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' These first two clauses of the United
States Constitution have meant so many things to so many people over the
years.2 To one ever growing Jewish movement it has meant freedom and
protection from the likes of Cossacks, Nazis, and other hatemongers.' These
are but some of the many groups that have made it their mission to kill Jews
* J.D. Candidate 2006, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center;
M.A. in Jewish Studies, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia; B.A. in Religious Studies, Uni-
versity of Florida, Gainesville. The author would like to thank his wife, family, and friends
for all of their love and support during the writing of this article and to the hard work and
dedication of the Nova Law Review staff during the editing process for their support and
guidance.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. These clauses are often referred to as the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, respectively. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 586, 690 (8th
ed. 2004).
2. See infra Parts Ill-IV.
3. See, e.g., SUE FISHKOFF, THE REBBE'S ARMY: INSIDE THE WORLD OF CHABAD-
LUBAVITCH 24, 72 (2003).
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and to extinguish the light of Judaism. Fleeing from war torn Europe of the
1940s, Chabad-Lubavitch (Chabad), a branch of Orthodox Judaism that prac-
tices Hasidism,4 has made 770 Eastern Parkway, Crown Heights, New York
their world headquarters.5 From this location, Chabad has become one of the
most visible Jewish groups in the world.6
Chabad's mission is in fact to be visible and to spread its form of Juda-
ism to other Jews around the world.7 Chabad has made it a goal to place
shlichim, emissaries, on every comer of the globe.8 It is this wide visibility
that has led to numerous lawsuits in the United States, both initiated by Cha-
bad and by those wishing to stop Chabad's efforts. 9 These lawsuits have
made their way from coast to coast across the United States.' °
This paper will focus on how Chabad has attempted to spread its mes-
sage from community to community and how Jewish and non-Jewish
neighbors have reacted with litigation. While often times the reaction has
been one of welcome and open arms, there are many examples of communi-
ties responding with concerted attempts to force Chabad out." Even when
others did not initiate suit against Chabad, Chabad has been willing to com-
plain when members felt their rights were being violated. 12 Part II of this
4. Chabad is an acronym of the Hebrew words, chochmah, binah, and da'at (wisdom,
understanding, knowledge). Avraham Rubinstein, Habad, in 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA
1013 (1982); FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 18. The term Lubavitch is a geographical reference
to the Russian town where four of the founding rebbes taught. FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 18.
Hasidism is commonly referred to as mystical Judaism. Id. at 17. This form of Judaism was
founded by Rabbi Israel ben Eliezer (born around 1700), or the "Baal Shem Toy" (Besht),
meaning "Master of the Good Name." Id.; Rubinstein, supra, at 1013. The Baal Shem Toy's
disciple Rabbi Dov Ber was the teacher of Rabbi Shneur Zalman, the "Alter Rebbe," who is
the founder of the Chabad-Lubavitch Movement. FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 18.
5. FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 24, 73.
6. Id. at 10.
7. Id. at 12, 31.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Lucas Valley Homeowners Ass'n v. Chabad of N. Bay, Inc., 284 Cal. Rptr.
427, 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that Chabad's receipt of a permit to hold services in a
residential neighborhood was valid even in the face of neighbors' concerns about parking and
noise); Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d 341, 345, 348 (7th Cir.
1990) (recognizing that displaying a Christmas tree in an airport is secular while displaying a
menorah is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction); Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. v. City
of Burlington, 936 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1991) (denying Chabad's right to place the menorah
in the city park). This is not an exhaustive list, but a few examples in a long trail of litigation.
Cases in Ohio, Georgia, and Florida are discussed below. This paper does not analyze litiga-
tion involving Chabad outside the United States.
10. See Lucas Valley, 284 Cal. Rptr. 427; Lubavitch Chabad House, 917 F.2d 341; Cha-
bad-Lubavitch, 936 F.2d 109.
11. FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 24, 72; see infra Parts III-IV.
12. See infra Parts III-IV.
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paper will introduce the message and the mission of Chabad and how that
has often times, unwittingly, instigated lawsuits. Chabad's message has not
wilted even in the face of these lawsuits. 3 If anything, in more recent law-
suits, Chabad is learning from past mistakes and more carefully choosing the
best legal arguments. Part III of this paper focuses on the Chabad menorah,
which has been heavily litigated across the country. This section discusses a
few examples of cities where Chabad has both succeeded and failed in its
efforts at displaying the menorah. In all of the examples to be discussed, the
goal of publicity for Chabad was achieved. In Part IV of this paper, the fo-
cus is on Florida. Due to the recent growth of the active Chabad community
in Florida and the tough real estate market, there have been a number of
cases concerning the location of Chabad centers in residential neighbor-
hoods. In the examples which will be discussed, the old adage, "location,
location, location,, 14 rings true. Finally, Part V will conclude this paper with
a premonition that Chabad will continue to grow across the country, and so
too will the number of Chabad-related lawsuits.
II. CHABAD COMES TO THE UNITED STATES: A LIGHT UNTO THE JEWS
Chabad became the well-known movement that it is today under the
leadership of the seventh and last rebbe, Menachem Mendel Schneerson. 5
In 1941, Schneerson, affectionately referred to as "the Rebbe," arrived on the
shores of New York.16  The long and dangerous journey out of Nazi-
occupied Europe took him to the United States to join his father-in-law and
other family members. 7 His father-in-law, the sixth Lubavitcher rebbe,
quickly saw Menachem Mendel's potential and appointed him in charge of
outreach. 8 Upon taking the helm of Chabad, Schneerson transformed Cha-
bad from a small and insulated remnant of European Jewry to a major force
in the Jewish community. 9
Part of the Rebbe's vision for Chabad was to have Chabad centers es-
tablished all around the world.20 It is considered an honor for a young Cha-
13. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 10.
14. "Location, location, location" is the colloquial phrase referring to the importance of
real estate when building or opening a new home or business.
15. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 10.
16. See id. at 73.
17. See id.
18. See id at 72-73.
19. See id. at 10-12.
20. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 12. Even after the Rebbe's death, Chabad has contin-
ued to grow:
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bad member, a Chabadnick, to be sent out as an emissary to open up a Cha-
bad Center, whether it is in Boca Raton or Timbuktu.2' Most often a young
couple is sent with just enough money for housing and to get started.22 It
would be up to them to meet people and create a center in the community.2
This usually requires a lot of hard work and fundraising.24 The first goal
though is always to get people interested and involved and to spread Chabad
teachings.25 The size of the center will depend on the needs of the commu-
21nity.
Usually Chabadnicks will set up shop wherever they believe they can
best meet the needs of the community and of course this decision also de-
pends on the funding they have received, if any, prior to their arrival there.27
If a storefront shop is in the best location and affordable, then the emissary
might set up there; however, if the emissary can only afford a home to live in
at that time and not such a meeting place, then often times the emissary's
home will become the meeting place.28 The focus though is always on pro-
viding for the community's needs, over and above any emissary's needs.29
Wherever Chabad emissaries do choose to live or set up a center, Cha-
bad has always been involved in the local community.30 Sometimes this
means speaking at the local schools about Jewish holidays, and other times it
means inviting people over for Shabbat dinner.3' One common trend among
Between 1994 and 2002, more than 610 new emissary couples took up their postings and
more than 705 new Chabad institutions were opened, including 450 new facilities pur-
chased or built from scratch, bringing the total number of institutions world-wide-
synagogues, schools, camps, and community centers--to 2,766. In the year 2000, 51
new Chabad facilities were established in California alone.
Id.
21. See id. at 31. One rabbi exclaimed that one can "'find more [people] every day will-
ing to go on shlichus [missions] to farther places .... One guy just called me. He wants to go
to Cyprus. Imagine... the rest of his life in Cyprus."' Id.
22. See id. at 15.
23. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 15. "These young, newly married Chabad couples
leave home with one-way tickets and-if they're lucky-a year's salary. After that, most are
expected to make their own way financially .... [Tlhe individual shliach [emissary] couple is
pretty much on its own .. " Id.
24. Id. at 160.
25. Id. at 11,121.
26. See id. at 160.
27. FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 160. Each Chabad center is responsible for itself. See id.
"Shlichim in the field are responsible for their own fundraising, and they must find the money
they need not only for their own operation, but also to raise their children, pay their mortgage,
and put food on their table." Id.
28. See id. at 161.
29. See id.
30. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 11.
31. Id. at 11, 30.
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Chabad emissaries is to host large parties celebrating the Jewish holidays.32
This has become a way for Chabad members to show non-observant Jews
how Judaism can offer both spirituality and fun.33
The Jewish holiday that has often received the most public attention,
due to the way Chabad chooses to spread the holiday's message, is Chanu-
kah. 4 It is Chabad's display of one of the symbols of the holiday, the Cha-
nukah menorah, 35 a nine-branched candelabrum, that has led to some of the
most protracted litigation.36
III. IF You BUILD IT A LAWSUIT WILL FOLLOW: To LIGHT THE MENORAH
OR NOT TO LIGHT THE MENORAH
One of the best known symbols of Chabad in most communities, other
than the men being known for wearing black hats and black coats and having
beards, is their large Chanukah menorahs.37 Chabad emissaries usually try to
find the most visible place in the city possible to place the menorah.38 While
some might argue that this symbol of Chanukah is meant to compete with the
Christmas tree or Christmas decorations, Jewish law requires that every Jew
place a Chanukah menorah in a place that can be seen by strangers. 39 This
32. See id. at 11.
33. See id. at 11, 30.
34. See id. at 11. The Jewish holiday of Chanukah is an eight-day festival, commemorat-
ing two great miracles in Jewish history: 1) a small group of Jews, known as the Maccabees,
defeated the much larger Syrian-Greek army; and 2) the rededication of the Holy Temple in
Jerusalem (circa 164 B.C.E.). See Moshe David Hem, Hanukkah, in 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
JUDAICA 1280 (1982); RABBI JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, JEWISH LITERACY: THE MOST IMPORTANT
THINGS TO KNOW ABOUT THE JEWISH RELIGION, ITS PEOPLE, AND ITS HISTORY 117-18 (1991).
Chanukah is known as the Holiday of Lights because upon the Maccabees entering the Tem-
ple, they discovered a small jar of holy oil that was only enough to last for one day, but in-
stead it lasted for eight days. Hem, supra, at 1283-84. This is also often referred to as a
Chanukah miracle. Id. at 1284.
35. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 11. The menorah is a symbol of the holiday and has
eight evenly laid branches with a ninth branch set off from the others known as a shammash
(servant) that is meant to light all of the others. Jacob Elbaum, Hanukkkah Lamp, in 7 EN-
CYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1288-92, 1315 (1982).
36. See generally, e.g., Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. v. City of Burlington, 936 F.2d 109 (2d
Cir. 1991) (regarding denial of request to place menorah in city park); Lubavitch Chabad
House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1990) (regarding the City of Chicago's
denial of Lubavitch's request to display a free-standing Chanukah menorah at O'Hare Interna-
tional Airport).
37. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 11.
38. See id.
39. See Elbaum, supra note 35, at 1289-90.
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symbol of Chanukah is over a thousand years old.4' During the Chanukah
holiday, the menorah is often placed in a central location, so that many
members of the local community can see it.4 The more visible the location,
the more attention it gets. This increased visibility has brought both admirers
and detractors out of the woodwork.
A. Cincinnati, Ohio Exemplifies the Difficulty Faced by Chabad in Many
Cities
One example of a city that has attempted (and is continuing to attempt)
to prevent Chabad from placing its menorah in the city's downtown square is
the City of Cincinnati. 42 In Chabad of Southern Ohio v. City of Cincinnati,43
a battle ensued between a local Chabad group and the City of Cincinnati (the
City).' This case was not the first time the City has faced off with groups
wanting to use the downtown square, known as Fountain Square Plaza; in
fact, this case is one out of a series of cases where the City has attempted to
limit public displays to only those of the City counsel's choosing.45
It was not difficult to anticipate that litigation would follow when Rabbi
Sholom Kalmanson was told that the only time that he could not put up a
menorah in the city square was during the winter months, which is of course
during the season of Chanukah.' The City created an ordinance that re-
stricted the use of Fountain Square for the City's exclusive use from the last
two weeks of November, through the month of December, and the first week
40. See id. at 1288-90. Most often, Jews who display a menorah place it on their window
sill to be seen by passersby. Id. at 1289-90.
41. See id.
42. Chabad of S. Ohio v. City of Cincinnati (Chabad Ohio 1), 233 F. Supp. 2d 975, 976
(S.D. Ohio 2002), vacated, 537 U.S. 1501, 1502 (2002).
43. Id. at 975.
44. See id. at 979-80. While the court documents do not make any claims of an-
tisemitism or anti-Judaism as a motive for the actions of the City, Rabbi Kalmanson believes
that it is "obvious what was behind it all." Telephone Interview with Sholom B. Kalmanson,
Rabbi, Chabad of Southern Ohio (July 24, 2005).
45. Chabad Ohio I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 977, 981, 984. The city has a history of litigation.
See, e.g., Knight Riders of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Cincinnati, 72 F.3d 43 (6th Cir. 1995).
While not frequently linked, both the Ku Klux Klan and Chabad have found themselves suing
the city over the years to lift restrictions on their ability to gather ceremoniously in Fountain
Square Plaza. See id. at 45; Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati (Congregation
Lubavitch 1), 923 F.2d 458, 459 (6th Cir. 1991).
46. Chabad Ohio I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 978-79.
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of January.47 This is the very square that Rabbi Kalmanson had already
submitted a permit request to display his approximately ten-foot tall menorah
from November 29, 2002 to December 8, 2002.48 In fact, Chabad had been
celebrating Chanukah in the very same square since 1985 by erecting a me-
norah49 and holding a candle lighting ceremony on one of the days of the
holiday.5°
The Cincinnati City Counsel unanimously passed the restrictive ordi-
nance without community discussion. 5  The ordinance's text specifies,
among other purposes, that its goal is "to promote and develop tourism and
recreation" and "to encourage, promote, stimulate, and assist in the develop-
ment of the Cincinnati business economy.52 Not surprisingly, Chabad filed
a complaint, along with a homeless advocacy group that annually sponsors a
program called "Santa on the Square" during the winter season, requesting
an injunction from the court.53 In Chabad of Southern Ohio, the simple yet
persuasive argument by Chabad was that their First Amendment rights were
violated.54 The district court agreed.55
During an evidentiary hearing before the court, the City was incapable
of presenting evidence that explained the origins or the reason for the ordi-
nance's seven-week ban on issuing permits during the time of the year when
the Fountain Square was most widely requested. 6 However, there was evi-
dence presented that the City was at that time preparing for a display created
by the City, which was to include two Christmas trees and a skating rink.
7
Coincidentally, a tree lighting ceremony was also planned by the City to take
place on November 29, the first night of Chanukah that year.58
47. Id. at 978 (citation omitted). Since the Hebrew calendar and the Jewish holidays are
set according to a lunar cycle, the days of Chanukah on the secular calendar fluctuate from
any time in November to the first week of January. See id. at 977 n. 1. The first day of Cha-
nukah on the Hebrew calendar is always Kislev 25. Hem, supra note 34, at 1280.
48. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
49. Id. at 977
50. See id. at 979.
51. Id. at 978.
52. Id. at 979.
53. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
54. Id. at 981. Chabad also argued that the City violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by retroactively applying the city's new regulations. Id.
55. Id. at 988.
56. Id. at 980.
57. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 980.
58. Id.
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Chabad made a strong case, and the court ruled that Chabad had met its
burden for a preliminary injunction.59 It is ironic that one of the arguments
by the City was that the display of a menorah is not symbolic speech and
thus not protected by the First Amendment 6°-as this fact was conceded by
the City in the same court in a similar case ten years earlier.6'
Chabad's primary First Amendment arguments were based on the pro-
tected nature of speech62 and their ability to use the public forum for this type
of speech.6 3 In both arguments, the court cited previous Chabad litigation
against the City where "the very same menorah at issue here [was upheld] as
speech deserving full First Amendment protection." 64 This decision was
easy for the court based on clear precedent.65 Even though the menorah is
considered speech (of a symbolic nature) deserving protection, the court also
needed to decide if "'the [g]overnment's interest in limiting the use of its
property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to
use the property for other purposes."
66
In determining the government's interest, the court defined the forum at
issue and determined the type of forum. 6 7 This classification is an important
step in the constitutional analysis since different types of forums are afforded
varying levels of protection. 68 Again, this determination was easy since there
was no argument that Fountain Square was the relevant forum, and, further-
more, it had already been defined by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals as a
traditional public forum. 69 The final step taken by the court was to determine
if the City's regulation was a constitutional restriction on the use of Fountain
Square.7"
59. Id. at 981. Chabad proved that there was a "strong likelihood of succeeding on the
merits of their free speech claims under the First Amendment." Id.
60. Id. (citing Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati (Congregation Lubavitch
111), 997 F.2d 1160, 1164 (6th Cir. 1993)).
61. See Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati (Congregation Lubavitch II), 807
F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
62. Chabad Ohio I, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
63. See id. at 982-86.
64. Id. at 981 (citing Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati (Congregation
Lubavitch 1), 923 F.2d 458, 461-62 (6th Cir. 1991)).
65. See id. at 981-86.
66. Id. at 982 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 800 (1985)).
67. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 982.
68. Id. at 982 n.3.
69. Id. at 982 (citing Knight Riders of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Cincinnati, 72 F.3d
43, 45 (6th Cir. 1995)).
70. Id. at 983.
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The restrictions were considered content-neutral on their face since all
types of private speech were forbidden during the holiday season, regardless
of their content.7' This is not the end of the analysis because even a content-
neutral restriction on its face can be content-based in fact.72 This situation
was similar to a previous Chabad case where the City passed an ordinance
restricting unattended structures in Fountain Square.73 In that case, the ordi-
nance was found facially content-neutral; but the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found it de facto content-based 74 since the aim, as evidenced by state-
ments of various city council members, was to prohibit a Ku Klux Klan cross
and a menorah from being erected.75 In this instance, the court heard testi-
mony by Rabbi Kalmanson that a city official suggested that the rabbi
quickly get his permit request in, since the permits were being issued on a
first come first serve basis to prevent the Ku Klux Klan from receiving a
permit.76 It was also telling that the City's own stated intention was to ensure
that any speech that was heard in Fountain Square appealed to "'the widest
of audiences,"' thus forbidding that speech which appealed to a minority of
individuals.77
After concluding that the regulations were content-based, the court then
looked to whether the City's permit scheme was "narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest. 7  The City listed six interests, which it
believed justified the ban on non-governmental use of Fountain Square dur-
ing the winter season.79 All six were found not to justify the regulation and
71. Id. at 984.
72. See Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati (Congregation Lubavitch II1), 997
F.2d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir. 1993).
73. Id. at 1162.
74. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 984.
75. Congregation Lubavitch Il1, 997 F.2d at 1164-65.
76. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 984.
77. Id. "Distinctions between speech that is 'controversial' and speech that is 'accept-
able,' or between that which appeals to 'the widest of audiences' and that which appeals to
only a few individuals, are distinctions based, at the very least, on content." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 984-85. The newly amended city code listed the following purposes for its
enactment:
(1) to better coordinate competing uses of Fountain Square;
(2) to ensure equal access to Fountain Square;
(3) to promote and develop tourism and recreation;
(4) to encourage, promote, stimulate, and assist in the development of the Cincinnati
business economy;
(5) to maintain, develop, and increase employment opportunities for those who live,
work, and may consider moving to Cincinnati and the Cincinnati region; and
(6) to pursue efforts to promote the expansion of the population residing within Cincin-
nati and to specifically encourage, stimulate, and develop an expanding downtown resi-
dent population.
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its ban on issuing permits.8 ° None of them clearly rose to the level of a com-
pelling state interest that could override Chabad's First Amendment rights. 81
The City was also unable to show how the ban on the issuance of permits
over the seven weeks during the winter holiday season fulfilled any of the
City's stated interests.82 On the contrary, the court commented that it would
seem as though the menorah, "Santa on the Square" program, or any other
private speech, would attract more tourists and visitors to Fountain Square
than just the "arguably Christian symbols featured in the City-sanctioned
holiday display. '83 Even if the regulations were content-neutral, under a
lesser constitutional standard (that of time, place, and manner restrictions),
the ordinances were still not "narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest," nor would they leave open the required alternative chan-
nels of communication.84
The district court issued the preliminary injunction barring enforcement
of the ordinances and concluded that, based on Chabad's arguments, the suit
had a strong likelihood of success on the merits.85 However, this was not the
end. In a whirlwind of appeals over a forty-eight hour timeframe, the city
obtained a stay of the injunction from the Sixth Circuit followed by Chabad
taking the issue to the United States Supreme Court, where Justice Stevens,
acting as a Circuit Justice, vacated the stay. 6 Chabad prevailed over the
"outrageous intrusion on the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment" and
was able to celebrate Chanukah in Fountain Square.87 This dispute began
just prior to Chanukah in November 2001, but it took the Sixth Circuit until
April 2004 to affirm the District Court's decision.8
Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court cited the prevention of terrorism and the practice of professions as the
types of regulations that rise to the level of compelling state interests to justify restrictions on
freedom of speech. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
84. Id. at 986. The court explained that no other place in Cincinnati is comparable to
Fountain Square as a location providing the opportunity for speeches and demonstrations. See
id. Even presidential candidates chose to hold rallies in Fountain Square when in the area. Id.
85. Id. at 986-87. The injunction was ordered on November 27, 2002, just two days
before the first night of Chanukah for that year. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 975, 980,
988.
86. Chabad of S. Ohio v. City of Cincinnati (Chabad Ohio I1), 537 U.S. 1501, 1501-02
(2002).
87. Chabad Ohio 1, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
88. See Chabad of S. Ohio v. City of Cincinnati (Chabad Ohio 111), 363 F.3d 427, 436
(6th Cir. 2004). In reality, the case history between Chabad and the city goes back to the
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Even though, during Chanukah of 2004, Chabad of Southern Ohio re-
ceived the proper permit and placed the menorah in Fountain Square, future
Chanukah celebrations are still in doubt.89 According to Rabbi Kalmanson,
more litigation might be on the horizon.90 The City has notified Chabad that
it is planning to do construction in Fountain Square and is also considering
selling it to private entities.9' In light of the past two decades of fortitude
exhibited by Chabad in Ohio, it appears that the City once again will have a
fight on its hands.
B. Atlanta, Georgia Greets Chabad with Good Old Southern Hospitality
In the case of Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Harris,92 followed by
Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller,93 two Chabad rabbis sought to place
a menorah on the steps of the capitol building and in the Capitol Rotunda. 94
Similar to the cases in Ohio, Chabad of Georgia did not succeed at first, but,
in the end, the First Amendment prevailed, and the menorah took its place in
Atlanta.95
In 1989, the Georgia Building Authority granted Chabad permission to
display their fifteen-foot menorah in Atlanta on the plaza in front of the state
capitol building for the eight days of Chanukah. 96 Permission was also
granted for an accompanying sign, "'HAPPY CHANUKAH from CHABAD
OF GEORGIA,'" and for a lighting ceremony.97 Each day the menorah was
to be lit for no more then forty-five minutes.98 Located inside the Capitol
Rotunda was a live nativity scene, "surrounded by a Christmas tree, reindeer,
gifts and a Santa Claus."99 This display was sponsored and organized by the
1980s. See Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati (Congregation Lubavitch 1), 923
F.2d 458, 459 (6th Cir. 1991).
89. Telephone Interview with Sholom B. Kalmanson, supra note 44.
90. Id.
91. Id. Rabbi Kalmanson has not shied away from litigating with the City as a matter of
principle. Id. The rabbi also sees the attention that the menorah has received as positive since
it helps to publicize the miracle of Chanukah, which is his goal to begin with. Id.
92. Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Harris (Chabad Ga. 1), 752 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga.
1990), rev'd en banc, 5 F.3d 1383 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
93. Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller (Chabad Ga. V), 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993).
94. See Chabad Ga. 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1064; Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1386. The style of
both cases reflects the change in sitting governors, Joe Frank Harris in 1990 and Zell Miller in
1992.
95. Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1395-96.
96. Chabad Ga. I, 752 F. Supp. at 1064.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1065.
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Georgia Building Authority.'0° There were no public complaints or distur-
bances formally noted that year attributed to the menorah's placement or the
nativity scene and its accoutrements.'10
The following year, in 1990, Chabad attempted to get the same permis-
sion from the Building Authority, but was met with new limitations.'02 Ac-
cording to the Attorney General, Chabad could still display the menorah and
conduct a candle lighting ceremony, but, instead of eight days, they could
only observe one day. 10 3 Ironically, this scenario sounds like the Chanukah
miracle in reverse. The Attorney General concluded that the entire eight
days would give off the impression of an unconstitutional state endorsement
of re-ligion.' ° The Christmas scene, as displayed the previous year, was
given a similar pronouncement due to the dominance of religious symbols,
but a tree and ceremony led by a Methodist minister was permitted. 0 5
Soon after the restrictions were placed on Chabad's ability to exhibit the
menorah, Chabad, led by two rabbis, initiated a complaint and requested a
temporary restraining order based on First Amendment violations.10 6 Chabad
had to meet four elements to obtain the order: 1) irreparable harm would be
inflicted; 2) there was no harm to the state; 3) public interest was not ad-
versely affected; and 4) the claim was likely to succeed on the merits of the
case if a trial was to proceed.'0 7 The district court found that Chabad had met
the first three requirements, but it was the final one that Chabad did not over-
come. 1
08
The first step in the court's analysis was to determine if Chabad did in
fact have a constitutionally valid claim."° Chabad was able to show that the
menorah did fall under the category of constitutionally protected symbolic
speech."0 The issue then became whether this type of speech was permitted
on the steps of the capitol building."' Since the state had previously deter-
mined that the plaza was a public forum and that it has been regularly used
100. Id.
101. Chabad Ga. 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1064-65.
102. Id. at 1065.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See id. In addition to the invocation by the minister, secular and religious songs were
performed, and the governor's wife gave a benediction. Chabad Ga. 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1065.
106. See id. at 1064-65.
107. Id. at 1066.
108. Id. at 1066, 1068.
109. See id. at 1066.
110. Chabad Ga. 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1066.
111. See id.
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over the years for public debates and rallies, the court then needed to decide
if the restrictions placed on Chabad were content based.'
1
"
2
A content based restriction on speech in the public forum required a
strict scrutiny analysis, whereby the state must show the restrictions were
"narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.""' 3 In its analysis, the
court distinguished this case from two other Chabad menorah cases that were
published the year before: one in the Supreme Court and one in the Second
Circuit." 14 The court did not believe that people visiting the capitol building
would confuse "a menorah labelled as the property of Chabad for a state
sponsored event. ' 5
The State also argued that under a non-content-based policy, the restric-
tions placed on Chabad were reasonable in the time, place and manner that
the menorah could be displayed." 6 This was a persuasive argument for the
court since the State could show that the Georgia Building Authority had
instituted an unrelated policy in 1988 "that placement of any object on the
property of the grounds by members of the public is prohibited."' ' 7 While
Chabad claimed that the 1988 policy did not play a part in the decision to
deny Chabad permission in 1990, the court held that since the policy is valid
it made no difference if it was originally considered by the Building Author-
ity.'' 8
Interestingly enough, the court concluded its order in denying Chabad
the right to place the menorah in the square by contrasting the Christmas tree
and the menorah." 9 The court found that the Christmas tree in the Rotunda
"is a mixed secular-and-religious symbol which is not predominantly reli-
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1066-67 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981)).
114. Id. at 1067 (distinguishing this case from County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573 (1989) and from the majority opinion in Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d
Cir. 1989)). The Georgia court decided that its case was different from the case in Pennsyl-
vania because the menorah at issue there was to be maintained by county employees. Chabad
Ga. I, 752 F. Supp. at 1067. The Vermont decision was not binding in its finding that by the
mere proximity of the menorah to the seat of government the state was endorsing religion. Id.
The court agreed with the dissent in Kaplan where the judge concluded: "[p]ermitting reli-
gious speech in a public forum in and of itself 'does not confer any imprimatur of state ap-
proval on religious sects or practices' any more than permitting political speech conveys gov-
ernmental endorsement of a political group." Id. (quoting Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1033) (Meskill,
J., dissenting)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Chabad Ga. 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1067.
118. Id. at 1068.
119. Id.
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gious," whereas the menorah is a predominantly religious symbol.120 The
court held that the ban on Chabad's eight-day celebration was narrowly tai-
lored, and thus Chabad's motion for a temporary restraining order was de-
nied.
12 1
This final comment by the district court foreshadowed how they were to
rule the following year. 22 Since Chabad could no longer keep the menorah
on the square throughout the celebration of Chanukah, they next sought to
move the menorah into the Rotunda, surrounded by secular displays and
right where the Christmas tree was permitted to be displayed. 23
Chabad made the request of the governor to allow the menorah to be
placed in the Rotunda like the Christmas tree, but four months went by with-
out an answer. 24 Chabad returned to the courts again to seek relief.' 25 At
first, the request by Chabad to place the menorah in the Capitol Rotunda, in
the form of an amended complaint before the appellate court, was denied per
curiam by a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit. 126 Eventually, the
Eleventh Circuit convened en banc to reverse and granted Chabad's menorah
a place in the Rotunda. 127 The court, in an opinion by the chief judge, con-
cluded that although the state had a compelling interest in distancing itself
from the endorsement of any religion, the allowance of Chabad to display the
menorah in the Rotunda would not necessarily signify that the state is en-
dorsing, and thus establishing, Judaism. 28
Over the years various groups have utilized the open space in the center
of the Capitol Building. 29 The court highlighted various organizations and
programs that have utilized the Rotunda such as the National Organization
for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, two Holocaust commemoration ceremo-
nies, and the previous year's Methodist minister. 30 There have also been
120. Id.
121. Id. The decision by the court was entered on December 11, 1990, the first evening of
Chanukah that year. Chabad Ga. 1, 752 F. Supp. at 1063.
122. See id. at 1068.
123. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller (Chabad Ga. V), 5 F.3d 1383, 1386 (11th
Cir. 1993).
124. Id. at 1386-87.
125. Id. at 1387.
126. Id.; Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller (Chabad Ga. I1), 976 F.2d 1386, 1387 (1 1th
Cir. 1992) (upholding the district court decision).
127. Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1385, 1387; Chabad Ga. II, 976 F.2d 1386, reh'g granted,
(Chabad Ga. 11), 988 F.2d 1563, 1564 (11 th Cir. 1993).
128. Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1385.
129. Id. at 1386.
130. Id.
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unattended displays there, such as an eighteen-foot tall Indian hut that was
exhibited during Indian Heritage Week.'
31
The court focused its discussion on the inability of the state to demon-
strate how the exclusion of Chabad's display from the Rotunda based solely
on the content of the exhibit could withstand the heightened constitutional
analysis of strict scrutiny. 32 More specifically, the court could not "counte-
nance Georgia's exclusion of Chabad's display from the Rotunda unless
Georgia [could] demonstrate that the exclusion [was] 'necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it [was] narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.'' 133 Georgia was unable to do so."
Georgia could not support its claim that it must not permit Chabad to
display the menorah in order to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.
35
The court went one step further to state that if Georgia did have a compelling
state interest in keeping the menorah out of "the Rotunda, total exclusion is
not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."'
' 36
In order to determine that Georgia would not violate the Establishment
Clause, the court utilized the test created in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 37 The test
must be used to determine if Georgia did permit Chabad open-access to the
Rotunda, as it does all of its citizens, 38 would Georgia be violating the Es-
tablishment Clause?139 The Lemon test requires that the state act: 1) with a
secular purpose; 2) with the primary effect neither advancing nor inhibiting
religion; and 3) without fostering excessive entanglement with religion. 4'
Georgia did not argue in depth either the first or the third prong of the
test, but focused its attention on the second prong.'4 ' The court used the
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1387.
133. Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1387 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198
(1992)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1388.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
138. Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1389. The court set out to review under the Lemon test
whether the denial of Chabad's request to display the menorah in the rotunda was consistent
with its neutral open-access policy. Id. The court stated:
As a matter of course, Georgia grants private speakers equal and unimpeded access to the
Rotunda, a designated public forum. Its citizens may come and go, speak and listen, ap-
plaud and condemn, and preach and blaspheme as they please .... In sum, Georgia neu-
trally opens the Rotunda as a public forum available to all speakers, and Chabad seeks to
exercise its constitutional right to speak in that public forum.
Id. at 1388-89.
139. Id. at 1389.
140. Id. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).
141. ChabadGa./V5 F.3d at 1389.
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County of Allegheny v. ACLU decision, in conjunction with Lemon, to de-
termine if the placement of the menorah in the Rotunda would create the
appearance of state endorsement of religious beliefs, as argued by Georgia. 42
The court stated that Georgia was just plain wrong. 4 3 It is Georgia's
stated policy to allow open and equal access to the Rotunda, as a public fo-
rum.'" Any reasonable person would not visit the capitol building, enter the
Rotunda, and, upon seeing either a menorah or a Christmas tree, believe that
Georgia officially endorsed Judaism or Christianity. 14 5 "Precisely because
the religious speech is communicated in a true public forum, however, the
state, by definition, neither endorses nor disapproves of the speech ... but
rather acts in a strictly neutral manner toward, private speech."'' 46
In dicta, the court advised the state not to create a public forum in a
place that citizens would automatically associate with state authority if it
believed the citizens of Georgia would not be able to distinguish the private
speech of some with the state sponsored speech of others.47 If the state was
so concerned with this perception, it should have taken steps to teach the
uninformed and not to silence constitutionally protected speech, such as the
display of Chabad's menorah.148 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that Geor-
gia could allow Chabad a place in the Rotunda to display its fifteen-foot me-
norah during Chanukah and this display would not violate the Establishment
Clause. 141
142. Id. at 1390 (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989)). Alle-
gheny added an endorsement test that may be considered in Establishment cases, but in that
case the courthouse steps were not considered a public forum so it is distinguished from the
facts of Chabad Ga. IV. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597; Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1390-91.
143. See Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1395-96.
144. Id. at 1392.
145. Id. at 1390 n.11.
146. Id. at 1393.
147. Id. at 1393-94.
148. Chabad Ga. IV, 5 F.3d at 1394. The court, seemingly amused, quoted Chabad's
counsel who recited a limerick at oral argument in order to emphasize his point: "It seems to
a young rabbi of Chabad, [t]hat the Constitution is exceedingly odd; [t]o protect all speech in a
public place [o]n AIDS, abortion, or race, [b]ut to prohibit any person's mention of God." Id.
at 1394 n.17.
149. Id. at 1395-96.
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IV. LOTS OF LITIGATION IN THE SUNSHINE STATE
A. Home Is Where the Prayer Is at: Disney World, Universal Studios,
and Chabad
Two additional examples of Chabad-initiated litigation occurred just
south of Georgia, in Florida. 5' In both cases, a local Chabad rabbi lawfully
owned a home in a residential neighborhood; and, in both cases, the rabbi's
neighbors were not pleased with the apparent transformation of the rabbi's
home into a place of meeting and worship.'5' In each of the cases discussed
below, it was not only an individual neighbor that challenged Chabad's right
to hold services or meetings out of their homes, but it was also the city
through a zoning enforcement board or local city commission.'
While in each case various First Amendment arguments were made, as
well as other constitutional arguments, in both cases there also appeared po-
tential claims of antisemitism against the city.'53 In neither case though did
Chabad outwardly claim such motives were involved in denying them the
right to worship in the community of their choosing. 5 4 Antisemitic motives
are not easy to prove, but in both cases there were non-Jewish, particularly
Christian, groups that were allowed to do what the city was arguing Chabad
was not permitted to do.
55
In Sue Fishkoff's book, The Rebbe's Army, she dedicates a whole chap-
ter to the South Florida Jewish community and the growth of Chabad in Flor-
ida.'56 South Florida is described as the second largest Jewish community in
the United States, only after New York City. 57 Not only does Chabad in
150. Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov II), 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1331 (M.D. Fla.
2004), afJd in part, rev'd in part, 410 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005); Amended Complaint
at 1, Hollywood Cmty. Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, No. 04-61212 (S.D. Fla. Nov.
24, 2004) [hereinafter HCS Complaint].
151. Konikov II, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-32; Omnibus Order Denying in Part and Grant-
ing in Part Defendant Sal Oliveri's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (D.E. 17-1); De-
nying Motion to Strike in Part Amended Complaint (D.E. 17-2); Denying as Moot Defendant
Sal Oliveri's Motion for Protective Order (D.E. 29); Denying Defendant Sal Oliveri's Motion
to Strike Plaintiffs Response (D.E. 47) at 2, Hollywood Cmty. Synagogue, Inc. v. City of
Hollywood, No. 04-61212 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2005) [hereinafter HCS Order].
152. Konikov 1I, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1332; HCS Order, supra note 151, at 3.
153. See Konikov 11, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1334-35; HCS Order, supra note 151, at 5.
154. See Konikov 11, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1331; HCS Order, supra note 151, at 1-7.
155. Konikov 11, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1335; HCS Order, supra note 151, at 5-6.
156. See FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 33. In this chapter, Fishkoff's research focuses on
Boca Raton, in Palm Beach County, which has not in fact had any known litigation filed
against Chabad there. Id.
157. Id.
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South Florida make itself seen and heard because of the hard work of each
individual Chabad rabbi, but now attention is also on Chabad because of its
numbers and the sheer masses that are visible in the community. 58 This
growth has led to at least two recent legal actions in the Sunshine State. 5 9
One of the examples of Chabad related litigation can be found in one of
the most tourist friendly cities in the world, Orlando, Florida.160 The court
reminded the parties in Konikov v. Orange County 6' that Orange County is
home to Disney World, Sea World, and Universal Studios, among other
theme parks, but it seems to not have room for Chabad. 62 This suit began in
2001 in a county administrative hearing, and eventually made its way up to
the United States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 63 On June 3, 2005, the
court decided that the district court left some unanswered questions and sent
the case back for a determination of the definition of "religious organization"
under the Orange County Zoning Code."6 The Eleventh Circuit also held
that Chabad did have an action under the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000 as to unequal treatment and with
regard to Due Process. 65 Finally in January 2006, the district court, on re-
mand, concluded that Rabbi Konikov and Chabad of Orlando did have a
right to utilize the residential home as a place of worship.
166
In 2001, Rabbi Konikov began to use a single-family home situated in a
residential neighborhood as a meeting place. 167 While many new neighbors
might bring over apple pie or freshly baked cookies, the rabbi's neighbors
complained of excessive noise and traffic. 168 Even though there are many
examples in the same county of religious groups meeting in a member's
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Konikov II, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328; HCS Order, supra note 151.
160. Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov II1), 410 F.3d 1317, 1319-20 (11 th Cir. 2005).
161. Id. at 1317.
162. Id. at 1319-20.
163. Id. at 1320.
164. Id. at 1330. As of the time of the writing of this paper, the district court has not yet
settled the matter.
165. Konikov lll, 410 F.3d at 1322-25, 1331; see Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
166. Order on Remand at 1, 9-10, Konikov v. Orange County, No. 02-CV-376 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Konikov Order].
167. Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov I1), 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1331-32 (M.D. Fla.
2004).
168. Id. at 1332. One neighbor eagerly testified that a "high traffic business is being run
out of a single-family dwelling." Id. at 1334 (internal quotations omitted). Another explained
his dissatisfaction with Chabad as a neighbor: "I did not buy my house next to a chabad or a
synagogue or anything else. I bought my house in a residential neighborhood four years ago.
And now it's become changed." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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home, in a residential neighborhood, 169 the complaints against Konikov
brought on a full-scale investigation by the Orange County Code Enforce-
ment Division. 7°
This investigation led the Code Enforcement Board to conclude that
Rabbi Konikov "was operating a religious organization from a residential
property without special exception approval and thus was in violation" of a
number of county codes.'7 1 It was at that time that Konikov initiated litiga-
tion against the county and against a number of members of the Code En-
forcement Board personally.7 2
The first two issues before the court were 1.) whether Rabbi Konikov
could have two rabbis testify on his behalf as experts in Hebrew and Yiddish
terms and to testify as to the religious practices and obligations of Hassidim,
and 2.) whether an attorney could testify as an expert on the constitutionality
of the zoning codes as applied in the case. 173 The court held that the attorney
could not testify, but that the rabbi's testimony would offer insight into de-
termining the extent that the county regulations restrict Rabbi Konikov's
ability to observe Judaism. 1 4 This testimony will later be important because
169. Id. at 1335. The pastors at Northland Community Church and Trinity Baptist Church
testified on behalf of Rabbi Konikov that their worshippers meet weekly at individual homes
for prayer and none of their groups have been fined or ticketed by the code enforcement divi-
sion for such activities. Konikov I1, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
170. Id. at 1332.
171. Id. at 1336. No explanation was offered by Rabbi Konikov to the court as to why he
never sought a code provided exception to the zoning regulation. See id.
172. Id.
173. Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov 1), 290 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1316, 1318-19 (M.D.
Fla. 2003).
174. Id. at 1319-20. The Magistrate's decision was confirmed and ordered by the court.
Id. at 1316. Rabbi Immanuel Schochet of Ontario, Canada and Rabbi Eliyahhu Touger of
Jerusalem, Israel were allowed to explain the Chabad movement and the obligatory practices
and rituals that are binding on Hasids, followers of Hasidism. Id. at 1320. Rabbi Touger
explained how Jews commonly meet in their rabbis' homes:
It is longstanding Jewish practice to gather in the homes of Rabbis--either because
they cannot come to the synagogue or as a token of respect-for communal prayer.
And yet no one would consider their private homes anything other than that. For
example in my community in Jerusalem, there is a [minyan] three times a day in the
home of Rav Ovadah Yosef, the former [C]hief Rabbi of Israel. Now although he
lives in an apartment building with 20+ families, no one considers his holding these
prayer services as transforming his home into a synagogue.
Id. at 1319; see also Eliyahu Ashtor, Minyan, in 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 67 (1982) (de-
fining the term "minyan" as a prayer quorum of ten Jews). Rabbi Schochet also concurred
that "communal prayer will not transform the private dwelling into a synagogue" or conse-
crated place. Konikov 1, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
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the rabbi's claim that his home was not a house of worship will cause the
code's definition of "religious institution" to fall short.'75
Rabbi Konikov sued Orange County, Florida and four members of the
county's Code Enforcement Board claiming that the county's enforcement of
its zoning regulations violated his right to practice Judaism. 7 6 In total,
Konikov's complaint contained nine counts, which included a challenge to
the county code based on the Free Exercise Clause of the United States and
Florida Constitutions, as well as various claims under RLUIPA and Florida's
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (FRFRA) of 1998.' 7 There was also a
count of civil conspiracy.'
The Free Exercise claims under both the United States Constitution and
the Florida Constitution were held invalid based on the court's ruling that
"It]he Orange County zoning ordinances comprise a valid system of land use
regulation that does not infringe on Plaintiffs constitutional rights."'7 9 The
court found that Konikov was controlled by Grosz v. City of Miami Beach,80
which dealt with a similar situation in which the court ruled that the zoning
ordinance in question did not violate the plaintiffs free exercise of relig-
ion.181 While Grosz did not involve Chabad, it did involve another Orthodox
Jewish group that was held in violation of city zoning ordinances by holding
religious services in the residence of their rabbi. 8 In Grosz, the court con-
cluded that zoning laws aimed at maintaining the residential quality of a
neighborhood must be enforced "whenever that quality is threatened."'' 83 The
court concluded that the Groszs could find another location nearby with dif-
ferent zoning to hold services and not find their religious observances re-
stricted.'8" In addition to denying Rabbi Konikov's claims based on the
precedent set by Grosz, the court also predicated its denial on the same rea-
sons for which Konikov's RLUIPA claim was denied. 85
175. See Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov 111), 410 F.3d 1317, 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005).
The code defines a "religious institution" as a place "used primarily or exclusively for reli-
gious worship and related religious activities." Id. at 1328 (internal quotations omitted).
176. Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov 11), 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1331, 1336 (M.D.
Fla. 2004).
177. Id. at 1336.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1337.
180. 721 F.2d 729 (llth Cir. 1983).
181. Konikov 11, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1338-40 (citing Grosz, 721 F.2d at 733, 741).
182. Id. at 1338-39 (citing Grosz, 721 F.2d at 731-32).
183. Id. at 1340 (quoting Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739).
184. Id. at 1341 (citing Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739).
185. Id. at 1345.
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While RLUIPA was enacted to broaden religious protection, the court
held that Rabbi Konikov did not show that his religious exercise had been
sufficiently burdened.'8 6 The court also explained that while the county zon-
ing regulations might make religious practice more expensive based on ap-
propriation of suitable facilities for worship, this did not mean that a "sub-
stantial burden" under RLUIPA was manifested. 187 The RFRA claim was
decided similarly in that Konikov did not present evidence as to a substantial
burden in light of the county's compelling interest to maintain the residential
quality of the neighborhood. 188
Rabbi Konikov also charged civil conspiracy against four members of
the Board, arguing that they conspired to violate his religious rights. 9 This
count is understandably a common complaint among Jewish groups that find
themselves in the minority and find their freedom to practice their beliefs
restricted. Whether the limitation is based on antisemitism or not, it is hard
to prove such a claim, and, thus, often left out of complaints. 9° Konikov was
unable to present enough evidence to prove the conspiracy claim.' 9' In all
nine counts, the Middle District of Florida ruled against Rabbi Konikov and
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.'92 The case was then
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.'93
It was the RLUIPA claims of unequal treatment and Due Process viola-
tions that the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded to the Middle Dis-
trict.'94 The court found that the relevant "question [was] whether the land
use regulation or its enforcement treats religious assemblies and institutions
on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies and institutions."'95
The code did not define "religious organization" even though Konikov was
186. Konikov II, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1344. While RLUIPA's whole aim is to prevent un-
reasonable government exclusion of religious groups from a jurisdiction, the court concluded
that the statute's use of the word "unreasonabl[e]" suggests Congress must have intended that
"religious assemblies could be reasonably limited within a jurisdiction." Id. at 1345-46.
187. Id. at 1345.
188. Id. at 1346.
189. Id. at 1357.
190. See Konikov II, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1357. "'An action for civil conspiracy ordinarily
requires proof of an agreement between two or more people to achieve an illegal objective, an
overt act in furtherance of that illegal objective, and a resulting injury to the plaintiff."' Id.
(quoting Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks of Fla., Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 912
( lIth Cir. 1998)).
191. Id. at 1357.
192. Id. at 1358.
193. Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov II1), 410 F.3d 1317 (1lth Cir. 2005).
194. Id. at 1319 n.l.
195. Id. at 1324.
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cited for operating one. 196 The Board based much of their conclusion-that
Konikov operated a religious organization-on the investigation of the Code
Enforcement Division. 97 The court's analysis of the transcript of the Board
hearing showed that the Board's conclusions relied heavily on the weight of
the evidence showing a high frequency of meetings. 9 However, the testi-
mony by the Code Enforcement Officers showed that even they were unclear
as to what constituted high frequency.' 99 The court recognized the contrast
between the violation by Konikov's Chabad, which was cited for a few
weekly meetings, and those meetings which are not considered violations-
such as when the Cub Scouts hold weekly meetings out of homes or even
when friends gathered to watch a sports game a few times a week.2"u There
are no examples of the officers citing those groups.2"' "In other words, a
group meeting with the same frequency as Konikov's would not violate the
Code, so long as religion is not discussed. This is the heart of [the court's]
",202 cutcndiscomfort with the enforcement of this provision. Thus, the court con
cluded that by treating religious assemblies on unequal terms with nonreli-
gious assemblies, an equal terms violation existed.20 3 Because the Code was
not clear on what constitutes a violation, the court also held that there was no
fair notice to those that might be violating the Code.2°
On remand to the Middle District in January 2006, in light of the Elev-
enth Circuit's opinion, District Judge John Antoon II concluded both in favor
of Rabbi Konikov on his RLULPA challenge and his claim that the Code was
unconstitutionally vague. 20 5  The court found that the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion clearly pointed to the Board's violation of RLUIPA and that Orange
County failed to provide any compelling reason for treating Chabad differ-
ently then other religious groups.20 6 The court also held that the Code was
196. Id. at 1330. The court discussed how the Code defined "religious institution," but not
"religious organization," which when given their ordinary and natural meaning, are distinct
from one another. Id. at 1328, 1330.
197. SeeKonikovIII,410F.3dat 1330-31.
198. Id. at 1327.
199. Id. at 1328. Testimony by two of the Code Enforcement Division officers makes
clear that the code is unclear as to what constitutes a violation. Id. While the manager of the
division commented "that even one meeting per week might constitute a violation," another
officer "testified that it would not be a violation for a group to meet with the same frequency
as Konikov if the group had a social or family-related purpose." Id.
200. Konikov II1, 410 F.3d at 1328.
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1329.
204. Id. at 1329-31.
205. Konikov Order, supra note 166, at 1, 9-10.
206. Id. at 3, 6.
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vague as to its definition of "religious organization '20 7 and, therefore, also
vague as to its notice to citizens of what in fact the regulation prohibits. °8
While for now Konikov has won his case, the final celebration will have to
wait until the county decides what move it will make next.2°9
B. Hollywood Is Home to Chabad
Not too far south of Orange County, a similar Chabad lawsuit was initi-
ated in Broward County.21° While in the Orange County case Rabbi Konikov
was up against tough odds because he could have sought an exception to the
zoning code and did not, in this case in Hollywood, Rabbi Korf did apply for
the exception.21'
In Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc., v. City of Hollywood, Cha-
bad is in the midst of litigation to protect its Chabad center from seemingly
biased actions on the part of the City and one particular city commissioner. 2
The Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. (HCS) is a Chabad center lo-
cated in a residential neighborhood of Hollywood. 13
In 1999, Yosef Elul, president of the synagogue, purchased two homes
for the purpose of holding classes on Judaism and to serve as a residence for
the associate rabbi of the synagogue.2"4 At that time, religious services were
also being held there, and it was suggested to the synagogue by the Director
of Planning for the City of Hollywood that they apply for a House of Wor-
ship Special Exception.1 5 In May of 2001, an exception was applied for and
"[t]he Board of Appeal and Adjustments (BAA) granted a six month Special
Exception., 21 6 In September 2001, HCS was granted a one-year exception
and was informed that it was to be reviewed by the Board after the year was
up.2
17
207. Id. at 7.
208. Id. at 8-9.
209. Rich McKay, Rabbi Wins Long Fight for Religious Rights, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan.
24, 2006, at B 1.
210. Telephone Interview with Jason Gordon, Attorney for Chabad, Broad and Cassel in
Fort Lauderdale, Florida (July 19, 2005).
211. Id.
212. See HCS Order, supra note 151, at 1, 3.
213. See id. at 2.
214. HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 8.
215. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 2.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2-3.
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During this time, Chabad members were regularly receiving parking
tickets for parking on the synagogue's property.218 The rabbi witnessed that
only the cars parked on the side of the synagogue's property were ticketed
and not other similarly parked cars across the street or nearby.219 Upon fur-
ther inquiry, the rabbi was told by an officer that he was following the orders
of Commissioner Sal Oliveri. 220 The synagogue administrator also relayed
that a Code Enforcement Officer told him "that the department was under
orders from Commissioner Sal Oliveri and the Mayor to keep an eye on the
Chabad ... and to enforce the code. 2 1
"In September 2002, the Development Review Board... granted... a
six month Temporary Special Exception subject to certain enumerated condi-
tions., 222 The Board explained that the property could be used as a house of
worship and be "compatible with the existing natural environment and other
properties within the vicinity. 223 Commissioner Oliveri filed an appeal to
the Commission.224
Seemingly without a response to Oliveri's September 2002 appeal, in
March 2003 the Board granted the synagogue a Permanent Special Exception
subject to certain conditions being met within six months.225 Commissioner
Oliveri appealed again.226
One month after receiving the Permanent Special Exception, the Com-
mission reversed the decision of the Development Review Board finding that
HCS was "too controversial. 227 Oliveri was recorded as saying, "'it's al-
most common sense and reasonable that the Chabad ... will never fit in Hol-
lywood Hills.' 228
218. See id. at 3.
219. Id.
220. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 3.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 3-4. Five conditions were laid out by the Board: 1) no parking was permitted
in the alley behind the synagogue; 2) a lease agreement for off-site parking must be obtained;
3) City-approved garbage dumpsters were required; 4) they must enter into a property mainte-
nance agreement with a provider who will keep the property in compliance with the city code;
and 5) they must create an approved buffer along the rear side of the residences. Id. at 4 n. 1.
223. Id. at 4.
224. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 4. HCS also claims that "Oliveri was permitted to
vote on his own appeal and cast the deciding vote... [which was] against" Commission pro-
cedure. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
228. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 5.
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By July of 2004, Commissioner Oliveri was asking the Commission
"'to evict' HCS.229 He even went so far as to say in support of eviction,
"'[w]e're talking about neighborhoods here. We're talking about neighbor-
hoods having a smell.' ' 230 Later that month, the city filed suit in Broward
County Circuit Court against HCS for operating as a house of worship with-
out a Special Exception.23 1
HCS offered as evidence of unfair treatment that there were at least
twelve houses of worship in residential neighborhoods in Hollywood Hills.
232
In one home only blocks away from HCS is a residence operating as a shrine
to the Virgin Mary. 233 Even though numerous complaints have been made
about the traffic, noise and garbage associated with the activities there, no
Special Exception has been requested or granted.23 When Oliveri was asked
by synagogue members as to why the shrine was not required to obtain an
exception, he is alleged to have shrugged them off claiming the shrine did
not need an exception because it was a miracle.235
HCS filed a complaint in federal court in response to the state court
complaint by the city.236 The amended complaint by HCS had a total of fif-
teen counts, levied against the city and Oliveri, individually.237 Most of the
claims centered around HCS's First Amendment rights (freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, and freedom of assembly) being taken away by the de-
nial of the Special Exception, as well as various similar claims under
RLUIPA and FRFRA. 238 The First Amendment claims are similar to those
made by Rabbi Konikov in Konikov v. Orange County.239
229. Id.
230. Id. at 5, 22. In a footnote to the court's order, Judge Lenard adds that "Oliveri subse-
quently stated that his comment was an effort to compare his efforts to protect his single fam-
ily neighborhood with the City of Hollywood's efforts to protect the Hollywood Lakes section
from a smelly waste treatment facility." Id. at 5 n.5.
231. Id. at 5.
232. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 5.
233. Id. at 6. Rosa Lopez, who owns the home, has hosted as many as 4000 people. Id.
She also operates a gift shop on the premises. Id.
234. See id.
235. See HCS Order, supra note 151, at 6. Oliveri is alleged to have replied: "[T]he Vir-
gin Mary visits that particular home .... If you people know anything about the Catholic
religion, that's called a vision. To Christians and Catholics, that is considered a miracle.
That's not establishing a house of worship. That is a miracle." Id. (omission in original).
236. See HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 1, 16.
237. Id. at 17-33. At the time of the writing of this paper there was only one order issued
by the court. See HCS Order, supra note 151.
238. See HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 22-26.
239. See Konikov v. Orange County (Konikov 11), 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2004),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 410 F.3d 1317 (11 th Cir. 2005).
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One of the counts that HCS charged was that the its right to Substantive
Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated.24° This charge
was based on the Commission's reversal of the Board's decision to grant the
Permanent Special Exception.24 HCS claimed the Commissions' reversal
had nothing to do with "public health, safety, welfare or morals., 242 This
claim was substantiated by the fact that HCS had not created a greater prob-
lem than the other twelve houses of worship in the neighborhood and the
shrine a few blocks away.243 Also, distinct from Konikov, HCS applied for
the exception and at least temporarily received it.24  HCS could therefore
claim a property interest in the grant of the exception and an injury based on
its expenditures for relying on that grant in good faith.245 HCS claimed this
property right is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 246
Some of the actions described by HCS as violating its rights are charged
against Oliveri specifically.247 In count three of the complaint, HCS claims
that he abused his power and authority as a commissioner.2" By ordering
law enforcement to focus their attention on HCS and to only ticket syna-
gogue members' cars, HCS argued that "Oliveri acted under color of law" to
249harass HCS's congregants. The synagogue did not claim, for example,
that cars parked on the side of the road cannot be ticketed according to the
city's parking code, but rather that under the direction of Oliveri there had
been selective enforcement of this code.250 Thus, HCS claimed that Oliveri
has denied its members rights guaranteed by the Constitution.25'
Making the accusations against Oliveri is one thing, but it is much more
difficult to bring Oliveri into court. While no decisions have been reached
by the court on the merits of HCS's claims, HCS did overcome a high hurdle
in just being able to sue Oliveri individually. Since Oliveri is a city commis-
sioner, generally, his status as a government official would entitle him to
240. HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 29.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 8-9.
245. HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 29.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 20-21, 27.
248. Id. at 20. Oliveri succeeded in having this claim dismissed based on HCS's lack of
proof "that it was arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of its property right in a Permanent
Special Exception." HCS Order, supra note 151, at 33. The court held that there is no fun-
damental right in the Constitution to a Permanent Special Exception. Id.
249. HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 21.
250. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 20.
251. HCS Complaint, supra note 150, at 21.
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qualified immunity.252 This defense was argued by Oliveri in his motion to
dismiss the case.253
Qualified immunity is meant to free the hands of government officials,
individually, who are acting in the legal capacity of their office and to pre-
vent them from constantly defending frivolous lawsuits.254 The caveat to this
type of immunity is that if an official knowingly violates long held "statutory
or constitutional right[s] of which a reasonable person would have known,"
then such immunity cannot serve as a defense.255 The court stated that it does
not shield "'the plainly incompetent and those who knowingly violated the
law."'9
256
In determining whether Oliveri was shielded by qualified immunity
from the charges levied by HCS, the court had to first determine if the com-
missioner "was acting within the scope of his . . . authority when the alleg-
edly unconstitutional acts [claimed by HCS] took place. 257  The court
looked at the accusation that he abused his power by instructing law en-
forcement personnel to ticket HCS cars parked on the side of road.258 In this
example, the court found that it was his job to ensure that the city's code was
being upheld. 9 Since it was within his power to instruct law enforcement to
make sure that residents abided by parking regulations, Oliveri did act within
his job.26 Once Oliveri proved this, the burden shifted to HCS to show that
qualified immunity does not apply.2 6'
At first, the court noted that when looking at Oliveri's activities gener-
ally, they appeared to fall within the discretion of his job as commissioner
(e.g., working with code inspectors and police on upholding parking regula-
tions in the community).262 But after its analysis, the court changed its view
based on HCS's claims of selective enforcement of the law in order to harass
synagogue members and disrupt and discourage HCS's activities.263 The
court stated that the testimony regarding the selective enforcement of parking
and the comments regarding the shrine indicated "a nexus linking Oliveri,
the harassment of the synagogue by city personnel, and the discouragement
252. See Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1081 (11 th Cir. 2004).
253. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 16.
254. Williams v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11 th Cir. 2003).
255. Ray, 370 F.3d at 1081.
256. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 16 (quoting Ray, 370 F.3d at 1082).
257. Id. (citing Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1314 (1 th Cir. 2003)).
258. Id. at 20.
259. Id. at 19.
260. Id.
261. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 19-20.
262. Id. at 19.
263. Id. at 20-22.
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of the Chabad from continuing its religious activities in the Hollywood Hills
neighborhood."' Those facts were also "sufficient to state a prima facie
case of selective enforcement. '265 The court ruled that if the amended com-
plaint was "taken as true and if all reasonable inferences therefrom are con-
sidered in the light most favorable" to HCS, then "a reasonable person could
find that Defendant Oliveri targeted the Synagogue and its members for the
purpose of discouraging them from joining together to practice their faith. ' 26
The court found that all of the facts taken together as presented by HCS and
the allegation that the inspections and citations happened over a long period
of time were enough to establish that Oliveri's behavior and orders fell out-
side the permitted range of conduct for a commissioner. 267
The facts presented by HCS have so far been enough to overcome Oliv-
eri's motion to dismiss, but the judge has warned HCS that more evidence
will be needed to substantiate the facts presented to overcome Oliveri's
qualified immunity defense on a likely forthcoming motion for summary
judgment. 68 While the conclusions by the court are merely reflective of
HCS's right to go forward with their claims of constitutional violations, it is
a significant step in moving forward against Oliveri. Unless some compro-
mise is met, there is likely still a long way to go before the Chabad members
of the Hollywood Community Synagogue are out of the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Chabad's goal or mission when it comes to outreach is to be seen and to
be heard.269 Chabad emissaries are driven by the Rebbe's message of spread-
ing Judaism to those who want to embrace it.27° Sometimes, though, the
264. Id. at 23.
265. Id. at 25. Oliveri argued that he could not have targeted Chabad for selective en-
forcement, since Temple Sinai and Temple Solel, which operated near HCS, were similarly
situated (meaning both were Jewish houses of worship) and there were no allegations against
Oliveri from those synagogues. HCS Order, supra note 151, at 28. The court seemed to think
Oliveri's argument was misguided and responded accordingly:
This line of argument appears to assume that the improper or discriminatory motive
underlying Oliveri's alleged acts is anti-Semitism, and then argues that anti-
Semitism has not been shown since there is no allegation of selective enforcement
against Temple Sinai of Hollywood and Temple Solel. The Court notes however
that Chabad, unlike Temple Sinai of Hollywood or Temple Solel, was described in
Commission hearings as "too controversial."
Id. at 28-29.
266. Id. at 21.
267. Id. at 31.
268. Id. at 31-32.
269. FISHKOFF, supra note 3, at 11-12.
270. Id.
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message is perceived as too loud by those who are not interested. Many have
resorted to the court system to silence Chabad. As the litigation headlining
Chabad around the country has shown, it is not very difficult today to bring a
lawsuit, nor to defend one. In Chabad's case, there are plenty of attorneys
who are willing to take on the case pro bono. Chabad members have also not
hesitated to initiate litigation when they felt their rights were being con-
strained. While the litigation might be time consuming, it has also helped
garner attention to Chabad and the attention often helps Chabad fundraise.
While clearly Chabad rabbis and members are not seeking to be sued,
nor do they want to be forced into court to be able to display a religious
symbol or to hold services out of their home, such things have become regu-
lar occurrences in the past two decades. This situation may be partly due to
the ever-growing ease of bringing a lawsuit, or it may be due to the growth
of Chabad. Whichever way, it does not appear that there is an end in sight
for either.
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